in return for the overthrow of the democracy. Mistrusted also by the leaders of the successful but short-lived oligarchic coup d’état,29 ironically Alcibiades was recalled by the Athenian democracy, now embodied in the fleet at Samos, which immediately elected him general (Thuc. 8.81–82.1). Under Alcibiades’ leadership, the Athenian fleet handily won a number of sea battles, as described by Xenophon in the first book of his Hellenica (Thucydides’ narrative ends with the Athenian victory at Cynossema in 411), and the success of the navy provoked the restoration of the Athenian democracy. Alcibiades’ string of successes ran out, however, with the defeat of his second-in-command at Notium in 406 (Xen. Hell. 1.5.10–14), and he failed to be re-elected general (Xen. Hell. 1.5.16–17). Even without Alcibiades, the Athenians were victorious over the Spartan fleet at a battle in the Arginusae Islands between the island of Lesbos and the coast of Asia Minor (Xen. Hell. 1.6.24–34), but the aftermath of the victory left a tragic stain on the reputation of the Athenian democracy, for the commanders were put on trial in Athens for failing to recover the shipwrecked sailors (having been prevented by a storm) and were condemned to death (Xen. Hell. 1.7.1–35). The Spartan nauarch Lysander, whose friendship with the Persian prince Cyrus enabled him to strengthen the Spartan fleet with Persian subsidies, attacked the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami unprepared (in spite of the advice of Alcibiades, in his final appearance before his mysterious assassination) and was easily victorious in the last battle of the Peloponnesian War in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.1.22–32). Thereupon Lysander blockaded the Piraeus and starved the Athenians into surrender in 404. The Athenians had no choice but to tear down their Long Walls and the Piraeus fortification walls, surrender all of their ships except 12, relinquish their overseas possessions, accept back their (mostly oligarchic) exiles, and acknowledge Spartan hegemony.30 So ended the Peloponnesian War, with the Athenian exiles demolishing the walls of Athens to the music of pipe girls, “believing that this day was the beginning of freedom for Greece” (Xen. Hell. 2.2.23).
The Corinthian War (395–387/386)
The generation-long Peloponnesian War resulted in the collapse of the polarization between Athens and Sparta and left a lasting legacy on Greece.31 The optimism that the defeat of Athens would bring freedom to the Greeks was demonstrated almost immediately to be illusory, as the insular Spartans proved utterly incapable of managing an empire beyond the Peloponnese and the brutality of their rule soon made them even more unpopular than the Athenians.32 Furthermore, the Spartans’ failure to destroy Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War left their allies restless and unsatisfied (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19–20). Thebes, Megara, Argos, and Corinth immediately defied the Spartans by receiving exiles from the Spartan-backed government of the Thirty in Athens,33 and the Boeotians and Corinthians refused to participate in the Spartan attempt to dislodge the Athenian democratic forces from the Piraeus (Xen. Hell. 2.4.30; cf. 3.5.5). Shared animosity to Sparta soon resulted in a rapprochement between Thebes, Corinth, and Athens, whose individual goals (respectively the hegemony of Boeotia, greater independence in the Peloponnese, and restoration of their sea empire) would all be furthered by challenging Spartan imperialism.34 It was not until the Persians intervened directly by offering financial support for this anti-Spartan coalition (now joined by Argos) to foment war against Sparta in Greece (thereby forcing the Spartans to withdraw their forces from Asia Minor, where they were trying to liberate the Greek cities),35 that the outbreak of the Corinthian War occurred.
The war began in 395 with a dispute engineered by the Thebans between Phocis and Locris, both of whom appealed to their allies. Lysander advanced to Haliartus in Boeotia, hoping that victory there would bring a speedy end to the conflict, but was defeated and killed before Pausanias could arrive with reinforcements.36 The following year saw two large-scale hoplite battles at the Nemea River near Corinth (before the return of Agesilaus from Asia Minor) and Coronea in Boeotia (after his return).37 Sparta’s failure to gain a decisive victory resulted in a stalemate marked by ongoing conflict around Corinth for control of the isthmus. The Spartans were frustrated also in their attempts to end the war through diplomacy,38 and it was only when the Persians became alarmed by Athens’ growing naval resurgence and renewed control of the Aegean that peace was signed in 387/386.
