an attempt to cement these soldiers’ loyalty to a particular commander, lands were given out by the Hellenistic kings in return for military service. This was, indeed, similar to the practice instituted by Philip II in his creation of the original pezhetairoi. This practice had cemented the loyalty of Philip’s new infantry and had similar, though diminished, effects on these troops in the new Hellenistic states. Armies were no longer citizen forces called to duty in time of need. The kingdoms of the Hellenistic world maintained professional forces. Initially in the armies of Alexander’s Successors, this change was most noticeable in the proclivity of defeated armies to join the forces of their victors, as seen earlier in the case of Eumenes of Cardia. This practice was ameliorated later since so many of these troops held land back in the territory of their immediate commander where their families resided.
The last great battles of the Hellenistic age were fought against the armies of the Roman Republic at Magnesia in Asia in 190, and at Pydna in Macedonia in 168. In the former, the total Seleucid force was 70,000 strong and represented many different nationalities and fighting styles. This number included the sarissa-bearing phalanx of 16,000 troops (Liv. 37. 40.2; App. Syr. 6.32). These phalangites anchored the center and were divided into ten sections of 1,600 men Syr. 6.32). Interspersed between each section were two elephants (Liv. 37.40.2).39 Covering the entire front of the phalanx were skirmishers (App. Syr. 6.33, 35; cf. Liv. 37.42.3). On the right side of the phalanx, King Antiochus placed in sequence 1,500 Galatian infantry, 3,000 cataphracts, the king’s agema or royal cavalry guard of approximately 1,000 hand-picked Median horsemen equipped with slightly lighter armor than the cataphracts, and an additional mixture of light cavalry drawn from many other nations, supported by 16 elephants.40 After these come the royal infantry guard, the Argyraspides,41 and 1,200 Dahae horse bowmen;42 then, 3,000 Cretan and Trallian light infantry, 2,500 Mysian archers, 4,000 mixed Cyrtaean43 slingers, and Elymaean44 archers covered the flank of this wing. On the left stood another 1,500 Gallicians and 2,000 Cappadocians, 2,700 additional light-armed troops, 3,000 cataphracts, and 1,000 horsemen of the “royal squadron,” traditional heavy cavalry. In front of this body of cavalry were the scythed chariots and a detachment of Arab camel archers. These were followed by Tarentines, 2,500 Gallician cavalry, and 7,000 archers of mixed nationality; then, 4,000 mixed Cyrtaean and Elymaean slingers; and finally 16 elephants (Liv. 37.40.6–14). The ultimate length of this Seleucid front was so large that those in the center could not make out the end of each flank (Liv. 37.41.4).
Unlike their counterparts the Roman army of roughly 30,000 heavy infantry (App. Syr. 6.31) was practically uniform with respect to both men and equipment.45 They were armed with javelins, “short swords,” and protected by helmets, breastplates, greaves, and full-body shields. There were two Roman legions and two legions of Latins and allies, each containing 5,000 men. The Romans occupied the center of the formation with the Latins, their Italian allies, on the wings.46 To the right of the heavy infantry were 3,000 light-armed troops,47 many of these supplied by King Eumenes of Pergamum; then, 3,000 cavalry, 800 of which were furnished by Eumenes, the rest being Romans. Anchoring this wing were 1,000 mercenary light infantry and cavalry.48 On the left were stationed four squadrons of cavalry anchored against a river that was protected by steep banks. Some 2,000 Macedonian and Thracian volunteers guarded the Roman camp.49 The 16 elephants were placed in reserve behind the Roman legions.50 Skirmishers likely covered the fronts of both heavy infantry forces, but are not noted by our sources with respect to the Roman forces.
