rear, a number of men manhandled the single antique 6-pounder artillery piece that had been brought along to assault the American fortifications.
The American fortifications at the island of Michilimackinac [Mackinac]
From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 (artist unknown)..
Advancing along the narrow track that led to the fort, the infantry and Natives deployed into their separate battle formations, while the artillerists dragged the small cannon to a nearby piece of high ground that overlooked the fort. With his forces in place, Captain Roberts sent a note to the American garrison commander, Lieutenant Porter Hanks (U.S. Artillery), demanding the immediate and unconditional surrender of the American position. Unaware of the formal onset of war, unprepared and facing a strong enemy force, Hanks’ command officially consisted of only around sixty men. Of this small number, several men were sick, while many of the remainder were relatively elderly or otherwise considered unfit for active service. As a result, with no real alternative before him, Hanks surrendered the strategic position without a shot being fired. Tactically this victory was of only minor value, but strategically it swung the balance of power in the upper Great Lakes by securing the alliance of the western Native nations to the British war effort. It also had a decisive effect on the subsequent events that were to unfold on the Detroit frontier.
Back on the Niagara frontier, the American forces were also caught off guard. According to local folklore, when the notice of the declaration of war was delivered to Fort George the officers of the British garrison were entertaining their opposite numbers from Fort Niagara at a dinner in the officers’ mess. In a show of courtesy, the American officers were not immediately interred. Instead, the dinner was concluded with loyal toasts and expressions that a similar dinner would be held following the termination of hostilities. Following the meal the American officers were permitted to return to Fort Niagara, there to prepare for war to commence the following day.
Fort George, E. Walsh, artist, circa 1805. The parade ground and officer’s mess at Fort George in the pre-war period. (Below): A 2012 view of the reconstructed officer’s mess in the National Historic site of Fort George at Niagara-on-the-Lake.
Courtesy of the Clement Library, University of Michigan.
Despite gaining these minor victories, the fact remained that the British military position in Upper Canada was precarious at best. Britain was fully committed to the war in Europe and consequently had little in the way of resources that could be spared for the North Americas. Nor could the colonial economies provide the necessary agricultural or manufactured supplies needed to sustain the war effort on their own. Even where supplies were forthcoming, they had to be transported along a long and tenuous transportation network that was constantly open to being attacked or cut by enemy action. In view of these difficulties, securing and defending the vital lifeline of the St. Lawrence River, Niagara frontier, and Detroit River corridor became a top priority in the military planning of successive British commanders in Upper Canada. Unfortunately, each in his turn had to deal with Sir George Prevost, who was seemingly willing to entirely abandon Upper Canada so that he could keep the bulk of his supplies and manpower in Lower Canada, “just in case” of an attack against Montreal, Quebec, or Halifax.
In comparison, the American war effort, while getting off to a bad start, had the strategic advantage of being waged on its own continent. Furthermore, despite logistical difficulties and equally poor roads, each of the fronts could be supplied with men and equipment by several distinct and relatively secure routes. In addition, the larger base population, coupled with a relatively strong industrial and agricultural sector, provided the resources needed to supply the armies on an ongoing and timely basis. Having gone to the trouble of declaring war, the American administration naturally looked to its military to supply it with victories to justify its action.
Unfortunately, these American laurels were not to appear for some time, as General Henry Dearborn found that his goal for an immediate four-pronged assault on the Canadas was stalled before it had even begun. His proposed main thrust (toward Montreal from Albany) failed to recruit men; while the New England states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island refused outright to acknowledge the national call to arms and raised the question of seceding from the Union rather than have their men “dragged out of the State to fight Indians or die before the walls of Quebec.”[1] Further inland, his planned second thrust (from Sackets Harbor against Kingston) was woefully short of weapons and ammunition, thus preventing any significant offensive from that base for some time. It was therefore up to Dearborn’s commanders on the Niagara and Detroit frontiers, respectively Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer and Brigadier General William Hull, to press the American cause. Of the two, it was General Hull, who was also the governor of the Michigan Territory, who made the first move.
THE DETROIT CAMPAIGN,
JULY TO AUGUST 1812
Even before war had been declared, the Detroit frontier, although the most isolated of the potential war zones, had been given particular attention by the military planners of both Britain and the United States. As early as February 1812, General Brock had set down his “Plans for the Defence of Canada.” In this memorandum he outlined the vital need to secure the alliance of as many of the First Nations tribes as possible to counteract the American advantages of men and logistics. To this end, Michilamackinac was to be seized, followed by the forwarding of as many troops as could be spared from York and the Niagara to commence a direct offensive from Amherstburg against Detroit. By these bold thrusts and hopefully quick victories, Brock hoped to secure the Native tribes as allies of the Crown. In support of this, Brock made a flying visit to Amherstburg from June 14–17, 1812. While he brought supplies and around a hundred reinforcements for the post, he also paid particular attention to solidifying the tacit pact between the Native leaders and himself. He even went so far as to commit himself and his government to press for the establishment of a formal Native homeland that would act as a buffer zone between the two expansionist nations following a successful conclusion of the war.
The “Detroit frontier” in 1812.
From Major John Richardson, Richardson’s War of 1812, 1842.
In a similar fashion, the United States took steps before war became a reality to bolster their military position on the Detroit frontier. On May 25, General Hull was in Dayton, Ohio, massing his regular and militia forces for an expedition to reinforce the small garrison at Detroit, some two hundred miles (340 kilometres) away. By July 1, unaware of the declaration of war, Hull’s army was at the Maumee Rapids, where he decided to lighten his baggage train by placing a portion of his equipment and supplies, as well as his own personal baggage and correspondence, onboard the Cuyahoga Packet. The intention being that they would be waiting for him when he and his army completed the journey along the shore. The next day word of the declaration of war arrived, but it was too late to prevent the capture of the Cuyahoga Packet and the vital stash of military paperwork by the British. Hastening on, Hull’s army of around 2,500 men arrived at Detroit on July 6 and immediately set about strengthening the post’s defences, while equally making preparations to conduct an offensive campaign against Fort Amherstburg, some fourteen miles (22.4 kilometres) downriver from Detroit and on the other side of the river in Upper Canada. Commanding that small garrison was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas St. George (63rd Regiment), a sixty-year-old veteran soldier of the European wars. Under his command, including the latest reinforcements, he only had around 250 regular troops. In addition, while there were, on paper, at least 600 Essex and Kent County Embodied Militia that could be called upon, most were, at best, half-hearted in their enthusiasms. Finally,
