their forces and prepared to renew the struggle. By midnight the two armies, after many attempts to outflank one another, formed into line about 3.5 miles from the site of the previous battle. By now, however, both armies were too exhausted to continue. In the battle Antigonus’ forces suffered the loss of 3,700 infantry and 54 cavalry, with 4,000 wounded. Eumenes’ troops lost 540 infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900. (These may be heavy infantry losses only, Diod. Sic. 19.30–31.) While Antigonus had lost more troops, the battle had ended in a stalemate. Subsequently, in the Battle of Gabene, Antigonus was able to effect the capture of Eumenes and thus end the Second War of the Successors. This victory was the result of a cavalry victory of sorts. During the actual battle part of Antigonus’ light cavalry had captured Eumenes’ camp, putting them in possession of the wives and possessions of the Argyraspids in particular. These troops, even though the result of the battle had been remarkably similar to that at Paraetacene, surrendered themselves and Eumenes to Antigonus (Diod. Sic. 19.43.8–9).
In time, cavalry diminished in importance and phalanxes increasingly became almost exclusively sarissa bearers, with pikes reaching as much as 24 feet in length (Polyaen. Strat. 2.29.2). These phalanxes were protected on the flanks by light-armed infantry and/or cavalry, whom they supplanted as the decisive component of the army. The lengthening of the pikes made this unit more invulnerable to a frontal attack, but even less maneuverable. Polybius describes the opposing phalanxes at Sellasia in 222 (2.65.1–7) and again at Mantinea in 207 (11.15.6, 16.1) as primarily armed with pikes. At Sellasia there were 14,000 sarissa carriers of whom 10,000 were Macedonian (Polyb. 2.65).32 In these battles many of the light infantry were armed, however, more heavily than the usual light-armed troops. These carried large oval shields and weaponry that varied from long thrusting spears to javelins. Troops so armed were known as Thureophoroi. If these troops were more heavily armored still, with a breastplate, they were called Thorakitai. While distinguishable from other light-armed soldiers, they were none the less to be included in their number. While Alexander the Great’s Hypaspists often accompanied light-armed troops, they also served regularly in the phalanx. The Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai appear not to be associated with the latter. They seem to have been a lighter version of traditional hoplites. In his description of the army of Antiochus III in 209, Polybius includes both the Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai with the light-armed troops (Polyb. 10.29.4–6). This distinction is also made in a battle near the Arcadian city of Caphyae in 219 at the beginning of the Social War. In this battle these troops were initially stationed on the wings, perhaps serving here as Philip’s and Alexander’s hoplite units did to protect the flanks of the phalanx (Polyb. 4.12.3, 12). However, unlike the Hypaspists, they clearly do not move in any type of formation (Plut. Phil. 9.1–2; Polyb. 4.12.7; Plut. Cras. 25.7).
Nowhere are these changes from the legacy of Philip and Alexander more apparent than in the decline in the quality of cavalry. This change in Hellenistic warfare was due to a combination of factors. One such factor was an effect of Philip’s initial reforms, which changed the dynamic of Macedonian society. His creation of a landed peasant class who peopled his infantry and his centralizing of power in royal authority both diminished the esprit de corps of the aristocratic class, not to mention their role as highly skilled mounted warriors. Alexander’s conquests only accelerated this process. While Alexander crossed to Asia with a ratio of infantry to cavalry of 6:1, the later Hellenistic period seldom saw a ratio of 10:1, and often even higher. In one of the few battles in the third century where cavalry played a significant role, Sellasia, this ratio in the victorious Antigonid army was still 23:1 (Polyb. 2.65.5; Liv. 34.28). Moreover, this was mostly light cavalry. The reduction in the numbers of heavy cavalry was even more dramatic in the Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia and northeast Africa. In Asia there was little tradition of heavy cavalry and in Egypt not much tradition of cavalry at all, apart from chariots. It apparently was not until the campaigns in central Asia of the Seleucid King Antiochus III that the Parthian “cataphracts” were introduced into Hellenistic warfare, but generally only served in the eastern Hellenistic armies. Whereas Philip and Alexander’s heavy cavalry, the Companions, wore armor and carried lances, with cataphracts, horse and rider were virtually encased in armor similar to that of Medieval knights (Liv. 35.48.3).33 However, even with these troops, cavalry in the Hellenistic era primarily skirmished with other cavalry. They were seldom employed against infantry. As noted, heavy cavalry was critical in Philip’s and Alexander’s battle plans. Cavalry now increasingly took on a secondary role, most units being light in weaponry and armament. After the deaths of Alexander’s immediate Successors, cavalry seldom won battles, which increasingly became confrontations between opposing pike phalanxes.
