that would reproduce a newly established or re-established high culture.4 Diaspora Nationalism, or the nationalism of predominantly ethnically marked groups who served during the transition from Agraria to Industria as a “middle-man” between power-holders and the ruled. Being ethnically distinct from both the rulers and the ruled such historically dispersed groups as Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Parsis are good examples of Diaspora nationalism.
Gellner’s delineation of historical forms of nationalism sought also to reject at least four false theories of nationalism shared, at times, by nationalists, and at other times by scholars of nationalism, and sometimes by both. These are that nationalism is
1 Natural, self-evident and self-generating unless forcefully repressed;
2 A consequence of ideas that emerged as a result of a regrettable accident;
3 An awakening message that was intended for classes but that, by some error, was delivered to nations ( “the Wrong Address theory” favored by Marxism);
4 The re-emergence of atavistic notions of blood or territory (the “Dark Gods theory”).
Although most contemporary scholars agree that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, there is no consensus as to its causes or how it is related to processes of socio-economic modernization. Typologies of different forms of nationalism and their historical phases also vary widely. Scholars distinguish between Eastern and Western cultural and political, ethnic and civic, totalitarian and democratic, illiberal and liberal; aristocratic, bureaucratic, revolutionary, “actually existing” and even banal versions of nationalism. All of these and many other definitions use different criteria and approaches. The most important distinctions are discussed below.
Among the most “popular” distinctions of nationalism is that between Eastern and Western nationalism. After the Second World War, Hans Kohn (1944), and later John Plamenatz (1973), developed a set of criteria that defined Eastern nationalism as ethnocentric and irrational and Western nationalism as rational and liberal. Hans Kohn argued that the Renaissance and the Reformation in the West had produced a conception of nationality that related it to individual liberty and even rational cosmopolitanism. Nationalism in Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia, on the other hand, emerged without the “enlightenment” of a Renaissance and Reformation and on the basis of ethnographic demands. These later nationalisms “lacked self-assurance” and their “inferiority complex was often compensated by over-emphasis and overconfidence” (Kohn 1944, 330). In a similar vein, Plamenatz characterized Western nationalism as civilized and liberal, and the Eastern nationalism adopted by more primitive nations to the “East of Trieste,” as “nasty.” This distinction, however, included German and Italian nationalism in the Western model (Plamenatz 1973).
Anthony Smith defined a distinction between the civic and political nationalism of the West and an ethnic and genealogical Eastern variant. Smith, however, argued in his later works that these historical distinctions did not imply that one was necessarily better than the other. According to Smith, civic nations, which are more typical in the West
may demand eradication of minority cultures on the common assumption, shared by Marxists and liberals, not just of equality through uniformity, but also of the belief that the “high cultures” and “great nations” are necessarily of greater value than “low” cultures and small nations or ethnies.
In support of his arguments concerning the ethnic origin of nations, Smith further maintained that the “pedagogical narrative of Western democracies turns out to be every bit as demanding and rigorous—and in practice ethnically one-sided—as are those of non-Western authoritarian state-nations, since it assumes the assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the national state through acculturation to a hegemonic majority ethnic culture” (Smith 1995: 101). In other words, Western civic nationalism is not necessarily as tolerant and ethnically unbiased as its self-image suggests. The distinctions defined between Eastern and Western, ethnic and civic nationalism, however, are widespread and difficult to avoid, as all scholars agree that there are differences in how nationalism evolved in various parts of Europe and in the world in general. The notion of “good” civic Western nationalism in relation to “bad” ethnic Eastern nationalism is especially widespread in the media, and in political rhetoric (and therefore in public discourse). However, this distinction is rather more deceiving than revealing.
So, is there a theoretical justification for distinguishing between Eastern and Western, Ethnic and Civic nationalism? Do these distinctions point to important and inherent characteristics of nationalism?
In fact, the cultural and political dimensions of nationalism have not been clearly and persuasively elaborated. An attempt by Michael Ignatieff (1993) to equate “ethnic” and “cultural” nationalisms in order to explain why such nationalisms tend to be exclusive, as opposed to civic inclusive nationalism, has been criticized as short-sighted. Will Kymlicka has argued that Ignatieff and others have defined a false distinction, since both ethnic and civic nationalisms have a cultural component. As he points out:
Membership in the American nation, just as in the Quebecois nation, involves participation in a common culture. It is a legal requirement for children to learn the English language and American history in schools, and all levels of American government had insisted that there is a legitimate governmental interest in promoting a common culture (Kymlicka 1999, 133).
Rogers Brubaker (1998) argued that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationhood and nationalism is both normatively and analytically problematic. His view is similar to Kymlicka’s: he argues that, if we consider what is cultural in ethnic nationalism, virtually all nationalisms would be coded as ethnic or ethnocultural. In this sense, even the “paradigmatic cases of civic nationalism—France and America—cease to be counted as civic nationalism, since they have a crucial cultural or ethnocultural component” (Brubaker 1998, 299).
An enquiry into the history of the American nation and nationalism brings yet another dimension to the discussion. Not all authors agree that the American nation is similar in nature to European ones such as, for instance, the German or French nations. It is argued that this nation of immigrants from Europe is inclusive, democratic and liberal in its nature and therefore is not a nation with an ethnic, “bad” nationalism (See Yack 1999). On the other hand, as Kymlicka argues, America’s civic nationalism has historically justified the conquering and colonizing of national minorities and the coercive imposition of English-language courts and schools. The experience of the United States, and of other American nations, namely those in Latin America, illustrates that civic nations can be military dictatorships as easily as liberal democracies (e.g., Peru and Brazil, which are multiethnic societies, granting equal citizenship to whites, blacks, Indians and Asians). According to Kymlicka, North Americans often overlook this fact, because they fail to distinguish immigrants from national minorities. In fact, nationalist policies of the U.S. government led to the forced incorporation of Indian tribes, native Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans into the American state and their coerced assimilation into American culture. This is, according to Kymlicka, only one example of the link between aggressive expansionism and civic American nationalism.
However, other scholars have pointed out that there is a cultural aspect of American nationalism that has been evident in attempts to define an ideological norm for the American nation as a whole. As Anthony Richmond pointed out, the McCarthy era in the United States was an attempt to impose a single nationalistic ideology and to regard any non-conformity as “un-American” (Richmond 1984, 11). The British social psychologist Michel Billig, however, pointed out that such “philosophical” American nationalism is just as easily adaptable to the post-communist world. Since 1991, the old Soviet demons were quickly replaced in the nationalism of Pax Americana with new enemies: the religious fundamentalists and misguided extremists. He describes this as follows:
This
