be improved.9
The American team believed that the greatest technical risk area would be that of the integrated electronic and fire-control system. The RCAF wanted the aircraft to operate within SAGE for a fully automatic interception of enemy aircraft as well as allowing manual control by the pilot outside SAGE boundaries. The Americans argued this was counter to the flexibility provided by the two-man crew and two engines, and therefore the complexity of incorporating electronic “smarts” for operation within SAGE were not required. They also stated that since the proposed designer for the electronic and fire-control system would be the Hughes Aircraft Corporation, a complicated design would overburden this company, which was already committed to American programs. It was suggested that a less sophisticated system be chosen with only essential components provided by Hughes. RCA and North American Downey were suggested as potential suppliers.
In July 1956, Fred Smye would be told by the chief of the air staff that the RCAF had selected RCA to provide the complete sophisticated system and that co-operation from Avro was expected. Avro had argued, unaware of the American advice, that such a system was too complex, too costly, not necessary, and could threaten the entire project. In short, after soliciting American advice, which in turn was echoed by Avro, the RCAF ignored it, only to have this part of the project terminated due to cost, as Smye had predicted.10
Finally, the American team was asked which missile suite it would prefer, the Hughes-designed Falcon or the Sparrow 2, currently under development by the U.S. Navy. Avro had argued with the RCAF that the best choice would be the Hughes Falcon because the Sparrow 2 had been designed for lower-performance aircraft. The U.S. delegation essentially stated the same. The Falcon had been designed for greater height, could carry infrared or radar homing, and had the same “kill” probability as the Sparrow. Also, because it was half the size, eight Falcons could be carried by the Arrow instead of four Sparrows. The Falcon was also less expensive. In a conversation with this author in June 1991, Dr. Solandt stated that the DRB had provided similar advice to the RCAF. However, Canadian Air Commodore Jack A. Easton thought that the American team did not know enough about the Sparrow to make an accurate comparison. He believed the Sparrow was better and this would eventually become the weapon of choice. Later, in late 1956, the U.S. Navy would abandon development of the Sparrow, only to have it taken over by Canada, adding yet another major development burden to the program and one that was certainly not required.11
The U.S. team was then asked for its opinion of the Bomarc missile and its impact on the role of the manned interceptor. General Price indicated that this missile was being developed by Boeing aircraft as an addition to the manned interceptor. It was ground-launched, with the Bomarc A having a range of 125 miles and the Bomarc B a range of 250 miles. Bomarc might replace the F-102, but Price “did not foresee the day of the phasing out of the manned interceptors as he felt there would always be a need for judgement and mobility in a weapon system.”12 In other words, once aimed and launched, the missile would destroy its target regardless of whether the target was truly a hostile aircraft or a civilian plane that had strayed off course and been mistaken for an enemy warplane. A man in an aircraft, on the other hand, could exercise judgment and caution by first identifying the target. Like the F-102, the Bomarc, an unproven missile under development, would be restricted to target acquisition within the SAGE network. The SAGE network itself would be subject to electronic jamming, a technology the Russians were known to possess. Eventually, the Bomarc would, in fact, prove to be a disaster, while the F-102 cum F-106 would remain in service until the early 1980s.
Throughout the two-day meeting, Avro was asked to provide facts and information. The following is recorded by the RCAF within the conclusions of the meeting and speaks to the professionalism of the company:
It should be pointed out that the Company provided the meeting with complete facilities and information exactly as required in terms of quality and content. They made every effort to carry out the spirit of the requests made upon them by the CAS [chief of the air staff] and did this to perfection. There was absolutely no indication whatever of salesmanship or extravagant claims and only the engineering staff made contact with the visiting party. They provided only the information that they were requested to do and stuck strictly to their terms of reference. Mr. Floyd provided a short discussion on the future potential of the aircraft, showed a film of the test models that had been made and fired and explained design characteristics of the mock-up. Mr. Grinyer described the design philosophy of his engine and its present status and timing…. Both engineers were most objective about the problems that they were facing, were not at all reticent to describe their difficulties, and the ways in which they had hoped to overcome them.13
A letter dated November 9, 1955, was sent to the Honourable Ralph Campney, minister of national defence, from Donald A. Quarles, secretary of the air force. In it Quarles stated that as a result of the evaluation it was recommended that “development and production of the CF-105 proceed as now planned.”14 He also included a summary of the meeting that showed a preference for the Arrow in northern areas or offshore by “a fair margin over the F-102B … due to the CF-105 having twin-engine reliability; having with its additional crewman, a better navigation and search radar capability; [and] being better adapted to operations from marginal airfields.”15
The USAF liked the aircraft, had faith in the design team, believed that Orenda would succeed in developing the Iroquois, and wondered about the utility of this engine in American aircraft. It even gave Canada the go-ahead to proceed with the program. One must wonder, “Which government was controlling the project?” Moreover, although increasing cost had been mentioned as a potential problem by the RCAF, money to continue was made available now that the Americans had spoken. The Americans had issued their decree and this was all that mattered. Still, why was the RCAF persisting on the complex fire control and Sparrow missile? What source of advice was more important than the Americans’ on these issues? In conversation with this author, Dr. Solandt would only proffer that the RCAF wanted the absolute best and placed this above the actual requirements. And what of the NAE and the DRB?
From the same information available to the U.S. team, the DRB and the NAE had somehow concluded that the Arrow would probably be no better than the F-102. This assessment in a letter dated November 3, 1955, perhaps in anticipation of the American reply, prompted the following response from Air Vice Marshal Hendrick, air member technical services, on December 9, 1955. Commenting on the fact that numerous subsequent discussions had been held with the company and the DRB as well as with the CF-105 Aerodynamic Subcommittee, he added:
[T]here is a wide difference of opinion between NAE and A.V. Roe on the possible performance of this aircraft…. We note your statement that you can find no serious grounds for differing with the NAE figures. I think it only fair to say however that we as a Service, can find no serious grounds for differing materially with the Company who are our contractors and the designers of this aircraft…. [U]nder the worst conditions the 105 is likely to be as good as or better than the 102 in aerodynamic performance. This is a statement which you have agreed on more than one occasion…. [T]he tactical and fighting advantages of the CF-105 by virtue of its two men, two engines, large radar, etc., give it such superiority as a weapons system as to justify continuation of the project…. We do not accept the contention that the 102B and the 105 are geometrically similar and that simple arithmetic comparisons of their performance can be made…. [T]he difference between the high wing and the low wing aircraft are sufficiently great to make such forms of comparison oversimplified and dangerous.16
In January 1956, Orenda received official notification that the USAF was interested in the Arrow only if it were to be fitted with the PS-13 Iroquois engine and not with the lower-powered American J-75 engine, which was also being considered. In addition, it was disclosed that the USAF was interested in the Iroquois for other aircraft, including its B-52 bomber.17 Clearly, the USAF wanted the engine program to continue. It must be realized that quite apart from the engine itself, the manufacturing and research knowledge gained from both the engine and the airframe programs would be of immense value to similar programs
