other countries, especially if they would eventually prove successful. A.V. Roe would be solving technical problems not only for itself but for the rest of the world, including potential enemies.
By January 1957, John Orr, director of engineering research at the DRB, was reporting that Avro and NAE performance figures were finally coming into agreement. Avro had reduced its 2-g manoeuvrability figure to 1.63, and the NAE had raised its to 1.62. As noted by Orr in a letter to the chief of the air staff, this was still far superior to any other aircraft. Still, the cautions were evident, and by January 21, 1957, the NAE was claiming that its estimates were more accurate than Avro’s. The bottom line, however, was that the Arrow was being shown to be a better aircraft by orders of magnitude above the rest, and later flight testing would show that the 2-g requirement could indeed be achieved.18
In February 1957, another meeting was held in Toronto. This time it was by the Advanced Interceptor Committee, chaired by General Boyd of the USAF. The committee agreed with Canadian thinking on the design and operational requirements for an aircraft like the Arrow, and in April 1957, the RCAF was informed that the USAF wanted to be kept up-to-date on all developments. It seemed that American aircraft programs were indeed falling behind considerably in their schedules and that the Arrow might fill the gap.19
As before, though, the NAE sent another letter to the DRB, this one dated June 20, 1957, and signed by the new director, D.C. MacPhail. Now the NAE was claiming the aircraft would break up in flight:
We understand that the CF-105 is to be equipped with an artificial stability augmentation system which goes considerably beyond what is being attempted in the design of other high speed aircraft. The essential difference is that the CF-105 system is required to provide augmentation of static directional stability, as well as the now generally required damping. The result of this development is that failure of the servo system can be expected to cause nearly instantaneous breakup of the aircraft in several regions within its normal flight envelope…. The reason for this work is, of course, that we believe it should be possible to design the airframe so that even if artificial damping is needed to provide acceptable handling characteristics, the safety of the aircraft is not dependent on its functioning satisfactorily. We know that the attainment of this standard of safety is being demanded and achieved by the British, French, and Americans and we are continually astonished that it is neither being demanded or achieved in Canada in the case of the CF-105 aircraft.20
The letter is most curious. By this time, the subjects of safety, lateral stability, and so on had been well addressed by the Avro team in its presentations to NACA and, as will be shown later, as discussed with experts from the United Kingdom. The tone in the letter is also somewhat strong and could lead one to believe that the NAE was again being more obstructionist than helpful.
In fact, the question of safety was paramount in Jim Floyd’s mind and led him into several heated discussions with Harvey Smith, vice-president of manufacturing. It was Floyd’s opinion that if engineering realized during production — perhaps as a result of additional testing — that a given component might have a higher risk associated with it, then the component should be corrected if possible. This, of course, could lead to delays in production; with the tight schedules involved, delays would be unacceptable to Smith. The matter was resolved by Fred Smye, the president and general manager, who stated, “[I]n regard to safety of the first airplane, it is Floyd’s unqualified decision as to whether or not the change is to be incorporated…. [I]f engineering feels that they must make the change for safety sake, it will be made immediately and it is not a matter to be discussed.”21
The NAE must have been aware of these policies through the DRB: in 1955, Crawford Gordon, then Avro’s president and general manager, had personally supported a proposal to have a DRB individual attached to the project in the plant in Toronto; also, records show that the NAE fully supported the formation of aerodynamic and structural subcommittees of which they enjoyed participation. Under these circumstances, such a letter seems quite ludicrous.22
July 18, 1957, saw the visit of Dr. Courtland Perkins, chief scientist, USAF, to Avro. Dr. Perkins told Floyd that the USAF had issued a contract for a design study on a long-range interceptor complete with engine, missiles, and fire-control system. The project was losing support in view of the aircraft weight and the situation in dollars for defence. He stated that should the aircraft be cancelled, there was a good chance that the USAF would consider the Arrow and that it should be kept abreast of all developments. He then outlined the requirements, which included the abilities to fly out to 250 nautical miles, loiter for one hour, proceed at Mach 3 for another 325 nautical miles, and to engage targets up to 70,000 feet at 1.2 g and Mach 3. It was a tall order, but Avro thought it might be achievable with some modifications and if refuelling were allowed during the loiter. Dr. Perkins asked to be kept abreast of all ideas.23 One must indeed begin to wonder if, in a very subtle way, the USAF wanted Avro to do much of the work, perhaps thinking that U.S. manufacturers were unable to handle the project. On the other hand, maybe the USAF’s strategy was a surreptitious attempt to find out just how capable the Avro was. This author contacted Dr. Perkins several times during the preparation of this book in 1991. Dr. Perkins admitted to having visited Avro, but said he was not connected with the project in any way and did not recall what had been discussed at the meeting other than the circular wing flying saucer (Avrocar) being developed by John Frost of Avro. His parting comments on the Arrow were that he was not involved then and still is not today.
The whole subject of the Arrow was again reviewed, this time in Washington, between the Canadian vice chief of the air staff, Air Vice Marshal Larry Dunlap; the air member technical services, Air Vice Marshal Hendrick; and high-ranking officers of the USAF. Results of this meeting were reported at the 273rd Air Council meeting held October 19, 1957, in Ottawa. The vice chief of the air staff stated that the Americans thought North America must be defended against manned bombers and the intercontinental ballistic missile for the period 1960 to 1970. The United States also believed that the Soviet Union could have a supersonic intercontinental bomber by 1965, possibly even a nuclear-powered one. Therefore, the American concept of defence was to counter with an in-depth array of complementary weapons: long-range interceptors that would attack oncoming bombs at a great distance with nuclear weapons, followed by surface-to-air missiles within the heartland should some enemy bombers get through the initial long-range encounter.24
The Americans had stated that surface-to-air missiles would necessarily be limited in range to 250 miles. (Presumably, this was due to the distance limitations of radar acquisition that would guide the missile to the target; that is, SAGE.) Therefore, they would likely replace short-range interceptors as mentioned earlier, and perhaps some medium-range interceptors, as well, in the 1963–1965 period. There still remained the requirement, though, for a long-range interceptor that had the inherent advantages of flexibility, range, and human discrimination.
The Avro Arrow was regarded by the Americans as a long-range interceptor because of its radius of action and because of the geographical location of the bases from which it could be operated. Indeed, Dr. John J. Green, the DRB scientific adviser to the RCAF, had written the following in a memorandum dated June 10, 1954:
In computing combat radius different conditions are stipulated by the RCAF and the USAF. For instance, the USAF permits the use of external tanks, whereas the RCAF specification does not. If the combat radius of the CF-105 is calculated in accordance with the conditions permitted by the USAF specification, a figure of 782 nautical miles is obtained, which is not far short of the 1,000 nautical miles specified by the USAF. Incidentally, the combat radius based on the RCAF specification but with full internal tanks is 635 nautical miles for JP4 fuel and 665 nautical miles for JP1 fuel.25
Calculation of combat radius must also consider the type of mission to be carried out, but the memorandum from Dr. Green does point out some of the numerous other factors to be considered. This issue of combat radius would later become a source of confusion; the prime minister and others would state the figures incorrectly,
