‘Azar's political mission, like that of Murad before him, ended in failure; both discovered that the policy of the French government was in effect much more circumspect than that of the French circles they used to frequent. More important to this study is that ‘Azar, like Murad before him, apparently scribbled some notes on the history of the Maronites that were then translated into French in the form of a brochure and circulated, along with ‘Azar's petitions, in Catholic and colonial circles.89 The brochure was duly published some five years later in France, in the form of a book entitled Les Marounites, d'après le manuscrit arabe du R. P. Azar.
‘Azar's book was clearly rewritten by a Frenchman who interjected himself into the text by frequent reference to “us” or “our country” when mentioning the French and France. Moreover, the text was updated to fit changing circumstances and governments. The publication of the book corresponded with the proclamation of Napoleon III as Emperor, and it was addressed to him, enjoining him to carry on the great deeds of his uncle and all his eminent royal predecessors and to save and protect the Maronites: “Prince, turn your gaze upon Lebanon, and see the blows that have been dealt against France, against humanity, against the Catholic faith. . . . Associate your name with the names of St. Louis, Louis XIV and Napoleon; let us have our life, let us have our faith, you can do it: when France wants to do something, it can—especially when she is governed by those Napoleons.”90 Moreover, to strengthen this plea the small phrase allegedly attributed by Murad to Napoleon himself, to the effect that the Maronites were French “since immemorial times,” is continually reiterated throughout the text.
Most themes dealt with by Murad on the history of the Maronites, their historical Emirate, their close association with the French, and the traditional French protectorate of the community are reproduced in ‘Azar's book, with some slight alterations and stronger emphasis. For example, the identification of the Maronites with the French is pushed even further in'Azar's book, and the Maronites are not only the French of the Levant, or even the protégés of France, but clearly and simply French since the time of the Crusades: “The Maronites, then, are indeed French; they mix their blood with French blood on the battlefield; a noble fraternity of arms exists between them and the French. They also mix their blood through marriage; French blood flowed and still flows in Maronite veins.”91 Similarly, the moral obligation, and indeed duty, of the French to succor the Maronites in their time of suffering is strongly underscored in ‘Azar's text. Moreover, the advantages France could reap from such an endeavor, and indeed the identity of interests between the French and the Maronites, are more clearly highlighted. Hence, the author discussed at length why it was in French interest to help these “400,000 Maronites ripe to form a nation.”92 The Ottoman Empire was collapsing, and “the political eventualities which might arise in the Orient required that we protect the Maronites,”93 “this European colony transplanted in Asia.”94 In short, as the author asserted: “In the East, there is only one people that has virtue: the Maronite people; the Maronites are destined for greatness; on their own they will be able to revive and reinvigorate Asia: all of civilization's hopes rest upon them.”95
‘Azar's book, like that of Murad, had more immediate impact in France than in Mount Lebanon, where both works seem to have remained unknown for a long time. They were, however, rediscovered, along with many other French works of the same epoch, by some Lebanese intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century who drew much inspiration from them. Bulus Nujaym, also known as Jouplain, for example, often referred to ‘Azar's manuscript in his major work, La question du Liban.96
| CHAPTER THREE | · | The 1860 Massacres and Their Aftermath |
| A Map for Lebanon |
The massacres of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and Damascus represent a watershed in the history of the Syrian provinces in general, and of Mount Lebanon in particular. Their scope and magnitude ended a long period of crisis and instability that had marked the region since its occupation by Ibrahim Pasha in 1831, its reintegration into the Ottoman Empire in 1840, and the subsequent movement of reforms initiated by the Ottoman government. Underlying fears, expectations, tensions, and contradictions that had been building throughout this troubled period were brought to such an extreme limit, and expressed in such an appalling way during the events of 1860, that they left all involved in a state of shock and dismay. These prevailing feelings, as well as the ensuing stern repressive measures adopted by the Ottoman authorities, facilitated the reassertion of Ottoman control and reform in the Syrian provinces, which were henceforth accepted in a more conciliatory spirit by their inhabitants.
At the same time, the events of 1860 represent a momentous episode in the collective memory of the people of the region. They symbolize a rupture in the history of Syria, a moment when the normal order of things broke down, when underlying animosities and fervor were violently exposed and tested. In this sense, they remained thereafter a continual point of reference for local inhabitants, representing their most intimate fears and anxieties and a somber emblem of potential upheavals.
Moreover, the significance of these momentous events reaches beyond their factual dimension. The thorough consideration they generated of the fate of the Syrian provinces had a direct bearing on the future development of nationalist ideas in the region. The diverse solutions considered in the wake of these events helped to shape future local nationalist claims and assertions and set the terms of nationalist thought and debate throughout the following century.
The massacres and the Western and Ottoman reaction they provoked raised anew the issue of the Syrian and Lebanese provinces, first opened by the Egyptian crisis. Intense negotiations followed between the main European powers and the Sublime Porte in order to devise guarantees against the recurrence of such events. An impressive variety of political and administrative projects were envisioned or contemplated by local and foreign, official, and unofficial circles. In the case of Lebanon, the joint Ottoman–European search for a political solution involved a thorough inquiry, with a special commission convening in Beirut. The commission took particular pains to examine the economic, social, and political issues that led to the crisis and made genuine efforts to address all sides of the question. However, the final solution consisted, as usual, in a general compromise between the diverging views and interests of the powers concerned, who sought to defend the conflicting interests of the local population as they thought best.
Alongside this official and diplomatic activity, several French agents and publicists promoted projects for the future of Lebanon articulated around the establishment of an independent Christian principality. Many local parties and personalities from the Mountain became involved in this activity. Thus, the “Franco-Lebanese dream” was revived, and, in this new episode, gained much in consistency and scope. The frontiers of the projected Christian principality were extended by its proponents well beyond the confines of Mount Lebanon. A detailed map was drawn by the headquarters of the French army, and historical, political, economic, and communal justifications were advanced to sustain these magnified pretensions.
In short, a project for the establishment of a Greater Lebanon avant l'heure took form. And, if this whole project did not materialize at the time, its significance should not be measured by this failure, or by the apparent oblivion into which it fell for the rest of the century. Some decades later, Lebanese nationalists and the Maronite Patriarch claimed an identical entity in 1919, before the Paris Peace Conference, making use of the map drawn by the French army in 1860 to vindicate and impart legitimacy on the enlarged “natural and historical” frontiers of Lebanon that they demanded. And the Greater Lebanon that ultimately emerged in 1920 looked strangely in shape like the one already devised in 1860.
The present chapter reviews the intense diplomatic, as well as unofficial, activity triggered by the 1860 massacres and the impact of all these factors on the development of the Lebanist ideal.
THE 1860 MASSACRES
By