Later Battles: Raphia, Magnesia, and Pydna
Many of these changes are seen in the Battle of Raphia in 217 during the Fourth Syrian War between Ptolemy IV Philopator of the Kingdom of Egypt and Antiochus III the Great of the Seleucid Empire. Antiochus’ army comprised the 10,000 elite, pike-carrying Silver Shields (Argyraspids) and 20,000 so-called Macedonians, named for their also being armed with sarissai, for a total of 30,000 heavy infantry. The grand army also included 32,000 light-armed troops, including at least 4,500 archers and slingers34 6,000 cavalry and 102 Indian elephants completed the Seleucid force (Polyb. 5.79.3–12). Ptolemy’s forces are more difficult to calculate. Polybius mentions 70,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 73 elephants (Polyb. 5.79.1). This roughly equates to his description of the creation of the army as consisting of 3,000 royal guards, 2,000 “peltasts,”35 another elite unit of the phalanx, 8,000 Greek mercenaries, an additional 25,000 phalangites, 3,000 Libyans, and 20,000 Egyptians, all equipped in the Macedonian style (Polyb. 5.65.3–5, 8–9). These Egyptians were newly trained to fight alongside the Macedonians. Of the other troops there are listed specifically 700 “house” cavalry, likely heavy, 3,000 native Egyptian and Libyan horse cavalry, 3,000 Cretan archers, 4,000 Thracians and Gauls, and 2,000 others not clearly identified (Polyb. 5.65.5–10). Immediately before the actual battle, Ptolemy’s line, moving from left to right, is described as follows: the royal guard, the peltasts, 3,000 Libyans, the 20,000 Egyptians, and 8,000 Greek mercenaries (Polyb. 5.82.3–6). The 25,000 phalangites noted earlier have apparently disappeared from the narrative. While various solutions to the problems of the Ptolemaic numbers have been suggested,36 the solution may simply be that they stood in the center of the phalanx between the Libyan and the Egyptian phalangites and are not specifically noted. Ptolemy’s force was accompanied by 73 elephants of the African stock (Polyb. 5.84.9). According to Polybius, African elephants could not bear the smell, sound, and sight of their Indian counterparts and consequently were of little use (Polyb. 5. 84.5–6).37
After five days of skirmishing, the two kings arrayed their troops for battle. Both placed their phalangites in the center. The two pike phalanxes would then battle each other (Polyb. 5.82.2) with their flanks covered by light-armed infantry. In front of these light-armed infantry on the wings of both armies were their respective elephant corps and, even further on the wings, their cavalries. At the beginning of the battle, the elephant contingents moved to engage their opposite. Ptolemy’s force on the left retreated in panic and crashed into their own light infantry. Taking advantage of the chaos on the Ptolemaic left, Antiochus defeated the Ptolemaic cavalry and light-armed troops, now in disarray. On the Ptolemaic right the reverse took place with the Ptolemaic commander avoiding the elephants and effectively engaging the enemy’s cavalry and light infantry. Virtually in a vacuum, the two phalanxes engaged one another. The fighting continued until a charge by the sarissa-wielding Ptolemiac phalanx defeated its opponent (Polyb. 5.84–85). Neither cavalry was engaged in the primary struggle between the phalanxes.38
The other change begun by Philip was the developing professionalism of armies. Philip used traditional mercenaries especially for garrison duties, but he also created a professional Macedonian infantry guard, the Hypaspists. During Alexander’s decade-long campaigns the entire Macedonian force became increasingly mercenary in its characteristics and professional in its abilities. The camp had become these people’s home and the army their profession. In the years following the conqueror’s death, armies became mercenary forces fighting for those