The battle began with a charge by the Seleucid flanks. On the right their cavalry, commanded by the king, broke through the opposing infantry and cavalry, and made an unsuccessful attack on the Roman camp (Liv. 37.42).51 On the left, the scythed chariots attacked the forces of Eumenes, but that commander ordered the slingers, archers, and other light-armed troops to attack the horses. The battle also began in the midst of a thunderstorm, which further frightened the horses. These, when injured, became unmanageable, and many turned and charged their own ranks, disrupting the cavalry forces on the left, where the scythes were especially effective against the Antiochean cataphracts whose heavy armor made them less maneuverable.52 Eumenes followed this success with a cavalry charge that chased the opposing Seleucid cavalry from the field, thus exposing their phalanx to attack (App. Syr. 34–35; Liv. 37.41.9–12). Antiochus’ attack on the Roman left also ultimately failed through the counterattack by Romans and another part of the Pergamene cavalry under the command of Eumenes’ brother Attalus (Liv. 37.43).
While Eumenes’ assault on the Seleucid right was still in progress, the Romans and their allies charged the Seleucid phalanx, which quickly formed itself into a square to protect its exposed flanks. At first the Romans were pushed back by the sarissai of their opponents, but under attack from the legion’s javelins and the light-armed infantry and cavalry gaps began to appear and soon the battle was over. As gaps appeared in the square, the Roman legionnaires charged in. Panic now seized the Seleucid forces and most of the survivors of the battle surrendered. The battle ended in a complete Roman victory (App. Syr. 6.34–35; Liv. 37.42).
At Pydna, the Macedonian army met the Romans in the climactic engagement that saw the true end of Macedonian independence.53 In this conflict the Romans had fewer than 43,000 foot (cf. Plut. Aem. 16.4; Liv. 44.38.5), of whom 26,000 were heavy infantry (Liv. 44.21); the Macedonians had 39,000 infantry (Liv. 42.51.10), approximately 20,000 weilding pikes.54 The cavalry forces were roughly equal, about 4,000 each (Liv. 42. 51.10). The site was a plain very suitable for the phalanx, with nearby hills that gave the skirmishers and light-armed troops opportunity for retreat and flank attacks (Plut. Aem. 16.5). The Romans occupied the center of their infantry line with the allied Latin, Italian, and Greek infantry on their flanks. The cavalry was placed on the wings, with the Roman right being supplemented by 22 elephants. The pikemen took up the center of the Macedonian line, with the elite 3,000-strong “peltasts” forming the left of the phalanx. Lighter infantry guarded both flanks, where the Macedonian cavalry were also arrayed (Frontin. Str. 3.20). The stronger contingent was on the Macedonian right, where Perseus commanded the heavy cavalry. The battle began with the advance of the Macedonian phalanx, which initially pushed back first the Roman skirmishers and then the legions. As the phalanx advanced it passed onto broken ground and gaps began to appear in the once solid pike line.55 Into these, the Romans rushed. On the Roman right flank, the elephants proved most effective, crushing the Macedonian left. The Macedonian elephants proved of no use whatever. The Roman contingents of light-armed troops and cavalry followed up the charge of the elephants and drove off the Macedonian left wing. Once the compact nature of the phalanx was broken and attacked on its flank and rear, it became virtually useless. Sarissai were never designed for close-in combat and the pikemen themselves wore insufficient armor. The 3000-man royal infantry guard fought to the death, and the Macedonians are reported to have suffered more than 20,000 dead or captured. The high casualties were the result of the flight of the Macedonian cavalry, most of the victims falling during the pursuit (Liv. 44.41; Plut. Aem. 18–19).
Polybius, the second-century historian, compared the phalanx to the Roman legion, and while he declared that “it is impossible to resist the charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength,” he still conceded the superiority of the legion (18.29–32). He points to the inability of the phalanx to operate effectively on broken ground, but more importantly the legion’s greater flexibility and the individual legionnaire’s ability to operate singly or in a small group. While these are valid criticisms, it may not be fair to speak of Hellenistic weaknesses, when, in truth, the defeat of these Hellenistic armies was to a great degree the result of other Roman strengths. The phalanx was not initially created to win battles, but to create conditions so that the superior Macedonian heavy cavalry could probe an enemy’s infantry for weaknesses that could then be exploited to victory. This superior Macedonian cavalry did not exist in the second century. Cavalry was still effective in this period, but not in the same way as it had been, especially in the time of Alexander. In these last two battles, cavalry was indeed very effective, but unfortunately for the Macedonians and the Seleucids it was effectively used primarily by their
