come in if we let her alone … It is a mistake to assume that the population of Ulster for the time being is opposed to partition. It is not.’40 Nevertheless, once the Irish delegation stated that their allegiance to crown and empire was contingent on Ireland’s ‘essential unity’, Lloyd George and others within the British government appeared open to changing Northern Ireland’s status if Sinn Féin would accept allegiance to the crown.41 Austen Chamberlain, one of the British delegates, explained to his wife that ‘the six counties was a compromise, and, like all compromises, is illogical and indefensible’.42 After the negotiations had concluded, correspondence was published between Lloyd George and Craig, where the former said in November that ‘two dominions in Ireland was impractical and indefensible’.43 He ‘decried the idea of a partition that would involve “cutting the natural circuits of commercial activity”, and said that “when such frontiers are established they harden into permanence”’.44 Lloyd George unsuccessfully tried to squeeze Craig into accepting an all-Ireland parliament. Craig did not budge; instead, he ‘proposed that Northern Ireland should become a dominion “based on ‘equality of status’ with the South”, a proposal that came “as a shock to those accustomed to receive their passionate assurances of union”’ and demonstrated that unionists were somewhat flexible in their relationship with the union.45
Craig had become increasingly wary of Lloyd George since the latter’s five suggestions in July of local autonomy for the north within a Dublin parliament. He was aware of Lloyd George’s cunning and duplicity and also of Northern Ireland’s vulnerability. Ulster unionists noticed a cooling of their relationship with senior figures within the Conservative Party. John Andrews, northern labour minister, condemned the attempted ‘disgraceful betrayal of Ulster’ by members of the British government.46 Lloyd George’s overtures in July prompted the northern cabinet to agree
that everything in the situation pointed to the desirability of Northern Ireland consolidating its position as quickly as possible, and it was decided to carry on with the establishment of the new Parliament rapidly. The Prime Minister undertook to write to the Chief Secretary in regard to the early appointment of the Civil Service Committee, which had been suspended pending the establishment of some form of Government in Southern Ireland.47
Under the Government of Ireland Act, a civil service committee was set up to allocate civil service staff to the northern and southern jurisdictions. The committee could only function once both governments were established and had nominated their representatives to the committee.48 With no southern government in operation, Craig protested that the north was being ‘left in mid-air’ and suggested setting up a government in Southern Ireland ruled by the Lord Lieutenant or as a crown colony, or, alternatively, scrapping the idea of a civil service committee altogether.49 As the year progressed, he pressed harder for the transfer of services to Northern Ireland. Craig had appeared open to cooperating with Sinn Féin earlier in 1921, particularly through the Council of Ireland. He talked of a future of competition and rivalry between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland and of using the Council of Ireland to address all-Ireland problems. At a lunch in Belfast in February 1921, he spoke of his ‘hope not only for a brilliant prospect for Ulster, but a brilliant future for Ireland’.50 That same month, Craig stated, ‘The rights of the minority must be sacred to the majority … it will only be by broad views, tolerant ideas and a real desire for liberty of conscience that we can make an ideal of the Parliament and the executive.’51 One of the first actions of the Northern government was to select its twenty members to sit on the Council of Ireland, led by Craig (see Chapter Four). In declining to meet de Valera at a conference, he pointed out that they could instead meet at the council once it convened.52 Craig also appeared receptive to an all-Ireland council of finance, suggested by Arthur Griffith during the treaty negotiations.53 This openness changed, however, once he spoke to Churchill and Birkenhead. The return of Bonar Law, ‘an Orangeman and a fanatic’, back to the political scene after an absence due to ill-health also added to Craig’s resolve.54 Griffith noticed that by mid-November, Craig had ‘become more intractable as a result of the people he had met here in London’.55
Craig refused to concede any ground to Lloyd George and instead won a major concession from him. On 5 November, Lloyd George agreed to transfer services to Northern Ireland without the existence of a government in the south. The Lord Lieutenant was empowered to appoint, on a temporary basis, Southern Ireland’s representatives of the civil service committee, and services were scheduled to be transferred to the north between 22 November 1921 and 1 February 1922.56 That Lloyd George, the wily negotiator, would grant rather than receive concessions from Craig suggests that his commitment to an all-Ireland solution was not wholly sincere. The Irish delegation were aware that the northern jurisdiction was not fully functioning when the negotiations began in October; services being withheld by the British demonstrated that partition could be negotiable, but they appeared unaware of how to use this to their advantage. The significance of services being transferred to the north seemed lost on almost all of those in Dublin too.57 The main opposition in Dublin came from the civil service itself. From 9 November, the Dublin Castle departments were commanded to assign officers for temporary transfer to the north. Whilst Craig sat on his rock of Ulster, ‘the civil service sat on the rock of the Civil Service Committee … confident that whatever would emerge from the London negotiations would be at least as good as existing terms and might be even better’.58 To prevent the enforced transfer of staff to Belfast, the civil service representative body, the Irish Civil Service Association, took a case to the High Court, further stalling the transfer of staff.59 This did not greatly perturb Craig or Clark, who had been filling the northern civil service with Ulstermen they considered loyal.60 In fact, it suited them not to have too many staff transferred from Dublin, particularly those staff members who did not want to be there. Craig was satisfied that finance and, most importantly, law and order, had successfully been transferred, with agricultural services to be transferred by 1 January and education services by 1 February 1922.61 The transfer of powers of law and order gave the Northern government control over the RIC in the six counties and allowed it to remobilise the Specials.62 Clark’s role in Dublin Castle was discontinued, and he became Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Finance and head of the civil service in Northern Ireland.63 The judiciary was transferred to Northern Ireland on 1 October, with a formal opening of the new courts taking place three weeks later.64
With the possibility of reaching a settlement by pressurising Craig now ended, Lloyd George looked to squeeze the Sinn Féin delegation instead. His secretary, Tom Jones, dangled the idea of a boundary commission in front of Griffith and Collins. Collins was against the proposal, as ‘it sacrificed unity entirely’. When he enquired why the British would not concede to local plebiscites, cabinet member Austen Chamberlain could only reply meekly, claiming that ‘you could not put a more difficult question to us in the light of the history of recent years’.65 Griffith, however, ‘was not alarmed’.66 He believed the Ulster cabinet would not accept such an offer. Initially, the openness in relation to accepting a boundary commission was a tactical move ‘to deprive “Ulster” of support in England by showing it was utterly unreasonable in insisting to coerce areas that wished to get out’.67 Griffith did believe there would be benefits to it, writing to de Valera that the Boundary Commission ‘would give us most of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and part of Armagh, Down, etc.’.68 Griffith naively interpreted his assurances regarding a boundary commission as a ploy to help Lloyd George secure Irish unity. Instead, his assurances resulted in an animated Lloyd George using them against him as the negotiations reached their conclusion, leading to Griffith and the rest of the Irish delegation signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty on the morning of 6 December 1921.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty’s main provision relating to Ulster was Article 12. It stipulated that if Northern Ireland opted not to join the Irish Free State, as was its right under the treaty, a boundary commission would determine the border ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’.69 Although Northern Ireland was nominally included in the Irish Free State, ‘in reality the inclusion of a clause allowing the north-east to opt out of Dublin jurisdiction, something they were to do at the first opportunity in December 1922, was merely
