where they did, it was often to the detriment of their own army. Slingers, archers, javelin men, and caltrops were all effective against these animals, the last used effectively by Ptolemy in the Battle of Gaza in 312 (Diod. Sic. 19.84.4). Alexander the Great in his Battle on the Hydaspes River used his light infantry to kill the animals’ drivers and to surround the elephants, which were now injured by the javelins (Arr. Anab. 5.17.3). In 316, Antigonus Monophthalmus’ cavalry archers in the Battle of Paraetacene rode out of range and inflicted severe injuries on Eumenes of Cardia’s elephants (Diod. Sic. 19.30.2). Also, by maneuvering formations to let them pass harmlessly between the ranks and then attacking their legs and sides with javelins and swords experienced infantry would effectively negate them. Wounded or frightened elephants, unlike mechanized vehicles, had minds of their own and would often turn and injure their own forces. This was especially the case if their driver or the lead elephant was killed. Alexander faced elephants at least twice, at Gaugamela and on the Hydaspes. At Gaugamela, 15 were stationed in front of the Persian infantry (Arr. Anab. 3.11.6), but it has been argued that this is in error since they are only mentioned by Arrian and are never listed as engaging in the battle.22 They were, however, fully engaged on the Hydaspes. In 190, in the Battle of Magnesia, the Seleucid King Antiochus’ phalanx under attack on its flanks and rear formed a square with elephants in its center. The Roman ally, the Pergamene King Eumenes had his archers and slingers concentrated their fire on the elephants, causing them to panic and run through the Seleucid infantry destroying the cohesion of the square (App. Syr. 6.35).
Those actions where elephants proved effective were most often against forces unfamiliar with them. This was especially the case with horses who were commonly terrified of these animals unless they had previously been acclimated to them.23 In 275, in a battle between an invading force of Gauls and an army hastily assembled by Antiochus I, the Seleucid king, the elephants proved to be the source of the Seleucid victory. Antiochus was caught by surprise by the Gallic invasion. The Gauls had a sizable force of heavy infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 240 war chariots. Against this formidable force the Seleucid king could muster only a small force mostly of skirmishers and light-armed troops, but also 16 elephants. The latter were arranged on the flanks and in the center to meet the chariots. Apparently the Gauls had never before encountered elephants. Even before they were within arrow range, they turned and fled the field (Lucian, Zeuxis 8–11). These battles where elephants proved effective would also include Pyrrhus’ first victory over the Romans at the Battle of Heraclea in 280. Here, as the battle reached a stalemate, Pyrrhus brought forth his elephants, which to this point had been held in reserve. The Roman cavalry had no experience with these creatures and fled before them, resulting in the rout of the Roman forces (Plut. Pyrrh. 17.3). Subsequently, the Romans in their contests against Pyrrhus negated their effectiveness through the methods already described.
There are few cases where elephants were used effectively against forces familiar with their presence. The most notable of these is the Battle at Ipsos in 301 where they were partially responsible for the victory of Lysimachus and Seleucus over their rival Antigonus Monophthalmus. The elephants blocked the return of Antigonus’ cavalry, which, while victorious over that of the opposition, had over-pursued the fleeing enemy, leaving one flank of the phalanx unprotected. The result was the defeat and death of Antigonus (Plut. Demetr. 28–30). Elephants were also one key in the Roman victory over the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna, where they faced forces familiar with them, but despite the usual counter measures, nonetheless proved effective (see the section on Later Battles: Raphia, Magnesia, and Pydna).
In the years that followed the great conqueror’s death, cavalry continued to retain their importance, but seldom again became the “Hammer” envisioned by Philip and executed by Alexander. The numbers of heavy cavalry steadily decreased over time. This was not the case, however, during what is called the Second War of the Successors, fought from 320 to late 316.24 In what was probably the best documented battle of the entire Hellenistic era, heavy cavalry proved the salvation of what might have been a devastating loss for one of the parties. In late October or early November of 316, the armies of Eumenes and Antigonus drew up for battle in the Median district of Paraetacene, located somewhere on the fringes of the Dasht-i Kavir, likely southwest of the modern city of Isfahan. Antigonus’ army contained 28,000 heavy infantry, 15,000 light infantry,25 10,600 cavalry of whom approximately 6,900 were light cavalry, and 65 elephants; while Eumenes’ forces numbered 35,000 infantry,26 of whom 17,000 were heavily armed, approximately 2,000 heavy cavalry, 4,300 light, and 125 elephants. Both armies were of Asian majority. While Antigonus’ phalanx was likely mostly Macedonian, much of the rest of his forces, especially the light-armed infantry and cavalry, were recruited in Asia, and Eumenes’ heavy infantry was largely Greek mercenaries and Asian pikemen.27 Hellenistic armies in Asia came to be overwhelmingly Asian.28
Eumenes arranged his army with his best troops stationed on the right. Here were the Argyraspids, Alexander’s former Hypaspists, who had decorated their shields with silver and hence the new name, and Eumenes’ own personal infantry guards, themselves numbering more than 3000.29 Given the numerical advantage that Antigonus possessed in heavy infantry, especially those equipped with the sarissa, the Argyraspids were on this occasion equipped with pikes,30 and Eumenes’ Hypaspists with hoplite spears. This flank was protected by 2,900 elite heavy cavalrymen, personally selected by Eumenes himself, including his 900 “companions,” his personal cavalry bodyguard, and all under the Cardian’s command. The entire phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops, with the right cavalry wing screened by an additional corps of 40 elephants. On his left, Eumenes stationed 3,400 mostly light cavalry, anchored on the rising foothills, making any flanking maneuver by Antigonus’ forces difficult. In the infantry center, moving from left to right, were stationed 6,000 mercenaries armed as hoplites. Next came 5,000 “men of many races” armed with the sarissa. Following along the line were the Argyraspids, and then Eumenes’ infantry guards (Diod. Sic. 19. 27–29).
Antigonus, in response to Eumenes’ deployment, stationed approximately 7,000 light cavalry on his left flank under the command of Pithon. These included 1,000 mounted lancers and archers from Media and Parthia and 2,200 Tarentines,31 drawn up in open order and instructed to avoid any frontal attacks. They were to impede the progress of Eumenes’ best cavalry and elephants. Next to them were 12,000 hoplites, mercenaries, and Asian allies; and to their right, 16,000 sarissa-bearing infantry. The right flank was guarded by a few hundred light cavalry and 3,300 heavy cavalry, which, with the exception of 300 directly associated with Antigonus, were under the command of Antigonus’ 20-year-old son, Demetrius. Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right. After some initial skirmishing, the screening elephants and the light-armed troops on both sides retreated through the ranks of their respective infantries, which then advanced to battle. Only the 40 elephants protecting Eumenes’ right flank apparently saw action and then only against the enemy’s light cavalry.
With their armies thus disposed, both forces advanced in an oblique fashion, with their right wings leading and their left held back, hoping that their respective right wings would crush the enemy’s left before their own left was destroyed. Consequently, Antigonus had told Pithon to attack Eumenes’ opposing cavalry immediately to slow its advance and give Antigonus’ right wing more time to win the battle. While Pithon’s troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes’ right and inhibited this wing’s advance, Eumenes reinforced the harassed units with additional light cavalry from his left, with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills. Elsewhere Eumenes’ phalanx, even though inferior in numbers, proved superior in ability. Antigonus’ infantry was forced back to the hills as well. Antigonus now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat, Antigonus saved himself and his army. As Eumenes’ phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes’ left. Antigonus with his heavy cavalry detachment charged through the break. With his left threatened, Eumenes recalled his victorious right. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up in a line along
