The Avro Jetliner, the first commercial jet to fly in North America. Terminated and then destroyed in 1956. (Jim Floyd)
In January 1952, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) realized that the CF-100 would eventually have to be replaced. After 1951, an All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team was assembled to study Canada’s air defence needs and to recommend performance specifications for a new all-weather interceptor aircraft to counter the perceived enemy bomber threat. The team consisted of representatives from the RCAF, the Defence Research Board (DRB), the National Research Council (NRC), and the National Aeronautical Establishment (NAE). (The NAE had been established in December 1950 by the Canadian government as an aeronautical research and development centre administered originally by the NRC.11 )
The final report from this team was published on March 20, 1952, with a summary forwarded to A.V. Roe. Avro responded in June with two brochures entitled “C-104 Supersonic All-Weather Fighters.” They described a single-engine and a twin-engine aircraft, neither of which fully satisfied the required combat performance. Still, on August 25, 1952, the RCAF requested that the NAE analyze these proposals. The NAE reply stated that the twin-engine design came closest to meeting the specifications, and that although weight was excessive, aircraft performance estimates were realistic. It was recommended that further studies be undertaken.12
In March 1953, the RCAF issued Operational Requirement ORI/1-63, “Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft,” followed by RCAF Specification Air-7-3, “Design Studies of Prototype Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft.” Both were given to Avro with a requirement for design studies for the most efficient aircraft (in terms of size, weight, and cost) that could be developed for the engines that would be available at the time of some future production.13
Avro responded with report No. P/C-105/1, “Design Study of Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft,” dated May 1953. It described a series of delta-wing aircraft of varying weights and sizes. It identified the pros and cons, risks and benefits, for each. The report was studied by the RCAF and the DRB, who together concluded that the C-105/1200 — at a weight of 48,400 pounds and having a 1,200-square-foot wing area — would meet the requirement of Air-7-3. The requirements specification would eventually be issued as RCAF specification Air-7-4.
More information was requested on the aerodynamic claims, and it soon became clear that aerodynamic data had to be confirmed by wind-tunnel testing. Avro conducted the tests between August 27 and September 2, 1953, at the Cornell Transonic Wind Tunnel in Buffalo, New York. The resulting reports were sent to the NAE on September 18 for comment. In his September 28 reply to then Air Vice Marshal Douglas M. Smith (air member technical services), John H. Parkin, director of the NAE, stated, “[T]he Cornell wind-tunnel tests indicate that, aerodynamically, the C105/1200 configuration is capable of meeting its performance requirements, although it is important that wind-tunnel measurements be extended to higher Mach numbers as soon as possible.” Parkin was stating that while results were good, they were somewhat limited in terms of the speeds tested and needed to be extended in order to evaluate the aircraft’s performance at higher velocities it was expected to achieve.14
Smith’s position as air member technical services made him directly responsible for the aircraft program. He reported directly to the chief of the air staff, who in turn reported directly or through the chairman of chiefs of staff to the Cabinet ministers. Hence, Air Vice Marshal Smith reported to Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, chief of the air staff. Air Vice Marshal Max M. Hendrick would replace Smith as air member technical services in 1955, and Slemon would be replaced by Air Marshal Hugh Campbell in 1957. It would not be until 1957 that a separate project office dealing exclusively with the Arrow project would be created under the chief of aeronautical engineering, Air Commodore Gordon G. Truscott, who would report directly to the air member technical services. Truscott had been a pre-war officer, graduate engineer, and pilot who supported the Arrow project.
As work at the Avro plant continued, the RCAF conducted an investigation to determine if any foreign aircraft could satisfy the requirements. In his submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee on November 30, 1953, Liberal Minister of National Defence the Honourable Brooke Claxton stated the following:
With the object of economy and to avoid unnecessary duplication, every effort has been made to determine whether future U.K. or U.S. aircraft could meet our requirements. In the U.K. the only aircraft for consideration is the Javelin whose performance falls far short of the requirement. In the United States there is the Convair F-102 which is a single-engine, single-seat aircraft designed to carry a fully automatic armament which is now under development. This aircraft does not meet the range requirement set out and its manoeuvrability and ceiling are below our studied requirements. In addition, this aircraft is so highly specialized that if the planned development of any major element breaks down there is little flexibility in the design to permit substitution of alternate equipment. Further, this aircraft because of its design and layout does not have much development potential and is, therefore, liable to become obsolescent in a relatively short time. Adoption by Canada of this aircraft involves calculated risks greater than we are justified in taking. The RCAF, therefore have had A.V. Roe Canada work out an engineering proposal for an aircraft to meet our specification.15
The minister went on to outline that the Treasury Board had authorized an expenditure of $200,000 on May 8, 1953, and an additional $300,000 on July 21. These monies had been spent on design studies and wind-tunnel testing. He stressed that if the program were begun in earnest, a prototype could be completed by October 1956, with production by 1959. He then sought approval for the development to commence. Expenditures would be $26,925,000 spread over a period extending into 1958 and would include some $4 million in government-supplied equipment. Engines would be the most suitable ones found in either the United States or Britain. Two prototype aircraft would be built. Claxton was successful, and Avro was awarded a design-and-development contract in March 1954; the CF-105 design began in May of that year.
The RCAF specifications, which no foreign aircraft could meet, included a supersonic combat radius of 200 nautical miles, a combat ceiling of not less than 60,000 feet, a maximum speed at altitude of Mach 2, a rate of climb not more than six minutes to 50,000 feet, twin engines, a crew capacity of two, an all-weather capability, and a manoeuvrability of 2 g at Mach 1.5 at 50,000 feet without loss of speed or altitude. Also, the aircraft had to provide as much flexibility as possible for engines and armament capacity due to the uncertain availability of those under consideration. In the words of Claxton, the requirements had been developed by the RCAF “in conjunction with the DRB, the NAE, the United States Air Force, Department of Defence Production and various aircraft manufacturers both in the United States and the United Kingdom.”16 He had every confidence that Avro would be equal to the task.
Although the NAE had initially agreed that the C-105 configuration would meet its required performance, Air Vice Marshal Smith received another letter from Parkin dated January 15, 1954. This time the NAE director noted that his comments of September had been premature. The full assessment of Avro’s work was now complete and available in NAE report No. LR-87, “Assessment of the Performance Characteristics of the Proposed A.V. Roe C105/1200 All-Weather Supersonic Fighter Aircraft.” Essentially, the report concluded that the aircraft would not meet the required 200-nautical-mile radius nor the 2-g manoeuvrability because the supersonic drag (air resistance) was far greater than Avro’s estimate. Smith, however, countered that even if drag were increased, the aircraft would meet the combat radius due to the increased fuel capacity Avro had included. He states as much in a memo to the chief of the air staff, Air Marshal Slemon, on February 16, 1954. On the question of whether the amount of drag calculated by Avro was correct, Smith noted that wind-tunnel testing to verify the numbers was ongoing. This would prove to be the beginning of a long series of disagreements between the NAE and Avro that would carry through over the length of the project.17
Despite assurances, the uncertainties about the aircraft’s performance persisted,
