253).
There are, of course, historical periods when the construction of a national identity may be part of a nationalist program; however, national identity is not necessarily identical to nationalism as such. In other words, national identity and nationalism are different aspects of a more general phenomenon. It would be logical to assume that nationalism is only a part of national identity and that the latter does not have to be nationalistic. Just as national identity may contain other beliefs and myths, it can contain nationalism as a political principle or, as “modernists” would insist, nationalism as a myth. For instance, Gellner claims that:
Nationalism—the principle of homogeneous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and the obligatory cultural unity of rulers and ruled—is indeed inscribed neither in the nature of things, nor in the hearts of men, nor in the preconditions of social life in general, and the contention that it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self-evident. (Gellner 1983, 125)
Primordialists would argue, however, that the basis of nationalism is much more deeply rooted in the human belief of common ancestry (territorially defined) and destiny. For instance, Smith argues that: “Though nationalism as theory and ideology is quite modern (dating from the late eighteenth century in Europe), the identities on which it feeds and builds are either ancient and persistent, or preserved in memories and symbols that, given the right conditions, can serve as models for nation-creating nationalism” (Smith 1984, 289). In some sense, the set of these identities, memories and symbols can correspond to the belief system that we call patriotism. Gellner recognized nationalism as a species of patriotism distinguished by a few very important features: homogeneity, literacy, and anonymity (Gellner 1983, 138). However, as Morris Janovitz has pointed out, patriotism is as old as settled communities (Janovitz 1983).
It is also the case that nationalism as an ideology and doctrine habitually employs various myths as a means of subjugating the masses. As Hobsbawm notes: “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so. ‘Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation (Renan)’” (Hobsbawm 1990, 12).
Nationalists themselves are conscious of their usage of myths. For instance, Benito Mussolini argued that “Our myth is the greatness of the nation.”1 The same idea was expressed by the founder of Ukrainian integral nationalism, Dmytro Dontzov, who wrote in 1923 that each nation has and needs a myth for its own reinforcement (Dontzov 1966). We can conclude therefore that myth in nationalist ideology is required as a tool of mass mobilization. This function is not consistent with either modernist or primordialist conceptions of the transition to the era of nations and nationalism. As Anthony Smith has argued:
There can be no real ‘nation’ without its tacit myth of origins and descent, which defines the fictive kinship basis of the nation and explains the network of affective ties and sentiments. Indeed, together with the historical memories of successive generations of members, myths of descent furnish the cognitive maps and mobilizing moralities of nations as they struggle to win and maintain recognition today (Smith 1988b, 14).
When Habermas argues in favor of constitutional patriotism as an alternative to nationalism, he does not develop the idea of American civic patriotism as a “civic religion.” However, it is revealing that he defines (American) patriotism in terms of religion. In fact, one might consider religion a myth or belief system. In arguing that nationalism does not have to be ethnic, many scholars equate the civic belief system of the United States with civic nationalism. Therefore, we can conclude that nationalism as a belief system can and usually does include a set of myths as an essential part of its doctrine. At the same time, the structural and functional difference between nationalism and myth should be stressed. Insofar as a myth is included in nationalism as an ideological doctrine, it can be adequately included in national identity. In national identity, however, not only nationalists` myths but also other kinds of myths concerning the nature of nationhood and national belonging can be represented, even a cosmopolitan one. However, a belief about a cosmopolitan unity, as opposed to a national one, would have to develop in the evolution of the individual worldview within his/her national identity until a break with national belonging takes place.
The possibility of creating a cosmopolitan, non-national or even global democracy poses a serious challenge to the existing world order of nation-states. If Held is right in arguing that the universal political unification of the world into a system of nation-states was a result of European expansion in order to further its commerce and trade, it suggests that if the European Union replaces the nation-state principle with a supra-national principle, this will eventually became a world-wide movement. In other words, the development of the EU could be a test case for the future of the nation-state precisely because its development is driven by the logic of post-industrial economic development, just as the creation of the nation-state was driven by the logic of industrialization and modernization. Those who discount this possibility argue that, in fact, the national principle of state building may not be displaced by the successful integration of Europe. The European Union might become a super-power-type nation-state similar to the United States. A “United States of Europe” might become another civic nation similar to the American one, but based on a single European culture. Liah Greenfeld argues that potentially even a “United States of the World” would not necessarily depart from the principle of nationalism if sovereignty were vested in the population of the world and its various segments were regarded as equals (Greenfeld 1992).
Although the potential transformation of the EU into a single political unit is not likely to happen in the near future, it is possible to predict that such a federal Europe of countries, but not nation-states, would encounter the problem of developing a common identity capable of mass mobilization to the extent that national identity is capable of this within nation-states. However, as Anthony Giddens asks, would not a globalized democracy, featuring representative assemblies, meet with the same problems of apathy or hostility encountered at the national level? According to Giddens, “cosmopolitan democracy is not only about the movement of governance towards a world level, but about diffusion downwards to local regions” (Giddens 1998, 146). Again, the main reason states might devolve power upwards to institutions of global governance is not idealism but, according to Giddens, because it is in their interest to have the global economy managed more effectively. The latter is equally one of the guiding principles of the emerging EU alternative in the East of Europe—The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
The economic necessity for states to form supra-national or cosmopolitan democratic governance does not, however, provide the answer to the question as to whether national identities will disappear completely, merge into a cosmopolitan identity, or become merely regional components of a supra-national identity. In fact, humans enjoy a multiplicity of identities and new ones do not have to replace the old ones. This, however, does not necessarily hold in the case of nationalism as a political principle, according to which a separate national state is essential for the development of a national culture. In fact, the end of the Cold War manifested newly emerging ethno-national revivals and social identities that rapidly challenged national borders on the continent. US president Donald Trump reflected similar rising sentiments in his electoral base when he used his address to the UN general assembly (2019) to deliver a nationalist manifesto, denouncing “globalism” and illegal immigration and promoting patriotism as a cure for the world’s ills:
“The free world must embrace its national foundations. It must not attempt to erase them, or replace them,” Trump said. “The true good of the nation, can only be pursued by those who love it, by citizens who are rooted in its history, who are nourished by its culture, committed to its values, attached to its people.”
(Quoted from the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/24/donald-trump-un-address-denounces-globalism)
Trump went on to underline the role of patriots, a self-selecting group of citizens uniquely able to interpret national interest in the globalized
