the end of the day, serious disagreements among all parties and especially France, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the Ottoman government, on the other, obstructed the formulation of one common report. This situation compelled the commissioners to present to their ambassadors and to the officials of the Porte, who were to have the final say on the issue, two different projects for the reorganization of Lebanon, each one accompanied by the particular reservations of the French and British commissioners. The first, based on the 1842–45 arrangements, provided for the establishment of three separate districts, one for each of the Maronite, Druze, and Greek Orthodox communities, and the segregation of the populations of the Mountain in order to fit these new administrative units. It was opposed by the French commissioner, Leon Béclard. The second one, inspired by the pre-1840 situation, stipulated a reunified Mount Lebanon administered by a Christian governor. It was strongly criticized by the British commissioner, Lord Dufferin.
These two plans did not represent the option favored by the European representatives, who aimed at a complete reorganization of the Syrian provinces. But, they were brought, against their own better judgment, to abandon this initial stance and to fall back reluctantly on the two projects designed for Lebanon alone.
Therefore, the significance of the workings of the European Commission should not be judged solely on the basis of the two resulting projects presented to Istanbul. A fair assessment of its labors should rather include the representatives’ analysis of the situation and the different alternatives they considered, which represented a unique attempt at the definition, analysis, and solution of problems of the region. The meetings of the commission also had a critical impact on the local population and a significant effect on the subsequent development of local nationalist ideas.
Indeed, the meeting of the commission in Beirut was in itself an unprecedented occurrence for the local inhabitants. They were aware of the purpose of its mission, and they indirectly joined in its workings. Even though the commissioners did not try to consult them, local parties closely followed the various alternatives proposed, which were apparently widely circulated; they carefully considered them, and rejected or supported them, to the best of their abilities. All kinds of projects were circulated, ranging from some minor reforms in the Ottoman administration of Syria to the virtual independence of this province from the Ottoman Empire. Imaginary prospective maps were drawn and redrawn. Several candidates were examined to fill in the eventual positions of prince, viceroy, governor. The question of Mount Lebanon and the issue of its closer assimilation with the other Syrian provinces, or the extension of its administrative autonomy and boundaries, were closely scrutinized.
If we take into consideration the diverse alternatives examined by the commissioners, those suggested by the press and the pamphleteers, and those that circulated among the inhabitants, it is remarkable to note that all the nationalist ideas and options that would be adopted by some local party or other, from 1860 until 1920, were formulated and examined at this time. A regenerated and strengthened Ottoman Empire, a semi-independent Greater Syria or Greater Lebanon, an independent or only autonomous Smaller Lebanon within a Greater Syria, an Arab kingdom in the whole of Syria or a Muslim Arab kingdom in the interior, and a Christian principality on the coast: all of these alternatives, to mention only the most prominent, surfaced then.24
The terms of the nationalist quest and debate that occupied the elites of this region until the outbreak of World War I were thus all set during the two decisive years of 1860 and 1861. Future Arab, Syrian, Lebanese, and Ottoman nationalists did not develop any new alternatives out of those that had been elaborated then, and only fell back upon, pondered, and developed the ones already at hand during the half-century that separated them from the date when their ultimate fate was decided. Similarly, the European powers often recalled the options examined then, when subsequent crises led them to envisage alternatives to the Ottoman Empire.
Thus, the impact and significance of the meeting of the European Commission for the future of the region largely transcend its mere workings or its final conclusions. It represented the first serious examination of the Syrian and Lebanese questions and served as a source of inspiration and reference for the future. Its deliberations deserve, therefore, close scrutiny.
Initially, the European representatives devoted a considerable time—twenty-five out of twenty-nine sessions—to determining the responsibility for the latest events and the retribution and indemnities to be assigned.25 They did not formally begin their examination of the reorganization of Lebanon before March 1861. However, during that time, important informal negotiations did take place between the commissioners on the future of Syria and Lebanon.
The tone was set in the first days of November by the British commissioner, Lord Dufferin, who elaborated a plan for the reorganization of the whole of Syria.26 Attributing the causes of the events first and foremost to a deficient and weak Ottoman administration in Syria, linked to a sorry state of things in Istanbul, Dufferin's project confronted this issue outright. He proposed the establishment of a strong and centralized administration in Syria, virtually independent from Istanbul, and under the supervision of the European powers. The whole of Syria was to be unified into a single administrative district and entrusted to one governor-general chosen by the Porte in conjunction with the great powers. In order to shoulder his responsibilities, the governor-general of Syria would have to be empowered with adequate means to fulfill his mission. The financial policy of the administration would need to be locally determined and controlled and sufficient troops permanently quartered in this province. The Ottoman minister for foreign affairs, Fuad Pasha, Dufferin believed, represented the most appropriate candidate for the position of governor-general.27
Rightly suspecting that the main objection to his plan lay in the fact that the reorganization of Syria into a single province and the investment of the governor-general with such extraordinary prerogatives might be construed as inaugurating the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the British commissioner emphasized the fact that the new governor of Syria was to remain “the servant of the Sultan, and the governor, not the viceroy of the Province.” Furthermore, he added, with a touch of skepticism, “the disconnection of Syria from the Porte ought to be of a nature to admit . . . its reincorporation in the Empire, should the day arise when a strong and capable government shall be established at Constantinople” [my italics]. At any rate, this solution, Dufferin asserted, was the best suited to ensure the welfare and security of the Syrian population, consisting of “ten distinct and uncivilized races . . . again split into very fanatical sects.”28
Dufferin's proposal, as he explained, stemmed from his basic belief that the principle of fusion of these diverse populations was the proper panacea to their former divisions and trials: “As a general rule when you have to deal with a large population differing in their religious opinions, but perfectly assimilated in language, manners and habits of thought, the principle of fusion rather than that of separation is the one to be adopted. Religious beliefs ought not be converted into a geographical expression, and a wise government would insist upon the various subject sects subordinating their polemical to their civil relations with one another.”29 Gradually, he added in his distinctive style, the “barbarous distinctions which have hitherto divided its inhabitants into innumerable tribes and sects, may be expected to soften down; differences of race and of religion will to a certain extent become subordinate to those social relations, which a community of interests will establish.”30 The establishment of a strong and centralized government in Syria, Dufferin concluded, was the most appropriate arrangement to reach such a state of things.
Tackling the delicate issue of Lebanon, Dufferin identified two causes for its latest disturbances: the ambition of the Maronite clergy to establish Christian supremacy in the Mountain, which provoked the animosity of the other sects and especially that of the Druzes, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Ottoman authorities with the partial autonomy of Mount Lebanon and their continual schemes to stimulate the animosity of the Maronites and the Druzes in order to discredit the government of the Mountain. Furthermore, looking
