engines and airframe and to look at planning, scheduling, salary, morale of employees, and numerous other factors. The report states:
There is no doubt that the firm is capable with its present labour force and space of meeting the likely demands for the RCAF and in fact exceeding them considerably. An output of over 10 CF-105s per month on a single shift basis is well within the capabilities of the firm…. Orenda Engines Ltd…. Is excellently equipped and there is no doubt whatever in its ability to match the aircraft programme in mind by Avro Aircraft Ltd.32
The report finds remarkable the friendly relationship between the design and manufacturing staffs and the care taken in measuring the progress at every stage. In conclusion the report states that the best choice for the RAF would be the Arrow “as is.” So, yet again, independent experts from another country informed the RCAF that the project was sound, that they had great confidence in the Avro engineers, and that they disagreed with the NAE on the major technical issues.
With respect to purchases, though, it was believed that the aircraft might be too costly if manufactured in Canada. To keep costs in check, licensing arrangements were proposed. The report itself had included cost and scheduling estimates for various production scenarios involving 100 aircraft produced in Britain at costs ranging between $3.2 and $3.7 million per copy. Then, in May 1956, Air Marshal Pike (RAF) stated that although the Arrow was a very attractive aircraft, its proposed delivery date would be too late to meet the RAF requirement. Therefore, the chances of obtaining the aircraft would be small since Britain would rather obtain an aircraft that would be available sooner. Interest from the United Kingdom seemed to dwindle at this point only to re-emerge after the cancellation for the purpose of obtaining reports and technical data that might assist Britain in developing the TSR-2 aircraft.33
Meanwhile, on January 29, 1958, the Canadian ambassador to Washington, Norman Robertson, was the luncheon guest of James H. Douglas, secretary of the air force. It proved to be a fateful meeting! With him were Lieutenant-General D.L. Putt, deputy chief of staff, research and development; Major-General H.M. Estes, assistant chief of staff for air defense systems; and Dudley C. Sharp, assistant secretary (matériel), Department of the Air Force. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the CF-105. Douglas displayed considerable knowledge of the Arrow, Canada’s concerns about foreign sales to reduce cost, and continental defence. He stated categorically that there was no place in the USAF inventory for the CF-105. He stated that the USAF was going ahead with the F-108 long-range interceptor because it believed that fighter would be more advanced and capable. Later, of course, it would be cancelled.34
Still, the door had not been completely closed. The secretary stated his personal view that in the context of continental defence the USAF could purchase the Arrow in squadron strength to operate from Canadian bases and to be manned and maintained by the RCAF. The Canadian ambassador interpreted this as some form of charity and suggested that Canada wished to be a contributor to defence and not a beneficiary. He further stated there would be political problems with this arrangement.
General Putt speculated whether a plan through North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense Command (NORAD) could not be established that would call for more CF-105 squadrons than currently envisaged by Canada, with the difference being funded by the USAF. As an alternative, he mentioned that eight Strategic Air Command (SAC) refuelling bases were being planned for installation in Canada and that perhaps a swap could be arranged; the purchase of CF-105s in exchange for work done in Canada in readying the refuelling bases.35 On the one hand, it seemed the USAF was saying no, while on the other it seemed the Americans were saying the Arrow was wanted and needed, especially for protection in the continent’s north.
In a priority message back to Canada, air staff in Washington indicated that the meeting had been far from conclusive, but that the opportunity was at hand for an official approach to the USAF. The message stated that the climate was favourable, and that apart from the meeting with the secretary, there had been many indications that the CF-105 was being recognized as a very fine weapon. It does not appear, though, that General Putt’s ideas for a swap were ever followed up, and it is not known what Norman Robertson’s personal report on the meeting showed.36
As an early strategy at trying to interest the Americans further, notwithstanding this meeting, it was proposed that the Arrow be compared with the F-106 and F-108 aircraft to demonstrate the Arrow’s superior capabilities. Performance characteristics for the American aircraft would be needed, and it was expected the information would be made available since Canada had always shared data willingly. This would not prove to be the case. In 1958, repeated attempts at trying to obtain the data on the American aircraft failed. A request was even made through Air Marshal Slemon, now deputy commander-in-chief of NORAD, but this, too, yielded nothing. An exasperated staff officer would note, “The purposes of the letter are a) to pt. out to Senior Officers the importance of exactly comparable missions … and b) a last ditch effort to obtain F-106 operating data…. It would almost appear that the USAF are withholding this data…. 16 June 1958.”37
American interest in the Arrow was changing at a time when the aircraft was beginning to prove its capabilities. Was the USAF truly disinterested in a project it had supported since inception? Had the USAF obtained the solution to the technical problems its own manufacturers were facing and was it now pulling back, or was it being told that it no longer had an interest in the Arrow by some other authority that felt threatened? According to John Orr, then director of engineering research at the DRB, it is claimed that the USAF submitted a confidential evaluation of the technical and operational capabilities of the aircraft to the Canadian officials. This report had supposedly been written by a junior officer subject to influence by U.S. aircraft manufacturers who might see the Arrow as a threat to business. This author located one other individual who claims to have seen such a report, but the report itself, if it exists, has not yet come to light. Still, why would anyone go to such lengths?38
The facts clearly demonstrate that the USAF kept the project moving, with the RCAF seemingly following orders. American officials had not only been sought after for consultation on the project but were asked directly for the go-ahead to continue. The situation evolving was not unlike that in the late 1980s with the design and development of the Israeli fighter, the Lavi. Just as the prototypes were commencing flight tests, the United States removed support and effectively killed the program. The primary difference was that the United States was actually subsidizing the development of the Lavi and was likely well within its rights to pull out of the development if it so desired. Still, why did it not stop the project sooner? It is as if the Arrow and Lavi developments were simply a means of conducting research and development by exploiting foreign talent. In the case of Canada, this talent was being made available free of charge and always with the hope of a sale. But also in the case of Canada, why not purchase the aircraft? Was it really a problem with U.S. industry or were other factors involved? It is as if the more Avro and the Arrow proved themselves, the more important it became to stop the program.
What is perhaps most distressing is the seeming lack of Canadian confidence in the program, most notably from certain quarters of the NAE. Independent experts in both the United States and the United Kingdom were most impressed by A.V. Roe’s technical talent and its grasp of the problems being faced. Both were also in disagreement with the NAE, and still the NAE persisted in raising problems that seemingly were not there, giving every impression, perhaps inadvertently, of trying to thwart the program just to prove it was right.
What was it about this aircraft, which on the one hand was hailed by the international technical community, but on the other sparked a delayed lack of interest from foreign governments? Was it superior or not, and in which ways? What about that first flight? Would it prove to be Avro’s undoing?
Until recently, high-performance aircraft were not committed to production
