grievances of … the last 700 years … After half an hour he had reached the era of Brian Boru. After another half hour he had advanced to the period of some king a century or two later. By this time I was getting tired.’11 Although no agreement was reached, they both expressed an openness to meet again, but this never happened. The meeting also showed that Craig was open to negotiating with Sinn Féin. The meeting was supported by his party, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, Ulster farmers and ‘the trading community is also pleased as there looks to be a hope that by some understanding the boycott can be lifted’.12
Just days after King George V’s speech at the state opening of the northern parliament, Lloyd George invited de Valera, ‘the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland’, and Craig, ‘Premier of Northern Ireland’, to negotiations, without preconditions – another step towards a truce. Equally, it could be construed as recognition of partition by de Valera if he accepted.13 De Valera turned down the invitation, as it denied ‘Ireland’s essential unity’ and instead sought a conference in Dublin with ‘certain representatives of the political minority in this country’, including Craig, the Earl of Midleton (William St John Fremantle Brodrick), Sir Maurice E. Dockrell, Sir Robert H. Woods and Andrew Jameson. He also believed if he went to a conference in London with Craig, ‘they would be like two bad boys and would start fighting themselves at once and the Government would exploit their differences’.14 In his letter to invitees, de Valera stated:
The reply which I, as spokesman for the Irish Nation, shall make to Mr. Lloyd George will affect the lives and fortunes of the political minority in this island, no less than those of the majority.
Before sending the reply, therefore, I would like to confer with you and to learn from you at first hand the views of a certain section of our people of whom you are representative.15
All accepted de Valera’s invitation, except Craig, who replied to his ‘namesake in Dublin Senate’ that he had ‘already accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to London Conference’.16 For ‘sheer impertinence it could hardly be beaten’ claimed Craig’s wife.17
Craig was not involved in the talks between de Valera and Lloyd George following the truce in July. He informed Cope: ‘I’m going to sit on Ulster like a rock, we are content with what we have got – let the Prime Minister and Sinn Fein settle this and if possible leave us out.’18 He wanted to make Northern Ireland ‘a new impregnable Pale’.19 Craig believed that ‘no coercion of Ulster’ was among Lloyd George’s non-negotiable commitments. On 18 July, however, Lloyd George put forward ‘five suggestions to Craig and his ministers as to how they might accommodate de Valera’s requirement of Irish unity with local autonomy for the north devolved from Dublin’.20 Craig and his colleagues emphatically rejected them and Lloyd George backed down. Two days later, Lloyd George made his proposal to de Valera of offering Southern Ireland a dominion settlement. De Valera rejected the proposals, instead demanding ‘that Ulster should become a part of the Irish Dominion. Failing this, he demanded, as his only alternative, complete independence for Southern Ireland.’21 Lloyd George suggested that Craig meet with de Valera again, as another meeting was the only way to make ‘him realise that Ulster is a fact which he must recognise, not a figment bolstered up by the British Government as a counter to Sinn Fein. He does not understand this. Till he understands it, I fear that a settlement will always be unattainable.’22 Craig replied that he would only meet de Valera if he ‘accepted the principle of Ulster’s independent rights, and that he gave a written statement to that effect’.23 This stance was repeated when de Valera invited him to attend a conference in Castlebellingham in County Louth in late July.24
De Valera remained adamant that ‘we cannot admit the right of the British government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest, or at the call of any section of our population’.25 Importantly, he also stated, ‘we do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation. We agree with you “that no common action can be secured by force”.’26 He followed up by stating in the Dáil on 22 August that they ‘had not the power, and some of them had not the inclination, to use force with Ulster. He did not think that policy would be successful’.27 At the same meeting, he also declared:
as far as dual nationality was concerned, they never recognised it, but that fact would not prevent the British government from establishing it. For his part, if the Republic were recognised, he would be in favour of giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished. Otherwise they would be compelled to use force.28
The one ‘certain result’ of the county option would have been the gain of counties Tyrone and Fermanagh to the south at the expense of the north, something the Earl of Midleton ‘believed that the Sinn Féin leadership was especially covetous of’ and that there would be ‘no more trouble’ if they were transferred.29 During the impasse between de Valera’s talks with Lloyd George in July and the negotiations in October, Sinn Féin established a committee to ‘collect, compile and arrange … statements of fact and argument bearing on the position of Ulster’. It had the remit to address the ‘challenge which Ulster posed to the Sinn Féin cabinet’ and ‘devise a policy tolerable both to their own supporters and to the British government and which could also be imposed on the Ulster unionists’.30 The suggestion made by some northern Sinn Féin members to set up an advisory body of experts on the north to support the negotiation team in London was not taken up, however.31
Much has been written about the Anglo-Irish negotiations from October to December 1921. That the Sinn Féin plenipotentiaries had a number of disadvantages in comparison to the British delegation was clear. Chief amongst these was the vast experience of the British parliamentarians over the Sinn Féin negotiators. The Sinn Féin negotiation team consisted of Griffith, Collins, Robert Barton, Éamonn Duggan and George Gavan Duffy. The British team consisting of people like Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead was accustomed to stringent debate and opposition in Westminster, unlike the Irish delegates, who were part of what was essentially a talking shop – the Dáil. Lloyd George claimed the Irish delegates ‘are simple; they have none of the skill of the old nationalists; these men are not accustomed to finessing’.32 Most of the British parliamentarians had no respect for the Irish, with Bonar Law declaring ‘the Irish were an inferior race’.33
During the negotiations, the two primary issues discussed were Ulster and the crown. Were the talks to fail, ‘the British were determined that the break should come on the issue of sovereignty, while the Irish were intent that it should be Ulster’.34 The Irish were successful in reopening the Ulster question and rekindling matters that the unionists thought were settled. Lloyd George admitted they had a weaker case on Ulster, stating ‘while British soldiers might die for the throne and empire, I do not know who will die for Tyrone and Fermanagh’.35 The Irish delegation began with the position that ‘the unimpaired unity of Ireland is a condition precedent to the conclusion of a Treaty of Association between Ireland and the nations of the British Commonwealth’.36 On 17 October, the Sinn Féin proposals on Ulster contained concessions that weakened their hand from the outset; their proposals were in line with de Valera’s utterances in the preceding weeks. According to John McColgan:
The Unionists were offered the option of joining with the South or of maintaining local autonomy (over an area to be determined by plebiscite) subject to overriding authority from Dublin. Thus, instead of demanding complete Irish unity at the start, Sinn Féin opened negotiations giving away ground on Ulster. This approach probably prejudiced their chances of forcing the break on Ulster.37
It has also been argued that by this move, ‘Sinn Fein had … implicitly accepted partition by arguing that the state of Northern Ireland should be subservient to Dublin rather than London.’38 During the negotiations, Lloyd George had to expend as much energy in soothing unionist (both Ulster and Conservative) fears as he did in negotiating with Sinn Féin. Although Craig and Bonar Law were not ‘the elephants in the room’, they were ‘the elephants outside the door’.39 Lloyd George told Griffith, ‘we could
