The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea. Carol Hakim
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The Patriarch hence undertook to present such a program and rally his community around it. On March 29, 1841, he assembled the main leaders of the community and had them sign a pact, promising that they would henceforth “form one body, act towards one sole aim and work as a single hand in all matters relating to our interests and to the general welfare.” Toward this aim, the pact specifically tackled the issues dividing the Maronite community, providing for a more equitable distribution of taxes, respect for the authority and rank of notables and shaykhs in return for fairer treatment of commoners, and the selection of representatives, or wakils, for each district in order to facilitate contacts and coordination between all. The signatories finally swore that “their present union will last forever. [None] should seek to break it or alter it; ... nor time, nor the succession of the days, nor the great questions of the century, nor the misfortunes or the disasters. . . .”73
So much insistence on the henceforth everlasting unity of the Maronites and their unbreakable solidarity could only point to an attempt to conceal the divisions of the community and the deep concern and apprehensions of the Patriarch. By March 1841, the fate of the Shihabi Emirate was seriously compromised by the defiance of the Druze muqata'jis who challenged the principle of the selection of a governor from the Shihabi family,74 hence contesting the legitimacy of the whole system, by the schemes of the Ottoman government that was trying to reimpose its direct rule over the Mountain, and by the weakness of the Emir Bashir III himself. Furthermore, the attempt to mobilize the Maronites prompted, in reaction, Druze commoners to rally around their traditional leaders,75 thus forming an internal front lobbying against the Patriarch's plans and an internal danger to his community. In comparison, the Maronites lacked leadership and cohesion. By summoning all the Maronite notables and having them sign this convention under his supervision, the Patriarch was responding to these developments by presenting compromise solutions to the issues dividing the Maronites and striving to impart on them a higher sense of solidarity and responsibility in defense of the general interest. To bolster this projected Maronite unity, Mgr Hubaysh made public the text of the convention through the clergy in the villages and mobilized the Church apparatus to mobilize Maronite commoners and awaken their awareness to the ongoing contest and the need to identify and rally with their coreligionists.
The principle of such a pact between all the Maronites was in itself quite new. It rested on principles alien to the organization of the Mountain, aiming to supplant old parochial allegiances and clientele by a preeminent communal political identity and loyalty. More specifically, it challenged the traditional organization of the Mountain by contesting the legitimacy of the authority of the Druze muqata'jis over their Maronite tenants on the basis of communal differences. The Patriarch was thus acting to thwart all Druze attempts at reestablishing their old privileges by undermining the basis of their authority.76
THE END OF THE EMIRATE
Mgr Hubaysh's plans, however, came to none, and his project faced, shortly thereafter, a first and capital setback in November 1841, when the Druze muqata'jis, infuriated by the policy of the new Christian Shihabi Emir, Bashir III, besieged the town of Dayr-al-Qamar, seat of the governorate. The Patriarch immediately called upon the Maronite notables and commoners of the northern and central districts to gather an army to save “their” threatened Emir.77 He financed the campaign from Church funds, supplying the Maronite army with provisions, arms and ammunition, and used the Church apparatus to mobilize his flock. However, in spite of all the efforts and authority of the Patriarch and the clergy, which often reached the point of threats of excommunication,78 the Maronite army did not go to the rescue of the Emir at Dayr-al-Qamar. Instead, it dallied at Baabda arguing over leadership and organizational issues79 and finally attacked the neighboring Druze village of Shuwayfat before disbanding.
The Maronite army lacked cohesion and purpose. The leadership of the campaign had been assigned to a Shihabi Emir whose orders and directives were never heeded. Furthermore, the Maronite muqata'jis were more inclined to support their Druze counterparts than the Maronite Emir since they felt equally threatened by the insubordination of the commoners, while the commoners were more preoccupied with asserting their power against that of their muqata'jis than with rushing and saving “their” threatened Emir and coreligionists in the town of Dayr-al-Qamar. Finally, the Maronite army, composed of separate parochial groups, made any coordination between these separate bands and cliques impossible. This lack of coordination and mutual support among the diverse groups underscored the absence of any effective networks for the mobilization of the whole community as such and the originality of such an initiative.
The division of the Maronites seemed also connected to an apparent lack of motivation and concern for the issue at stake. The narrative of Tannus Shidyaq is replete with accusations of “treachery” by several groups and notables, underlining the lack of motivation and solidarity as well as the conflicting interests of the Christians as a group. Thus, all the pledges of “everlasting union and solidarity” between the Maronites failed to materialize at this critical time and on this critical issue. Their performance discredited the Patriarch's attempt to establish a firm Maronite political front backing his political program. It led him thereafter to pursue a more selective policy, relying more on behind-the-scene diplomatic and political channels to reach his aims than trusting the aptitude of his community.
In the meantime, Bashir III, abandoned to his fate, was expelled under humiliating conditions from Dayr-al-Qamar to Beirut, where an Ottoman special envoy dismissed him and sent him to Istanbul. The Shihabi Emirate thus ended ingloriously, and an Ottoman governor was appointed to rule Lebanon directly.
CHAPTER TWO | · | The Emergence of Lebanism |
The French Connection |
The end of Shihabi rule came as a blow to the Maronite clergy and represented a serious setback to its ambitions. As a result, the Patriarch immediately dispatched to Istanbul a special envoy, Abbot Nicolas Murad, who was assigned the delicate task of “earnestly requesting the immediate return of Emir Bashir II, the only [person] able to put an end to the disasters of Lebanon.”1 Thus, the Maronite Patriarch, who for a year had tried strenuously to uphold the Emirate, was conceding defeat. Without Bashir II, he was unable to maintain the status quo that had obtained in 1840 or to control the situation on the ground.
The Maronites’ rout and their failure to rescue the last governing Shihabi Emir were followed by communal clashes during which some Maronite villages were attacked and devastated. The new Ottoman governor, ‘Umar Pasha, seemed unable or unwilling to stop the fighting, and, disapproving of his appointment, the Patriarch was loath to ask his help. The only conclusion he came up with was that the old Emir alone—he was by then nearly eighty years old—could remedy this sorry situation. Hence, Mgr Hubaysh added a new element to his former claim. He now wanted not only confirmation of the autonomous status of the Mountain under a Maronite governor but clearly and simply the return to the 1840 status quo through the restoration of Shihabi rule with Bashir II. Given the reserved reaction of the Ottomans to his first proposal, the Patriarch faced certain failure had he not benefited from an unhoped-for support.