Thucydides ends his Pentekontaetia here, because “Samos was the last big violation of autonomy which Athens was to get away with”.20 20 Thuc. 1.44.2; cf. the careful financial preparations laid out in the Callias decrees, ML no. 58.
21 21 On Thucydides’ downplaying of the grievances of Aegina and Megara, see Hornblower 2011, 112–114.
22 22 On the war strategy on both sides, see Rhodes 2010, 101–106 and Hornblower 2011, 157–160.
23 23 For the reaction of the other Greeks to the surrender of the Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria, see Thuc. 4.40.
24 24 Thuc. 4.75–76; cf. Buck 1994, 16–18.
25 25 Thuc. 4.89–101.2 with Lendon 2005, 78–90.
26 26 So Lewis 1992b, 432 and Hornblower 2011, 164–165.
27 27 Thuc. 6.27–29; on the atmosphere in Athens, see Rubel 2000, 178–232 and Rhodes 2010, 166–168.
28 28 For a useful summary of the Athenian weaknesses that ultimately crippled the Sicilian expedition, see Hornblower 2011, 174–178.
29 29 On the oligarchic revolution of 411, see Rhodes 2010, 168–175 and Hornblower 2011, 178–187.
30 30 Xen. Hell. 2.2.19; Andoc. 1.80, 3.11–12; Diod. Sic. 13.107.4; Plut. Lys. 14.8.
31 31 On the effects of the Peloponnesian War, see Hornblower 2011, 190–216; cf. Welwei 2006, 535–537.
32 32 On the challenges facing Sparta in 404, see Buckler 2003, 1–3.
33 33 Xen. Hell. 2.4.1; Aeschin. 2.147–148; Diod. Sic. 14.6.2–3; cf. Buckler 2003, 5–8.
34 34 Corsi and Bernardini 2008, 33.
35 35 Xen. Hell. 3.5.2–12 (who patriotically denies that the Athenians accepted Persian gold); Hell. Oxy. 10.2; Paus. 3.9.8; Polyaenus Strat. 1.48.3.
36 36 Xen. Hell. 3.5.17–25; cf. Buckler 2003, 79–83.
37 37 Xen. Hell. 4.2.18–23 and 4.3.15–20; cf. Buckler 2003, 85–95.
38 38 On the failed peace agreements of the late 390s, see Buckler 2003, 139–152 and Rhodes 2010, 227–228.
39 39 On the King’s Peace, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.31 and 36; Diod. Sic. 14.110.2–4; cf. Badian 1991 and Buckler 2003, 166–180.
40 40 Xen. Hell. 5.4.1–12; Diod. Sic. 15.25; Buck 1994, 71–87.
41 41 On this puzzling episode, see Xen. Hell. 5.4.20–24, with Buckler 2003, 220–225 and Buckler and Beck 2008, 79–84.
42 42 Xen. Hell. 6.4.1–15; Diod. Sic. 15; cf. Buckler 2003, 289–293.
43 43 Buckler 2003, 298–299 and LaForse 2006, 544–546.
44 44 On Philip’s exploitation of his role in the Sacred War, see Buckler 1989 and Pownall 1998.
45 45 Buckler 2003, 467–477.
46 46 Dem. 18.87–94; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 292; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 162; Diod. Sic. 15.74.2–77.3; Plut. Phoc. 14.
47 47 On the so-called Fourth Sacred War, see Pownall 1998, 53–54.
48 48 Dem. 18.169–179; Aeschin. 3.14041; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 56a; Diod. Sic. 16.84; Plut. Dem. 18.
CHAPTER 4 Hellenistic Land Warfare
Edward M. Anson
Usually seen as beginning with the conquests of Alexander the Great, Hellenistic warfare in terms of armament and tactics actually began with the innovations of the conqueror’s father, Philip II. He brought changes to land warfare that were to dominate until supplanted by the Roman legions in the second century. Siegecraft, which prior to Philip barely existed in the Hellenic world, also became a serious component of warfare during the reign of that monarch and especially in that of his son. Hellenistic naval warfare might be seen as beginning with the Carthaginians and the creation of the quadrireme, as claimed by Aristotle (Pliny NH 7. 207), or perhaps with Alexander in his siege of Tyre (Curt. 4.3.14), bringing to a close the centuries of domination of the trireme. But it is in infantry warfare that Philip’s and Alexander’s contributions are most noted. Philip introduced a whole new heavy infantryman equipped with a pike instead of the stabbing spear that had dominated land warfare in the Western world for more than two centuries. Along with his son Alexander, he enhanced what is today commonly called “Combined Arms,” the integration of differently equipped military units, into a complementary force. Where, prior to these commanders, it was the heavy infantry that principally fought with light-armed troops most often engaging one another as skirmishers and cavalry either to defend the vulnerable flanks of these heavy infantry units or to hunt down fleeing infantrymen. The two Macedonian kings and especially the latter coordinated many different arms representing the flower of land forces both from the Greek world and, with Alexander, that of Asia. After Alexander’s death, changes emerged over time that diminished the skillful use of combined arms. Much of this was due not so much to deliberate changes in tactics but to the political changes that saw the breakup of Alexander’s empire and the emergence of a number of competing states.
Philip II
To understand the dramatic change in warfare, and in civilization itself, it is necessary to begin with those reforms initiated by Philip II. He transformed warfare by making the most of the resources available to him and saving Macedon from what might have been its extinction as a political entity. His accession to the throne in 359 came on the death of his brother, the former king, on a battlefield along with 4,000 Macedonian troops. Not the most auspicious of beginnings. The Illyrian victors from the northwest part of the Greek peninsula were now encamped in Macedon with much of the northern and western areas of the country either occupied or allied with the invaders. In a little more than two decades, Philip brought Macedon from seeming ruin to the most powerful state in the eastern Mediterranean. Much of this transformation resulted from his revolutionizing the instruments of war.
Prior to Philip, Macedon had been a land ruled ostensibly by an autocrat whose theoretical powers included control of foreign policy, the military, the state religion, and natural and human resources. In reality these powers were much curtailed. Most of the highland regions—Upper Macedonia—were under the control of local aristocratic families who paid only occasional lip service to the authority of the lowland king, and at Philip’s accession to the throne, these were either allied with or subjects of the Illyrians. Even in the lowland plain, powerful aristocrats controlled the localities. The king had no true bureaucracy, but relied on these aristocrats to perform many of the functions of government. They were his military commanders and his administrators. They also made up the Macedonian cavalry, which was the best in the Western world. These aristocrats were the king’s Hetairoi, his companions. With these individuals the king enjoyed a close personal relationship and shared his leisure activities. This relationship with the aristocracy was one that reminds many modern historians of the society described in Homer’s Iliad.1 While the Macedonian cavalry was a force to be reckoned with, unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Macedonian infantry, which was lightly armed, ill trained, and mostly under the control of their aristocratic officers, who were also their civilian overlords. The vast majority of the population were either tenant farmers or dependent pastoralists bound to some local aristocrat.2 This situation was quite different from that
