with the Boundary Commission was its ambiguity. No ‘timetable was mentioned or method outlined to ascertain these wishes; how exactly economic and geographic conditions would relate to popular opinion, and which would prove most important’.71 No plebiscite was asked for, the clause was open to a number of different interpretations and no time was specified for the convening of the commission. The ambiguity suited Lloyd George perfectly. On one hand, he could give the impression to Sinn Féin that large tracts of Northern Ireland would be transferred to the south. On the other hand, he could give the impression to Craig that it would rationalise the cumbersome border, with perhaps the inclusion of Protestant strongholds to the north. The duplicity of Lloyd George in 1916 in his dealings with Carson and Redmond was clearly forgotten. The Sinn Féin delegation blundered greatly in acceding to such a vague and indefinable clause. Frank Pakenham contended that the blame on the Irish part ‘must rest either on the legal intelligences of 1921 which failed to see evil lurking in Clause 12, or on those of 1925 which permitted the decision of Mr. Justice Feetham [see Chapter Six]’.72
Ulster unionists were vehemently opposed to the Boundary Commission, despite Craig being one of the first to suggest such a concept during the embryonic stages of the Government of Ireland Bill (see Chapter Two). Firstly, they were not party to the treaty and yet were now obliged to adhere to its clauses. It reignited the sense of uncertainty and once again put Northern Ireland’s future in doubt, or at least significant parts of it. Craig told Lloyd George that he would refuse to cooperate with the commission, as there was ‘no precedent in the history of the British empire for taking away territory from an established government without its sanction’.73 At a northern cabinet meeting the following month, the unionist government reflected on Craig’s refusal and weighed up their options on participating, or not, in the Boundary Commission. Although non-participation would make the government ‘very popular’ in Northern Ireland for a time, having no input meant that ‘Ulster would lose a larger area than if she had a representative on the Commission’, and resistance would be ineffective ‘unless we were prepared to take up arms against British troops’. Such a move would see them ‘probably lose the support of the Unionist Party in Great Britain’.74 If they did take part, Bonar Law assured them that either Lord James Clyde or Lord Dunedin, Andrew Murray, both politicians and judges within the Conservative Party, would act as the northern commissioner. Edward Carson also consented to act as Northern Ireland’s commissioner, stating that ‘a little modification of the boundary might be advantageous’. Craig ‘thought the best course would be not to show our hand at the present time but to consider the matter very carefully during the few months that might elapse before the Boundary Commission would be established’.75 A significant amount of time elapsed by the time the commission finally met in 1924.
Nationalist leaders in the six and twenty-six counties were overly optimistic, as it would transpire, regarding the outcomes that would be achieved from the Boundary Commission, believing many areas in Northern Ireland would be transferred to the Irish Free State, including ‘Derry and its western hinterland, most of Tyrone and all of Fermanagh, south Armagh and south Down’.76 Denis Gwynn wrote that the ‘suggestion of a Boundary Commission seemed naturally to imply that the Ulster Unionists would not be allowed to retain the full Six-County area if they did refuse to enter the Free State’.77 To many nationalists, the treaty ‘was a temporary settlement, regarded by many as extorted by threat of immediate war’.78 The optimism over the Boundary Commission in many ways explains the small fraction of time devoted to partition (just nine out of the total 338 pages of the treaty debates) during the acrimonious Dáil debates on the treaty.79 Both the pro- and anti-treaty sides supported the Boundary Commission as a means to end or at least limit partition. Both sides ‘were complacent about the vague terms of reference for the Boundary Commission and the lack of provision for plebiscites even in border areas’.80 Sovereignty was the primary cause of the split that followed the treaty. Even de Valera’s alternative proposal to the treaty, Document No. 2, originally included the same clauses on the north as the original treaty.81 Many nationalists along the border believed their transfer to the Irish Free State was imminent. They were lulled into a false sense of security, believing they could continue to ignore the northern jurisdiction and its institutions. Their hopes would soon prove illusory.
Up until 1922, partition was an administrative inconvenience that had little impact on the lives of people. The border ‘had not yet become a frontier between two mutually antagonistic states’.82 From 1922, with a new government established in the south, the effects of partition became more apparent. Both Irish governments were ‘forced to devote much attention to relations with each other and to the question of the boundary between their two states’.83
CHAPTER SIX
Politics
From its birth, Northern Ireland faced significant political challenges. In the eyes of many on the island, including one-third of the population within its own territory, it lacked legitimacy. Although signing the treaty meant that Sinn Féin had formally accepted partition, the inclusion of Article 12, gave hope to nationalists, who believed that much of the northern territory would be transferred to the Free State, leaving the remainder as an unviable rump. One of the objectives of the treaty, at least on the British side, was to normalise relations between both Irish jurisdictions. In many ways, the treaty led to the opposite. The shadow of the Boundary Commission hung over Northern Ireland. Nationalists felt they could continue to ignore and obstruct the northern jurisdiction, particularly in areas of nationalist majorities. The commission merely added to the vulnerability and paranoia of unionists. Craig stated as much to Churchill in May 1922:
The Boundary Commission has been at the root of all evil. If you picture Loyalists on the borderland being asked by us to hang on with their teeth for the safety of the Province, you can also picture their unspoken cry to us, ‘if we sacrifice our lives and our property for the sake of the Province, are you going to assent to a Commission which may subsequently by a stroke of the pen, take away the very area you now ask us to defend?’1
The prospect of some levels of cooperation in 1921 evaporated, replaced by a siege mentality to protect the north’s interests from the south and from those disloyal elements within its territory. The focus of the following chapter, security, was the primary concern of the northern government. Almost all political decisions arose from the need to secure and strengthen its borders and defeat its opponents through military and political means. The northern government was able to take whatever measures it saw fit. In the northern House of Commons, there was no opposition, with the Sinn Féin and UIL MPs abstaining from parliament. As the House of Commons elected members of the senate, only unionist senators were present.2 Other than providing financial support, the British government mainly adopted a laissez faire approach, allowing the devolved northern government to manage its own affairs unimpeded.
The make-up of the cabinet of the first northern government was also a significant factor in determining how the southern and internal opposition were dealt with. All cabinet members were drawn from the upper layers of Protestant Ulster society. James Craig, son of a millionaire, was a man of independent means. Lord Londonderry and Edward Archdale owned large estates of land. John Andrews was chairman of his family’s linen company and a director of two other companies. Hugh Pollock was managing director of a company of flour importers whilst Richard Dawson-Bates was a prosperous solicitor.3 They all had close links to the Orange Order, a trend that was to continue for many decades. By 1968, everyone who served in the cabinet had been a member.4 In 1921, the average age of the cabinet was fifty-four, and owing to Craig’s reluctance to make changes, the average age had increased to sixty-two by 1938. At the outbreak of the Second World War, only twelve people had served in the northern cabinet from 1921 to 1939.5
Cabinet ministers tended to be ‘dogged, reliable and conservative, rather than imaginative and innovative’.6 James Lichfield, a senior civil servant seconded to Northern Ireland, believed ‘the only Cabinet Minister of real value was Craig himself’.
