again, Dr. Kass has argued that it would be wrong to use certain kinds of artificial fertilization, on the ground that if children are conceived in these ways, rather than in normal ways, they run greater risks of certain deformities.7 But these particular children cannot be conceived in normal ways. For them, the alternatives are artificial fertilization, or nothing. So we can only claim that we would be harming them, or affecting them for the worse, if the risks of deformities were so great that their lives would probably be not worth living.
When we turn to population policy, the implications become much harder to accept….
[Editorial note: the rest of Parfit’s talk is not reprinted here. His more recent thoughts about the problems discussed in this talk, and the larger problems of population policy, will appear in a future issue of the journal, Philosophy & Public Affairs, under the title “Overpopulation.”]
Notes
1 1 Cf. Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, No. 1 (Fall 1972) [see chapter 1 in this Anthology].
2 2 Quoted in G. Tedeschi, “On Tort Liability for ‘Wrongful Life,’ ” Israel Law Review, October 1966, p. 514, footnote 3.
3 3 The logic he describes in his books, The Language of Morals, OUP, 1952, and Freedom and Reason, OUP, 1963.
4 4 For a legal discussion of related issues, see “A Cause of Action for ‘Wrongful Life,’ ” Minnesota Law Review, 55, No. 1 (November 1970).
5 5 This asymmetry is discussed in Jan Narveson’s two articles: “Utilitarianism and New Generations,” Mind, January 1967, and “Moral Problems of Population,” The Monist, January 1973. I have learned much from both of these.
6 6 For a different view, take a remark in Gwen Raverat’s Period Piece, Faber and Faber, 1952, “It is always a fascinating problem to consider who we would have been if our mother (or our father) had married another person.”
7 7 “Making babies – the new biology and the ‘old’ morality,” Leon Kass, The Public Interest, Winter, 1972.
8 Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having Children Be Immoral?
Laura M. Purdy
Is it morally permissible for me to have children? A decision to procreate is surely one of the most significant decisions a person can make. So it would seem that it ought not be made without some moral soul‐searching.
There are many reasons why one might hesitate to bring children into this world if one is concerned about their welfare. Some are rather general, such as the deteriorating environment or the prospect of poverty. Others have a narrower focus, such as continuing civil war in one’s country or the lack of essential social support for child‐rearing in the United States. Still others may be relevant only to individuals at risk of passing harmful diseases to their offspring.
There are many causes of misery in this world, and most of them are unrelated to genetic disease. In the general scheme of things, human misery is most efficiently reduced by concentrating on noxious social and political arrangements. Nonetheless, we should not ignore preventable harm just because it is confined to a relatively small corner of life. So the question arises, Can it be wrong to have a child because of genetic risk factors?1
Unsurprisingly, most of the debate about this issue has focused on prenatal screening and abortion: much useful information about a given fetus can be made available by recourse to prenatal testing. This fact has meant that moral questions about reproduction have become entwined with abortion politics, to the detriment of both. The abortion connection has made it especially difficult to think about whether it is wrong to prevent a child from coming into being, because doing so might involve what many people see as wrongful killing; yet there is no necessary link between the two. Clearly, the existence of genetically compromised children can be prevented not only by aborting already existing fetuses but also by preventing conception in the first place.
Worse yet, many discussions simply assume a particular view of abortion without recognizing other possible positions and the difference they make in how people understand the issues. For example, those who object to aborting fetuses with genetic problems often argue that doing so would undermine our conviction that all humans are in some important sense equal.2 However, this position rests on the assumption that conception marks the point at which humans are endowed with a right to life. So aborting fetuses with genetic problems looks morally the same as killing “imperfect” people without their consent.
This position raises two separate issues. One pertains to the legitimacy of different views on abortion. Despite the conviction of many abortion activists to the contrary, I believe that ethically respectable views can be found on different sides of the debate, including one that sees fetuses as developing humans without any serious moral claim on continued life. There is no space here to address the details, and doing so would be once again to fall into the trap of letting the abortion question swallow up all others. However, opponents of abortion need to face the fact that many thoughtful individuals do not see fetuses as moral persons. It follows that their reasoning process, and hence the implications of their decisions, are radically different from those envisioned by opponents of prenatal screening and abortion. So where the latter see genetic abortion as murdering people who just don’t measure up, the former see it as a way to prevent the development of persons who are more likely to live miserable lives, a position consistent with a world‐view that values persons equally and holds that each deserves a high‐quality life. Some of those who object to genetic abortion appear to be oblivious to these psychological and logical facts. It follows that the nightmare scenarios they paint for us are beside the point: many people simply do not share the assumptions that make them plausible.
How are these points relevant to my discussion? My primary concern here is to argue that conception can sometimes be morally wrong on grounds of genetic risk, although this judgment will not apply to those who accept the moral legitimacy of abortion and are willing to employ prenatal screening and selective abortion. If my case is solid, then those who oppose abortion must be especially careful not to conceive in certain cases, as they are, of course, free to follow their conscience about abortion. Those like myself who do not see abortion as murder have more ways to prevent birth.
Huntington’s Disease
There is always some possibility that reproduction will result in a child with a serious disease or handicap. Genetic counselors can help individuals determine whether they are at unusual risk and, as the Human Genome Project rolls on, their knowledge will increase by quantum leaps. As this knowledge
