conquered the abandoned royal residences and plundered the treasuries. Still hoping to rebuild his army, he was assassinated in 330 when his own generals and courtiers conspired against him. For Alexander, the alleged panhellenic mission was accomplished: The conflict, however, went on, triggered by the acclamation of the Bactrian satrap Bessus, probably an Achaemenid adopting the throne name of Artaxerxes V in 330, and by fierce resistance in Bactria and Sogdiana to the Macedonians (329–328). The invaders conquered the eastern parts of the Achaemenid Empire to the river of Hyphasis in India and made their way back. Yet the Indian lands informally connected with the Achaemenid house before could not be ruled directly. Macedonian control faded away as soon as the army left. When Alexander died in Babylon in the summer of 323, his swiftly conquered empire was susceptible to unrest.46
In order to cooperate with the indigenous leading circles, Alexander adopted the Achaemenid system of administration, plus elements of court etiquette and royal representation, and integrated indigenous nobles into his court and soldiers into his army. This political continuity was, however, an illusion meant to legitimize the new monarch. Persian rule had been ended—by the army of a descendant of a former Persian hyparchos.
Notes
1 1 In fact, there was a gap between the actual Greek knowledge and attitude concerning the Persian Empire and its stereotypical depiction in political discourse and literature (Madreiter 2012, 180–184).
2 2 Van de Mieroop 2007, 287.
3 3 Imipious Persians: Briant 1996, 531–533. Countless, too: Hdt. 7.61–99; Aesch. Pers. 12, 56–57, 61, 929–930. Brave Greeks: Bridges 2015.
4 4 Graf 1984a, 15.
5 5 Hdt. 7.138; Thuc. 1.18.1–2; Aesch. Pers. 234.
6 6 Hdt. 5.73 with Zahrnt 1992, 256–257; Ruberto 2010, 4, 24.
7 7 Hdt. 5.30, 49–51; cf. Evans 1976 and Manville 1977. Discontent: Chapman 1972; Badian 2004.
8 8 Müller 2017, 76–77.
9 9 Tozzi 1978, 161; Zahrnt 1992, 259.
10 10 Walser 1987, 165.
11 11 Cf. Thuc. 1.73.4; 2.34.5; Aeschin. 3.181.
12 12 Wiesehöfer 2013, 281.
13 13 Heinrichs and Müller 2008, 288; Heinrichs 2017, 88–93.)
14 14 ML no. 27.
15 15 Hdt. 7.143.3, with Heinrichs 2017, 91–3; Hdt. 7.205.2–220.4.
16 16 Arr. Anab. 3.16.7–8; 7.19.1–2 with Müller 2016a, 173–187.
17 17 Cf. Aeschin. 2.172; 3.181; Lyc. Leocr. 70, 73.
18 18 Balcer 1984, 281.
19 19 Thus, Alexander I of Macedon seems to have had an arrangement with Cimon regarding his expansion into parts of Bisaltia in about 477/476 (Heinrichs 2017, 79 n.1). Later on, in the late 460s, when Cimon was tried in Athens, his opponents also relied on his activities in the past, accusing him of having been bribed by Alexander (Plut. Cim. 14.3). For Argead Macedon, obviously, the trouble did not start with the Persian presence in northern Greece but with the Athenians as the new dominating force posing a constant threat to Argead autonomy, policy, and freedom of action under Perdiccas II who found his realm surrounded by Athenian foundations, allies, and members of the Athenian Naval Confederacy (Müller 2017, 125–224).
20 20 Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. Cim. 14.1.
21 21 Heinrichs 1989, 85.
22 22 Cf. Kurt Raaflaub, “with few exceptions, the entire range of the Athenian instruments of empire was derived from Persian models” 2009, 97.
23 23 Isoc. Pan. 117–118; Plut. Cim. 13.4–5.
24 24 Invented: Rhodes 2006, 185. Informal: Heinrichs, loc. cit.
25 25 Xen. Hell. 2.1.27–28; Diod. Sic. 13.105–106.
26 26 Welwei 2006, 535–536.
27 27 Xen. Ages. 1.6–7; Hell. 3.4.1, 5; Nep. Ages. 2.1–2.
28 28 Nep. Ages. 3.1–2; Hell. Oxy. 14.1–16.2; 24.1–25.4.
29 29 McKechnie and Kern 1988, 181.
30 30 Satrapal coins bearing the legend and showing his portrait on the obverse, support the view that the naval campaign was financed by Persia.
31 31 Xen. Hell. 5.1.35–36; Diod. Sic. 14.110.3; cf. Cawkwell 1981a. Koine Eirene: Jehne 1994.
32 32 Dem. 15.3; Diod. Sic. 16.21.1–4 with Cawkwell 1981b, 52–55; Rhodes and Osborne no. 22.
33 33 Anab. 2.14.1–2 with Olbrycht 2010c, 350. Arrian, however, problematically refers to a letter written by Darius III to Alexander. Its authenticity is uncertain. But the historical kernel, namely the alliance, might have been trustworthy.
34 34 Wirth 1985, 148–150; Worthington 2008, 170; Müller 2010, 179.
35 35 Plut. Alex. 10.1–3, Ruzicka 2010, 4–11.
36 36 Arr. Anab. 1.23.6–8; Strab. 14.2.17; cf. Ruzicka 1992, 136–139.
37 37 Heckel 2006, 162; Panovski and Sarakinski 2011, 8.
38 38 Revolts: Aesch. 3.239; Din. 1.10; Hyp. 5.17; Diod. Sic. 17.7.2. Demosthenes: Wirth 1999, 75.
39 39 Philip: Flower 2000; Squillace 2010. The generals: Heckel 2016a, 53–55.
40 40 Ashley 1998, 91. The fleet disbanded: Diod. Sic. 17.22.5; Arr. Anab. 2.20.1. Revived: Curt. 3.1.19; Arr. Anab. 3.2.6.
41 41 Heckel and McLeod 2015, 260.
42 42 Heckel 2006, 65; the citiation, Ruzicka 1988, 134.
43 43 The citation, Ruzicka 1988, 144. Levantine events: Ruzicka 2012, 206.
44 44 Scythians: Diod. Sic. 17.59.5, 8; Curt. 4.14.3, 15.14, 15.18; Arr. Anab. 3.8.3, 11.5–6, 13.2, 13.4. Indians: Diod. Sic. 17.59.4; Arr. Anab. 3.8.3, 8.6, 11.5–6, 15.1.
45 45 Heckel 2017a.
46 46 Bessus: Jacobs 1992. India: Bosworth 2003.
CHAPTER 3 Internal Wars from the “First Peloponnesian War” to Chaeronea
Frances Pownall
Introduction
Although the Persian invasions galvanized many of the Greek city-states in uniting, this new-found harmony was short-lived and shortly afterward the Greeks reverted to their traditional state of perennial internecine warfare, with one important difference—the stakes were now much higher. Instead of relatively small-scale campaigns where citizen armies challenged their neighbors for control of scarce agricultural land (particularly in border territories) in a single pitched infantry battle,1 the Greek world was now divided into two competing spheres of influence, ensuring that henceforth internal wars were to become lengthy large-scale campaigns.
