Unexpected assistance came in the form of determined and steadfast French support for the Maronite position in the Mountain, in Istanbul, and in the other European capitals. The French government sanctioned the Maronite claim for the restoration of the Shihabs between 1842 and 1845. At the same time, it followed a sufficiently ambiguous policy to feed the aspirations of the Church. Additionally, some circles and personalities in France, directly and indirectly, fanned the expectations of the Church by advocating the Maronite cause. French support and influence was thus not only limited to political and diplomatic support by the French government. It also came in the form of political ideas promoting Christian emancipation from Ottoman rule. The multifaceted nature of French support needs to be elucidated before we resume our narrative.
THE FRANCO-LEBANESE DREAM
In 1840, the French alone, and against all the other European powers and the Ottoman government, backed Muhammad Ali's claim for confirmation of his rule in Syria.2 France refused to associate itself with the London Convention of July 15, which enjoined the Egyptian Pasha to withdraw from Anatolia and most of the Syrian provinces in return for recognition of his hereditary rule in Egypt. If Muhammad Ali refused to submit, the Ottoman government, with the assistance of the signatory powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, would take adequate measures to force him to yield.
Until the last minute France tried to prevent a joint military intervention against its Egyptian ally, and when the intervention ultimately occurred, secretly hoped that the Egyptian Pasha would be able to hold his ground honorably. The total rout of the Egyptian forces in Syria came as an unpleasant surprise. Not only was France's ally badly defeated, but the French position and influence in Europe, Syria, and Istanbul was badly damaged. By bluntly refusing to associate itself with the other European powers in the solution of the Eastern crisis, France lost its position inside the Concert of Europe that had been established after 1815. It had to wait until the signature of the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841, to recover its former rank among its peers. France's influence in Syria, which had rested for the past ten years on French patronage of Egyptian rule and on its informal protectorate of the Maronites, looked seriously comprised. Ottoman rule was reestablished against France's apparent will in these provinces, and the Maronites were embittered by the position of the French government, which had preferred to support unconditionally their Egyptian oppressor instead of backing up their rebellion.
As a result, Francois Guizot, who replaced Adolphe Thiers as minister of foreign affairs after these French setbacks, decided to send back Prosper Bourrée as consul in Beirut to revive French influence in Syria. The consul had warned his government some months earlier about the eventual threat to its position in Lebanon if it chose to side unconditionally with Muhammad Ali.3 He thus gained the gratitude of the Maronites, who had received the news of his recall with concern. He was therefore considered the best choice to amend the tarnished image of France with them.
Bourrée returned to Beirut in August 1841 and soon reached the conclusion that the Maronite Patriarch had emerged from the last crisis as the “real leader” of the Mountain: “Speaking of the Mountain, I should have first mentioned the patriarch, who is today its real leader. Over the past year, the patriarch has gathered into his hands all the powers and influence formerly held by the Emirs and shaykhs, who have either fallen or left with the old Emir Bashir.” Bourrée added, however, that Mgr Hubaysh, who had inherited these charges unexpectedly, was unprepared to shoulder these responsibilities without foreign assistance, and, since the Maronite prelate represented the “most powerful support for our influence in Lebanon,” the French consul henceforth endeavored to back him while relying on him to advance France's position in Lebanon.4 This approach was welcomed by the Maronite prelate, who was desperate for some assistance, especially in Istanbul, where lay his only chance of salvaging the situation and obtaining a political victory, through the restoration of Bashir II, which would compensate for the latest internal political and military setbacks. During a meeting with the French consul some days before the demise of the Shihabi dynasty, Mgr Hubaysh, in a desperate tone, implored the French diplomat to uphold the Maronite cause, stating, according to Bourrée: “Let France take our cause in hand, this cause is just, let her settle it in Constantinople, and we shall do whatever you instruct us.”5
The foundations of a solid and lasting alliance based on mutual interest between France and the Maronite Patriarchate was thus laid. The Patriarch was hence accepted by France as the “real leader” of his community, and Paris promoted and supported his position and influence within his community and on the local political scene. In return, France could rely on a powerful ally within the Mountain. The close association of France with the Maronite Patriarchate remained, in spite of some vicissitudes, a central feature of French policy in the Levant until the end of the Ottoman period.6
France's support of the Patriarch tallied with the new policy toward the Empire adopted by the new French foreign minister, François Guizot. The withdrawal of Muhammad Ali from Syria had delivered the Ottoman Empire of its most serious internal threat and allowed for the reestablishment of Ottoman rule in Syria. The Ottoman government had, however, to pay a heavy price for the Allied support then obtained. Ottoman officials had to endure henceforth continual intervention by the European powers, ostensibly anxious to assist and supervise the restoration of Ottoman rule in Syria on new and sound grounds and, indeed, to see a comprehensive reform of the Ottoman Empire. The Western powers had, however, serious misgivings about the Ottoman government's ability to regenerate the Empire and had opted for the preservation and reform of the Ottoman Sultanate for want of any better solution. Their main aim was to prevent a general scramble for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, which might lead to a generalized European conflict. It was hence European peace they first had in mind in seeking to uphold the integrity of the Empire and promote its reform. At the same time, in view of their misgivings about its fate, they began to prepare for an eventual collapse of the Empire and a consequent intervention.
This undeclared scramble for the informal partition of the Ottoman Empire, fanned by a climate of acute rivalry and suspicion among the European powers, involved multifarious pressures on the Ottoman government in order to obtain economic or political benefits and enhance their future options and prospects. Syria was especially coveted by France and Britain, who engaged after 1840 in an intense competition to consolidate their current and prospective future positions. At that time, the best asset of the French government in Syria was the Maronite community, whose support loosely overlapped with France's protectorate of the Catholics in the Empire. Moreover, Mount Lebanon then represented a key strategic asset, and as the recent Egyptian crisis had revealed, whoever controlled this “impregnable citadel” could dominate the rest of Syria.7
So, after Guizot took over the helm at the foreign ministry, he opted for a more cautious and conciliatory, but nevertheless ambiguous, policy than that followed by his predecessor. He moved to reintegrate France in the Concert of European powers, aligned France with the general European consensus aimed at upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and worked closely with the other European powers in Istanbul on the formulation of new arrangements for the administrative reorganization of Syria and Lebanon.8 At the same time, he emphasized more diligently the promotion of the protectorate of Catholics in the Empire and sponsored the extension of the educational activities of the Catholic missionaries, initiating a sustained cultural policy that greatly contributed to foster French influence in the Ottoman lands and more particularly in Mount Lebanon.9 Finally, Guizot endorsed the claim of the Maronite Patriarch for the restoration of the Shihabi dynasty and earnestly lobbied his peers to reestablish the 1840 status quo in the Lebanese Mountain.10 The ambiguity of Guizot's policy was well summarized in his instructions to his ambassador in Istanbul, just after the Egyptian rout:
I draw your attention in particular to our religious interests in the Ottoman Empire. The glorious patronage that France has extended for centuries to the Catholics of the East, the
