a major attack on both the Irish and Swedish camps was imminent, but Swedish and Irish mortars went into action on targets at the Tunnel, as later intercepts revealed that the Gendarmerie were ‘weakened and becoming discouraged’. The attack never developed.
The night of 9 December was a nerve-racking nightmare for the Irish as all night long Gendarmerie and mercenary mortars and machine guns kept up a continuous concentration of fire on the Irish camp, including harrowing fire from a Greyhound APC. Most mortar rounds fell short but there were some twenty that didn’t. The troops again spent the night in their trenches and at this stage most trenches had anything upwards of a foot of water in them. Contrary to expectations no one was injured, but from further intercepts it was learned that the Gendarmerie were reforming once again for an attack on the Irish camp. Irish mortars went into action, successfully, and again the attack did not happen. There was a serious shortage of mortar and anti-tank weapons by this time, as 36th Battalion supplies had been flown to Albertville, their original destination. Over the coming days these armaments and ammunition began to arrive in Élisabethville, but for now the Irish reply to an attack was by measured means, content in the knowledge that the next day would see a more offensive response.
The planned UN expansion operation towards the Liege crossroads, Point ‘E’, on which the Unit commanders and their staff had been briefed, went into effect the following morning, 10 December, and was preceded by an air strike on the Gendarmerie base, Camp Massart. Silver Swedish Saab fighter jets, nicknamed ‘flying barrels’ because of their thick fuselage, screamed overhead, expertly piloted, while Indian Canberra bombers strafed other Katangan strongpoints. The capture intact of fourteen Katangese aircraft during operation Rampunch, the majority of their air assets, and the destruction of almost all the remaining aircraft during a crushing air raid on Kolwezi airstrip on 5 December substantially neutralised the Katangese threat from the air and the UN now pressed its advantage to good effect. As in almost all conflicts it is the ground forces, the ‘boots on the ground’ that have to actually secure the victory. It is this hard, tough, grinding out of on-the-ground fighting by the infantryman that ultimately secures the objective and the day. It is both deadly and dangerous and the issue at hand in Élisabethville was still far from being decided. Since Operation Morthor’s unsuccessful conclusion, the UN had been busy ferrying in materials and munitions, manpower and firepower; the build-up was nearing completion.
It takes a form of fatalism to put yourself in direct line of sight. Nonetheless, encouraged by the air strike someone had to step out and be the first susceptible to a hailstorm of possibly pinpoint accurate fire. Those advancing have the difficulty of doing so while at the same time responding to and/or avoiding defensive fire. The men of A Company were without the advantage of surprise, shielded by darkness, nor screened by smoke. They knew all too well that any prepared defences they encountered must be suppressed before they were riddled by bullets and ripped open from top to bottom by the immediate threat ahead of them; unseen, remaining hidden with no visible sign of presence. There is no mood music or a dramatic musical score – nor an enemy that either convivially pops up or conveniently dies – and there is only a split second between being victor or victim. There is only one thing worse than wondering if someone out there is going to try to kill you, and that is knowing it. You can’t avoid being afraid; the survival instinct is too strong.
This extreme exposure to fear makes one very aware of the basic elements of self; the tension between having to be in the situation and not wanting to be; the strain of moving forward towards danger wishing instead to turn back and stay in safety; the struggle for courage, lost and found in one moment. Every man feels it, not many show it, but all share it. But how to deal with it? The drill is of cover and movement and in the event of coming under attack is ‘fire and movement’.
‘X’ marks The Tunnel. An aerial view of Élisabethville and A Company’s 36th Irish Battalion’s avenue of advance.
Courtesy of the Military Archives, Dublin
An infantry company has three platoons; each in turn comprises three sections. The ten-man section is the basic manoeuvre unit and this can be broken into two, one covering the movement of the other, leapfrogging forward ready to give mutual close-range supporting fire to the other, providing an ordered continuity of interlocking fire and movement. Good in theory, practiced in training, rehearsed in exercises. Add the distinct element of fear to cope with and does it work for real? A Company was about to find out.
Corporal Gerald Francis, the lead section commander of the lead platoon, No. 1 Platoon, recalled this unenvied task as a daunting undertaking:
I knew this was going to be difficult because the avenue along which we had to advance was an open road and we were highly exposed to being fired on. In the open we were going to be very vulnerable [and] I was highly conscious of the … probability of being fired on first. Chance and circumstance dictated it was me and I was all too aware of the potential dangers and wondered how best to deal with them. Glancing to my left as we advanced early on I noticed, looking down a connecting side road, the Swedes advancing along on a parallel route with APCs.
As they advanced their APCs were pouring ‘anticipatory fire’ from their twin box-fed Madsen machine guns into anywhere in advance [where] they felt attackers may be lurking so I raised my Carl Gustav sub-machine gun to my shoulder and did likewise and was quickly joined by the Vickers machine gun fire from the two Ford armoured cars. By means then of this ‘active defence’, while hugely exposed on the move, was how we proceeded, hoping to seize the initiative from any would-be attackers, nullifying their advantage. That there wasn’t anyone there or those that were decided the better of taking us on, the net effect was us reaching Liege crossroads without being fired on. The Swedes on the left route, us on the right route, Point ‘E’ between us.
The Irish battalion perimeter was now extended along Kasenga and Savonniers as far as Liege. B Company had earlier cleared from the Police Camp to the beginnings of Rue De Kasenga, whereupon the Swedes continued. Lieutenant Kiely had been injured by small arms fire. If the firing along the parallel routes had not provoked a direct response from the Gendarmerie then it was because they were only waiting to do so by indirect mortar fire. The ‘danger from the sky’ was to rain down for days.
Mortar fire is deadly, its lethality derived not so much from its explosive effect, unless it was an unlikely but possible direct hit, rather from the slivers of fragmenting shrapnel subsequent to the shredding of its outer metallic case on impact; a killing radius of around 25–50 metres. The larger the calibre, the greater the killing zone. Mortar bombs are fired – more correctly launched – indirectly, that is not in a straight direct line of sight from firer to target but instead lobbed from a firing line onto a target area, up and over in an indirect flight path following an arch-like trajectory. Mortars themselves are essentially metal tubes with a fixed firing pin inside at its base, the desired direction and distance governed by the angle of elevation at which it is set thereby controlling the fall of shot. The mortar bomb, or round, is dropped down the tube, its base striking the fixed firing pin and projected skywards, the tailfin keeping its direction in flight steady and true. Individual pin-point precision is not required due to the dispersive nature of its deadly debris. Accuracy, especially over distance, can be hampered by poor use of the weapon, varying wind direction or fluctuating wind strengths, and so can cause mortar bombs to fall short, long or wide. Some fall on or near the target area but do not explode. These ‘blinds’ need careful consideration because they could yet explode by themselves or if inadvertently disturbed. There is also a potential danger that in a rapid fire situation a mortar bomb is slid down the tube and does not launch. Then the firers, thinking it has exited, drop a subsequent mortar bomb down the tube which explodes on contact with the one already in it; this is known as a ‘double-feed’.
An indirect fire support weapon’s main use is to suppress enemy movement in defence or attack, to subdue their activities, to keep their advance in check, to lay
