Quinlan again approached the depot, this time commando style. He and his squad infiltrated through a swamp, at times up to their waists and even necks in water, to set the remaining much-needed fuel tanks ablaze. Flames rose to an estimated 100 metres, lighting up the countryside and, because of the nightly bombing raids, causing some concern at the airport, some five miles to the northwest. However, no bombing was attempted that night and the blaze continued for four more days.
While this action hampered Katangese motor movement they still retained a bombing capacity, under the direction of mercenary pilot Jerry Puren. A South African, with Second World War bomber service with the South African Air Force, Puren later flew transport planes with the Royal Air Force and saw service during the Berlin Airlift. Recruited as a mercenary in 1961, for the next seven years he was intensely involved in mercenary operations in the Congo, initially on the ground and then an air commander. Later he was an aide to Tshombe himself. Initially paid $1,000 a month, Puren became one of the very few mercenaries who fought for the Katanga ideal, not solely for the money. Early involvements saw his planes strike against Baluba concentrations, dispersing the Jeunesse warriors along the northern borders of Katanga around Lake Upemba and Kabala. Later, Puren’s flights attacked ANC troops of the Central Congolese government crossing Katanga’s border from Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Now, having kept a few planes safe from the UN jet fighter attacks on Kolwezi airstrip by holding them in nearby but much smaller airstrips, he was both conducting and directing night attacks on the UN’s Élisabethville airport.
He flew a converted Dove aircraft, used as an eight-seater transport or for light cargo deliveries, and rigged a rack system along the interior fuselage to take 12.5 kg bombs, making a hatch in the floor and mounting a plastic bombsight on the floor. By pulling a lever, bombs were dispatched one at a time through the hatch in the floor. By such means, with two Dornier aircraft and Puren in his Dove, the Katangese responded at night to the daytime raids by the UN jets. Thankfully, for the most part, their aim was largely inaccurate, but those below were not to know that until after the fact.
Over the next two days (13–14 December) heavy mortaring continued on all Irish positions. Some of this counter battery fire was in response to Swedish mortars firing from A Company’s locale, and during one bombardment Captain Harry Agnew was injured, losing one and a half fingers to shrapnel slivers. At one stage during these heavy exchanges it was agreed with the American Embassy that mortar fire from Irish lines should stop to allow the evacuation of 500 women and children from the Athene schools.
The identification of Katangese mortar positions was vital in the ebb and flow of the ongoing exchanges, which rapidly developed into duels. After three days and nights of almost continuous exposure to heavy incoming mortar barrages, a very definite direction was given with the aim of determining exactly the location of the enemy mortars. It was imperative they were found and neutralised. This involved the mortar OP (Observation Post with the MFC) going to higher ground, but to do so necessitated crossing a road under constant bombardment and having to move the necessary radio equipment, a heavy and cumbersome C-12 Wireless set with two large 6V encased ‘wet’ batteries to power it. This required crossing the exposed road on no fewer than four occasions, all the while under fire. The observers, Paddy Guerin and the previously injured Paul Ferguson, now gave a new ‘fire mission’ order with revised directions. The first fall of shot was declared ‘near’, the second ‘on’ – remarkable accuracy from the Irish. Thereafter, the enemy mortar line was taken out by A Company counter battery fire. A great deal of damage was inflicted on the Gendarmerie, neutralising its effect. This took a lot of unwanted ‘attention’ away from the Irish positions along Liege crossroads, and secured a springboard from which to set up the advance on the Tunnel.
On one subsequent occasion, the sighting of a Gendarmerie Greyhound armoured car in a firing position behind a house in Belair – a residential area for white settlers south of Avenue de Kasenga – led to the further discovery of new mortar positions. Surrounded as they were by city residents, the Irish could not direct fire onto them and the Katangese took full advantage of any opportunity afforded in the circumstances. Any such advantage was very short-lived, however, as these exchanges were about to be rapidly overtaken by events and happenings dictated by the UN Force Commander; Operation Unokat was about to be put into effect.
Seize and Hold
It was barely a week since A Company’s arrival into Congo and the build up to Operation Unokat, but in terms of experience it had been an electric escalation. They arrived as tentative peacekeepers, immediately became tough peace-enforcers and would soon be tantamount to ‘war fighters’. This tacit transformation from timidity through tenacity to temerity had been torrid and traumatic, the journey taut and tense, brutal and bewildering. Shot at on touchdown, subjected to several attacks since and under constant mortar and sniper fire, the Irish had been heavily pounded for the last four days. Having sustained one fatality and suffered several seriously wounded, they were no longer raw recruits and were far from being ‘green’. They had gone through something monumental, a situation that had been intense, fast and fluid. Being ‘new to the fight’ there was an excitement and drama to it, but this was neither history nor Hollywood, it was all too authentic and pressurised. They were beginning to be ground down by their experiences, their tempo degraded, their energy sapped. They were already tired, but the situation demanded a step up in toughness – they had to go toe-to-toe with an ‘enemy’.
The undertaking of a conventional offensive military operation was now the task in hand. Taking on this manoeuvre was accompanied by various tactics and techniques, which they had trained for but was now for real. A deliberate full-blown company attack, they were now part of a battalion action, itself a portion of the plan involving a brigade formation operation. The challenge to be accomplished was to be conducted in darkness and within the urban environment of Élisabethville. Fighting in built-up areas is difficult, lengthy and more costly in terms of ammunition and also, potentially, casualties.
The Tunnel, a vital railway bridge intersection with a dual carriageway underpass, controlled a crucial avenue of access into central Élisabethville and was a key point from which to continue the attack and support future operations. The Gendarmerie, under mercenary supervision, had the time, means and weaponry to prepare and fortify selected key buildings and structures as strongpoints; the Tunnel itself ideal for this purpose. The string of mutually supporting bolstered-up buildings and improved protected positions were certain to offer stiff resistance. Due to its nature, a defence of this type is easier to withstand any assault. An attacker faced with fighting in a built-up area will immediately look first and foremost to bypass; next to neutralise, stand off and fire into; then to destroy by artillery, tank or air bombardment. Only as a last and least favoured option would an attacking force conduct an assault. The Tunnel was the centre of gravity of the Katangese defence of Élisabethville; it was on this that everything depended and A Company had to rupture it. Bypassing or reducing it to rubble were not options, the Tunnel had to be seized and held the hard way. It was boots-on-the-ground, troops-on-the-Tunnel time.
A crucial bottleneck, the Tunnel was the single access point, the vital valve controlling the flow to and from the city centre from the south. For approximately 2 km either side it was completely built-up, a critical choke point of strategic importance. To seize requires advance; advance demands forward movement; movement needs impetus; and maintaining impetus under fire is dependent on momentum. It is difficult to keep the continuous tempo of an attack after you have been fired upon at close range. The inclination is to remain under cover and from there return fire. Junior leaders have to push hard and despite training and instruction the tendency is for men to bunch together, to misuse ground and cover; an instinct that has to be fought against throughout such an action. The success of an attack in particular depends on the initiative, energy and determination of the junior leaders in applying the company commander’s plan. Giving effect to this offensive spirit is fundamental to getting and keeping men moving towards seizing the opportunities available and gaining the objective. When soldiers come under fire they want reassurance and direction.
The moral strength of the commanders as much as the
