the Arrow’s range would be so limited as to render it useless.
In addition to being regarded as a long-range interceptor, the air member technical services who was responsible for the Arrow development program added that the aircraft would not only fill the gap from 1962 to 1965 but that its true potential could be exploited after 1965 to deal with the supersonic bomber threat through increased range and speed. Limitations to speed were thought to be due to thermal heating of the aircraft skin in supersonic slight, but the air member emphasized this might not prove to be the problem once thought. In supersonic flight, airborne particles and molecules strike the aircraft with such force that the skin heats up due to friction. This can cause the wings and other parts to distort because of uneven heating, possibly resulting in the loss of the aircraft.26
Meanwhile, at the Ottawa 273rd Air Council meeting, members were told that the Americans were pushing ahead with the Bomarc missile and were planning to improve the SAGE system. But the Bomarc and SAGE combination would only be useful against manned bombers and would be used primarily against the bombers that got through the initial encounter from the defending long-range interceptors. What about the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), against which interceptors and the Bomarc would be useless? No decisions had yet been reached on how to counter the ICBM threat, but several weapons were under development. In an interview with this author on July 31, 1991, Air Vice Marshal John Easton confirmed that an anti-ICBM capability was being considered for the Arrow. The Americans had provided charts and estimates of proposed defensive weapons, performance capabilities of Soviet bombers to 1965, costs of the Bomarc in relation to aircraft such as the F-106, hypothetical attack scenarios, and defence strategies against the supersonic bomber threat. It seemed the old subsonic Soviet bombers were slowly being replaced with supersonic bombers.27
The air member technical services stated that his own view, like the Americans’, was for an all-encompassing program of Arrow, Bomarc, and improved radar defences. The vice chief of the air staff agreed, but did not believe the economy could afford a variety of expensive weapons. At this same meeting, the air member personnel, Air Vice Marshal J. Gordon Kerr, questioned the value of continuing with the Arrow given that it would be in use for only two or three years before the American long-range interceptors were ready and that less expensive Bomarcs would also soon be available. His position was to improve the ground environment and build missile bases. He, too, expressed the opinion that together “the cost of both Bomarc and the Arrow was prohibitive.” This combined cost would eventually erroneously translate into only the cost of the Arrow as being prohibitive.28
Unfortunately, it appears that Air Vice Marshal Kerr did not fully understand the technical discussion that had preceded his comments on the need for long-range interception and the differences between aircraft and missiles for varying roles. This lack of understanding is not surprising, as he was a non-technical participant. The question, though, is whether his comments deflected the course of the conversation or influenced the outcome. Did he expect the Americans to handle Canadian long-range requirements, or were they expected just to provide their aircraft without charge? The Bomarc was short-range, yet why did he think it could replace the long-range Arrow? Was the Canadian air defence strategy truly thought out? And what of the future potential of the Arrow discussed at this same meeting? Was this group truly capable of discussing the question of defence and the role of the Arrow in an intelligent fashion, or were the concepts beyond their comprehension?
Like the United States, the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom was well aware of the CF-105 developments. In December 1955, the British minister of supply requested permission from the Canadian government for a team of experts to visit Avro. The director of the Royal Aeronautical Establishment, the deputy chief of staff of the RAF, and others descended upon Avro in January 1956. It was acknowledged at the outset that the Arrow had been designed with Canadian geography in mind. However, this geography would not be unlike Britain if one considered the North Sea to be akin to the vast stretches of the Canadian northwest.
Conclusions from the British report agreed generally with the Americans. The U.K. team thought that Avro’s claims were reasonable. They pointed to the differences of opinion between Avro and Canada’s NAE and said that further wind-tunnel testing would be needed to augment the numerical calculations. Still, they addressed the contentious point of drag due to trim at supersonic speed. Explaining that this drag results when the elevators are deflected upward to help control and stabilize the aircraft, the report goes on to state:
For the control derivatives (a), an analysis of NACA data on delta wings, suitably corrected for minor variations in geometry along the lines suggested by theory, would seem to support the values being quoted by the firm. We are therefore in disagreement with NAE on this point since they are suggesting lower control effectiveness…. Broadly speaking, the firm’s estimates for thrust and drag are not seriously in error, i.e., probably not more than 5–10% optimistic. If we have understood the NAE estimates for trim drag correctly, we would say that they are over estimating the value of this quantity…. The amount of work done by the firm at this stage on the intake is especially laudable.29
The British experts were essentially agreeing that Avro’s numbers were probably correct and that those of the NAE might be in error by a greater amount. It is known that the NAE received a copy of the U.K. results, but Jim Floyd does not recall having seen them. Still, this type of assessment might have upset those in the NAE who were certain the NAE was correct.
Further on, the report discusses, in some detail, the electronic automatic stability augmentation system, failure of which the NAE thought would cause the aircraft to break apart while in certain regions of the flight envelope. NACA had already stated electronic stability was feasible. Noting that failure of such a system could create severe problems, the British experts concluded:
Any aircraft of the performance of the CF-105 will require artificial stability and damping of some kind…. [W]hile most firms are adopting the philosophy of designing the aircraft to have the best possible inherent stability characteristics, and then bringing the aircraft to the required standard by the minimum of artificial means, this firm has taken the view that since artificial stability is required it should be exploited to the full…. Their arguments include the saving of weight … and better handling characteristics generally. The clear indication is that a high degree of reliability will be required from the system which may cause delays in development, since it is in any case very advanced in concept…. We were however impressed with the thorough and realistic manner in which they are tackling the project. Their avowed objective is to obtain a system reliability equivalent to that demanded of the engines on a twin-engine aircraft…. The CF-105 has a higher performance than the F-153 (Javelin) and the RCAF intends to equip it to a more effective standard than we could achieve in the same time. When fitted with British equipment the CF-105 would still be better than the F-153 but our less versatile weapons would tend to reduce its margin of superiority.30
The artificial stability system being discussed in this and the NAE letter are today part of the fly-by-wire systems that are used in the most advanced jets, including the F/A-18 Hornet, Canada’s newest fighter. More will be explained later, as fly-by-wire was indeed built into and successfully flown in the Arrow. Unlike the Avro engineers who were thinking toward the future, it is clear that the NAE wanted to take the lower-risk traditional approach, but as had been pointed out by NACA and now the British team, the traditional approach would give poorer performance. In fact, given that the British report was released to the NAE before its memo of June 20, 1957, one wonders if the NAE was not simply extracting from selected portions of the report, leaving out the comments regarding the high degree of confidence the British team had in Avro. The F/A-18 is also inherently unstable, but it is precisely this feature that gives it its agility and manoeuvrability. The British report goes on to say that these types of controls will be “essential in higher speed aircraft and experience of them in the CF-105 would be invaluable.” Indeed, this has proven to be the case.31
The visiting U.K. team also undertook to examine closely the
