with those of patriots who lived elsewhere two hundred years ago.
There is no satisfactory explanation in the sociological literature for the shift from simple national identification and group allegiance to the action-oriented national identification that typifies “patriots’ groups.” Identification theory suggests a possible explanation of why individuals might decide to join a “group of patriots.” It suggests that people seek positive group identification to obtain psychological security. This is the central argument of all “psychologically” oriented approaches (e.g. Billig 1995; Bloom 1990).
According to identification theory, human beings have a natural tendency to form groups with shared similarities and to distinguish themselves in this way from “the Other.” What remains unclear, in the case of Cossacks, is the relationship between psychological security based on positive group identification, and the readiness to engage in self-sacrifice. A plausible explanation could be based on the social identity theory of Henry Tajfel (1981). Tajfel argues that when exiting from a group or category is not possible and self-esteem cannot be protected in this way, a person may seek to induce social change. Such social change would involve the individual in efforts to influence the relative power and status of the group concerned. By achieving greatness for a group one cannot escape, one achieves a reflected grandeur for the self. Tajfel and others have suggested that this may be the spur to the creation of new militant subgroups, the development of new rhetoric, and various forms of social activities.
Glynis Breakwell argues that identity is “a dynamic social product,” residing in psychological processes, which “cannot be understood except in relation to their social context and historical perspective” (Breakwell 1986, 9, 36-39). Following her suggestion, our analysis focuses on:
1 Cossack identity over time (nationalist memories, myths, stereotypes—i.e., components of self-perception);
2 the identity processes and the principles of their operation (e.g., transition from pre-Cossack to Cossack and sometimes to a post-Cossack identity);
3 the social context of identity (Cossack revival, perception of Cossacks by their wider social communities);
4 the effects of social change upon identity (transformation of Cossack identity under pressure from other social actors and processes, such as alternative Cossack movements and/or state policies);
5 The relation of identity to action (relation between self-images and real actions).
Despite the official and unofficial support of political elites it is clear also that the Cossack revival is a “bottom-up” movement, i.e., it originates in local, regional initiatives that are supported, at a later stage, by officials. The empirical data also shows that there have often been economic interests directly involved in stimulating the growth of Cossack organizations. Cossack claims to revive “traditional” trades such as beekeeping or, indeed, military service suggest that economic factors form at least part of the explanation for the successful revival of Cossack nationalism. Although economic nationalism was developed as a category to be applied to inter-state relations (Burnell 1986; Hieronimi 1980; Johnson 1967), there is good reason to apply it to small-scale (inter-group) social interrelations if competition for limited resources is present in social discourse.
Research undertaken for this monograph shows that the new nationalist movements that constituted the Cossack revival have had two clear paths of development. The first path is toward the further elaboration of an ethnic model of Cossack and wider Russian (supra-)community, as is happening predominantly in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and North Caucasus; the second path has led to the reinvention of a civic model, as in mainstream Cossack organizations in Ukraine. The research suggests that much depends on how the revival of ethno-geopolitics in the region of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) succeeds in promoting economic nationalism and whether this proves beneficial to ethnic and/or national communities. Yet the choice between an ethnic and civic model will have to be made at a cost that is reasonable in terms of nationalist identity, that is, so as not to threaten the societal security of a given national community.
The concept of “societal security” is useful for analyzing violent expressions of nationalism. Traditional state-as-actor theories that predominate in the field of International Security failed to predict the inter-ethnic violence that accompanied the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The empirical findings clearly illustrate that war preparations among nationalist elites in Russia and Ukraine began practically since 1991. Russia’s nation-building project aims at the re-creation of a larger inclusive state within boundaries that historically are associated with the Russian (Tsarist or Soviet) empires. The Ukrainian “irredentist” nation-building project requires the inclusion of all minorities in order to be viable. This, however, contradicts the logic of Russian supra-state expansion that must incorporate most if not all of the Ukrainian nation-state territories. The fact that neither nation-building project is ethnically exclusive does not prevent inter-group violence, as is clearly demonstrated in Donbas, where armed conflict began in 2014. The ethnic composition of fighters on both sides of the conflict is not dissimilar; all nationalities of the former USSR are represented to various degrees and Russian was initially the dominant language of instruction in both militaries.
Scholarly optimists in the 1990s believed that liberalization of developing democracies and the acceptance of extensive non-territorial federal arrangements could be the two factors that would turn the “no war community” of Russia and Ukraine into a “security community” where war is inconceivable. However, Putin’s government opted for an armed solution of its upgrading neo-imperial Eurasianist project and made Ukrainians fight for the survival of their nation-state. The logic of the self-determination principle will endure for the foreseeable future; and the better we understand the mechanisms of mass mobilization for violence, the safer that future will be.
1.3. Plan of the Study
The next chapter (Chapter 2) will review theories of nations and national and ethnic identity/consciousness and will suggest a synthesis of Western and Eastern (Soviet) approaches that can help with understanding the dominant perspectives in nationalism studies.
The crucial disagreements among various approaches have to do with the actual role of ethnicity in nationalism. Chapter 2 argues that ethnicity is important to national identity only in some cases. Generally, modern identities, including national ones, absorb elements of ethnic history in the form of common narratives (e.g., myths and stereotypes), transforming the ethnic component to suit new purposes. A continuity of ethnicity from pre-modern history is, therefore, not essential for modern societies as it (ethnicity) can always be (re-)introduced like other cultural borrowings from the past. A clearer understanding of how ethnicity functions in modern societies can help to resolve debates about the degree to which ethnicity is reinvented or is perennial in character (while incorporated into national identity).
Chapter 3 analyzes the connection between nationalism and war as ultimate expressions of insecurity and destruction. Although it is commonplace to blame nationalism for war, few studies have examined the conditions under which nationalism causes violent conflict and war. The main conclusion drawn from the literature reviewed in this chapter is that a new, societal sector of security is a useful lens—along with a state’s military, political, economic and environmental security—that can foresee the potential for violent conflict in a given society.
Studies of regional security and nationalist conflict inevitably take researchers into the larger domain of inter-state relations. There is a need, therefore, for methodological clarity concerning levels of analysis, similar to the concern central to International Relations theory. This study traces nationalist conflict from the individual and group level (Cossack movements) to the level of nation-state bureaucracy (governments) and then to sub-system (nation-sates) and system levels (security community of nation-states). These levels are further delineated and discussed