Spartan Imperialism (387/386–371)
The King’s Peace was negotiated with the Persians by the Spartan nauarch Antalcidas. In exchange for signing over the Greeks of Asia Minor to Persia, the Spartans were given a free hand within Greece (Isoc. 4.127), and the autonomy clause at one stroke dashed the hegemonial aspirations of Thebes over Boeotia, Athens’ hopes to establish a new maritime empire, and the political union of Corinth and Argos, forcing Corinth to return to the fold of the Peloponnesian League.39 The Spartans used the authority conferred upon them to enforce the terms of the treaty to punish the Arcadian city of Mantinea for evincing insufficient loyalty during the Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 5.2.1–7), and then to suppress the increasingly powerful Chalcidian League, led by the city of Olynthus (Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–24, 37–43, 3.1–9, 18–20, 26). Even more egregiously, in 382 the Spartans occupied the Theban acropolis, garrisoned the city, and imposed a pro-Spartan government (Xen. Hell. 5.2.25–36), a blatant violation of the autonomy clause.
This act of hybris (cf. Xen. Hell. 5.4.1) marked the climax of Spartan power and matters rapidly went downhill for them afterward. The first nail in their coffin was the recapture of the Theban acropolis by a group of exiles who had taken refuge in Athens; they assassinated the pro-Spartan rulers and forced the Spartan garrison to withdraw.40 Successive Spartan military incursions into Boeotia were limited and unsuccessful, and the attempted raid on Attica by the Spartan harmost Sphodrias succeeded only in exacerbating tensions with Athens.41 The Thebans re-established the Boeotian League and the Athenians founded a second Athenian naval confederacy, of which the Thebans were founding members. Mutual antipathy for Sparta did not make easy bedfellows, however, and the Athenians became increasingly nervous of the rapid growth of Theban power, particularly after Pelopidas’ reorganization of the Theban army around a core unit of elite warriors, the Sacred Band, led to the unexpected defeat of a larger force of Spartans at the Battle of Tegyra in 375 (Diod. Sic. 15.37; cf. 15.81.2; Plut. Pel. 16). Tensions culminated in renewed peace negotiations in 375, but the peace was short-lived thanks to continuing conflict between Sparta and Athens, as well as aggressive Theban expansion, including the destruction of Athens’ loyal ally Plataea (Isoc. 13; Paus. 9.1.8; cf. Xen. Hell. 6.3.1). In 371, both Sparta and Athens agreed to put aside their differences, and hammered out a peace agreement, which the Thebans refused to sign when the Spartans would not recognize their hegemony over Boeotia (Xen. Hell. 6.3.18–20; Diod. Sic. 15.50.4). Resolving to force the Thebans to comply with the terms of the peace, the Spartans sent an army into Boeotia, which engaged with the deepened Theban phalanx at Leuctra. Unable to cope with novel military strategy, the Spartans were severely defeated and the battle ended Sparta’s traditional hegemony of Greece.42
The Theban Hegemony (371–362)
After their decisive victory at Leuctra, the Thebans immediately struck at Spartan control of the Peloponnese with a series of successful invasions, in the course of which the Spartans witnessed their own territory devastated for the first time (Xen. Hell. 6.5.24–32; Diod. Sic.15.64–65). Worse yet, the Thebans permanently liberated Messenia (Diod. Sic. 15. 66.1; Paus. 4.27), not only putting an end to centuries of Spartan domination but also crippling Spartan infrastructure. Although the Thebans also intervened in both central and northern Greece, they did not impose direct control on their allies outside of Boeotia,43 which led to constant shifting of alliances and jockeying for position among previously subordinate states, particularly in the Peloponnese. This Peloponnesian infighting culminated at the Battle of Mantinea in 362, when despite the expectation that the battle would determine the leadership of Greece, the death of the Theban leader Epameinondas led to a stalemate, and “there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece than there
