actions. However, the most important weapon in any war is intelligence, and the UN didn’t do intelligence. Yet it was effectively at war. It was evident to the Irish that the task that lay ahead was not going to be easily achieved. There are many things that mitigate against such efficiency, some controllable, others not. Knowing the ground, particularly the terrain whereupon sits and surrounds the objective, is important. A Company were without proper maps providing any indication of the nature of the ground or buildings on the objective. Air photographs were not provided, organic fire support weapons – those within the Company were 60mm mortars and medium machine guns – were in short supply, and radio communications were poor. But every commander at every level knows you cannot possibly hope to possess all the advantages all of the time, the reality of the situation you are faced with is often far from the textbook ideal. Notwithstanding, the requirement remains, the objective has to be taken and the mission achieved.
What was a given was that the Katangese Gendarmerie were now a determined, well-equipped force. They were well led by battle-hardened, experienced, ruthless mercenaries who were a thinking adversary with a well-conceived campaign plan. Before this operation the Gendarmerie had been going from strength to strength and implementing this plan granted them a direction towards success. It began with harassing tactics, with close-in firing on UN camps at the time when the Irish and Swedish battalions were rotating. Their aim was to confine these raw new battalions to their camps. Next, they were determined to isolate the UN troops from their supply line; in this they were almost successful. The Irish, Swedish, Ethiopian and Indian battalions were denied routes Alpha and Bravo through Élisabethville. Finally, they aimed to seize the airport thus denying the UN its strategic APOD (Air Point of Disembarkation) and base.
Therefore, UN command had to counter and a plan to implement the destruction of Katangese resistance in the Élisabethville area was hatched. What would become known as Operation Unokat was a brigade in attack with a further brigade encirclement; in effect a division-sized operation. The operation was to be carried out in two phases: Phase One would contain and keep pressure on the Katangese Gendarmeries and mercenaries, in the Tunnel area particularly, with mortar fire pre-H-Hour (the exact time for the attack to commence). Phase Two, the Indian and Ethiopian battalions would surround Élisabethville by cutting off and blocking key routes – effectively sealing the city – preparatory to the destruction of the Katangese Gendarmerie and mercenary resistance by the Irish and Swedish battalions. This second phase was itself made up of two parts, one for the Irish 36th Battalion, the second for the composite 12th/14th Swedish Battalion. The one brigade-sized manoeuvre involved two deliberate and deep battalion-in-attacks – one Irish, one Swedish – supported by Indian 120mm heavy mortars.
The specific mission for the Irish Battalion, out of the brigade operation order, was the vital task of seizing and holding the Tunnel and to exploit forward positions in order to secure the right flank of the Swedish attack on Camp Massart, the Gendarmerie base. The UN brigade-in-attack plan for this offensive operation had therefore to synchronise the efforts of a number of elements of different nationalities, to coordinate their moving parts with fire support, properly integrated to a precise timetable, in order to dominate the fluid tactical situation. In turn, the individual battalions prepared their own respective attack plans, integrating with the specific details of the brigade’s mission and its coordinating instructions. Thus ‘Operation Sarsfield’ was brought into being, with A and B Companies launching the main attack on respective twin axes, mutually supported by C Company in reserve. The main effort of the entire brigade attack and overall divisional effort lay in the hands of the Irish, and as circumstances were to play out, hinged mostly on A Company’s efforts to seize the Tunnel.
In addition to its significant tactical importance, the Tunnel’s capture would have immense psychological value, smashing the Katangese grip on the city’s access, and allowing the UN to retake control of its freedom of movement and the overall situation. In exerting its military force in support of its mandated stand, the UN was making a massive statement to the world that it was prepared to back its position militarily. The loss of this major junction was crucial in breaking the morale and will of the Gendarmerie and the mercenaries. This was high-stakes stuff, tactically and strategically, both militarily and politically. It would be heavily defended and not easily given up.
The importance of the plan, its clear communication and effective execution, was emphasised at the ‘O’ Group, where the commander imparts his plan to his subordinates through the issue of orders. These full formal verbal orders are the key to ensuring that commanders within the battalion clearly understand the part they have to play in the upcoming action; that all important aspects are covered; and a precise prescribed formatted sequence is followed. That the mission completion is paramount is emphasised and the mission itself stated unambiguously, then restated for effect. Questions are answered and no effort is spared to ensure everyone has a clear understanding of the coordinated action to conduct the operation is arrived at. More than that, the commander will impress his personality on the operation and motivate his commanders verbally. It is here that leadership, that unseen but immediately obvious quality, comes directly into play and the unit cohesiveness of action is built around the commander’s intent, and Lieutenant Colonel Hogan’s intent was very clear: the Tunnel was to be seized and held and A Company were to do it.
Code Word: ‘Sarsfield’
On the afternoon of 15 December 1961, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hogan, Officer Commanding, 36th Infantry Battalion, received orders for the UN offensive to commence early the following morning (16 December). He issued orders at 2100 hours and H-hour for the attack to commence on the Tunnel was fixed for 0400 hours. In the intervening hours, between receiving his mission and issuing his own orders, Lieutenant Colonel Hogan had to prepare his own plan of action and his unit for combat. In the circumstances, time was the number-one enemy and he had to know both what, and perhaps more importantly, how to think in order not to allow precious hours and minutes to slip by. Having been given his mission he now had to prepare his plan to achieve it, and these efforts would only culminate when – having estimated the situation he was tasked with – he would develop and impart this plan via his ‘O’ Group (orders group) and launch the troops of his battalion into the forthcoming fray as fully prepared as he possibly could make them.
To craft his plan he had to consider what the mission accomplishment tasked him with, both stated and inferred. What did he have available in terms of military assets to achieve it, did he need additional support, and how was he going to organise all of this to best effect? In the given circumstances he and his staff had to determine the risks associated with the various options in light of the successful accomplishment of the essential tasks required of him and decide which were acceptable. Military men do not gamble. They take risks, but they weigh the different degrees of risk between one course of action and another, mentally and methodically war-gaming and scoring each. When it comes to analysing the mission, the trained military mind set works backwards, so to speak. A reverse logic and mental process kicks in, beginning with the objective to be achieved then analysing the time and physical space available to achieve it, in order to establish the correctly sequenced chain of events to be set in motion. This then drove the schedule of activities that had to occur. Out of this process fell clarity, the more concise construct of the essential mission for the 36th Battalion plan. Its precise purposes and specific tasks.
There is an old army saying that ‘time spent on reconnaissance is time well spent’. An initial ‘map recce’ is first conducted aided by any air photographs that are to hand. This informs the undertaking of the on-the-ground physical reconnaissance, important in the assessment of terrain and developing the various courses of action. The advantages and disadvantages of each course of action are considered and compared and a decision arrived at. In this case the maps were of limited use, there were no air photographs and physical reconnaissance was restricted so as not to give the game away to any observant Gendarme or mercenary. It was nonetheless useful in confirming the obstacles that would slow the advance, disrupt their movement and impede the manoeuvre towards the objective; the Tunnel. It was a built-up area, highly suited to defence. There were open spaces, good for the defender’s observation and fields of fire, bad
