both sides of the European conflict, the Americans found their effective monopoly threatened by the subsequent actions of both Britain and France to tighten the economic “noose” on their enemy. Inevitably, the domestic pressure to maintain their new economic advantage, coupled with a political determination not to bow to any foreign decrees, led the American government into direct confrontation with both countries. However, while the actions of both combatants had severe economic impacts on the United States, the American newspapers repeatedly highlighted those incidents that involved British interests, leading to strident demands for retribution by the more extreme members of the American government.
In an offshoot to this situation, the huge growth in American mercantile traffic created an increased demand for experienced sailors to crew the ships. American merchant navy pay rates rose dramatically, leading to an increase in the numbers of men deserting from the brutality of the Royal Navy to the relatively lenient American trading vessels. Determined to recover these deserters, and rejecting the concept of any British citizen having the right to ever relinquish or change his nationality, the Royal Navy strained maritime legalities to breaking point by stopping and boarding American vessels to search for and seize what they deemed to be British nationals. The intimidation finally reached its climax when the HMS Leopard fired broadsides into the USS Chesapeake (June 22, 1807) to compel her to heave-to and submit to being boarded for the purpose of being searched.
War was now a distinct possibility, and the fact that legitimate American complaints (of U.S. citizens being “pressed” into British service) were being met with blunt indifference from the British government did nothing to ease tensions. President Thomas Jefferson, faced with the difficult choice of declaring war or submitting to the demands of both France and Great Britain, chose instead to enact a series of draconian and economically catastrophic Embargo Acts that effectively quarantined the United States from all trade and business dealings with Europe. Faced with the outright ruin of their lucrative shipping industry and wholesale unemployment across all sectors of the economy, the New England region soon became the centre of a massive system of coordinated smuggling with its neighbouring Canadian maritime colonies. American customs officials were threatened and even attacked by their own citizens, as were the troops sent to enforce the new regulations. This unexpected turn of events temporarily ended the call for war, as American anger was turned inward on their own government. Although the hated Embargo Acts were replaced in 1809 with the Non-Intercourse Act (forbidding American trade with Great Britain or France until either country revoked their own decrees), it did little to mollify the anger and concerns of the east coast merchants and shipping owners.
Meanwhile, the unremitting westward expan-sion by white settlers prompted the affected Native nations to unite in a common political and military confederacy under the leadership of a charismatic Shawnee chief, Tecumseh (Leaping Panther), and his brother Lolawauchika (Open Door), otherwise known as “The Prophet.” In response, Governor William H. Harrison of the Indiana Territory instigated a military campaign that resulted in the defeat and destruction of the Native alliance at the Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811). From this point on, many of the surviving Native tribes became the deadly enemy of the United States and saw any potential enemy of the new republic as an ally to be secured.
The Shawnee War Chief, Tecumseh (Leaping Panther). Artist unknown. The lynchpin of the Native alliance opposing the westward expansion of the Americans in the pre-war period, he was also a crucial element in Upper Canada’s defense during the War of 1812. He was killed in action against the Americans at Moraviantown, Upper Canada, in October 1813.
From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812.
The potential for conflict between Great Britain and the United States deepened in 1810, when American congressional elections resulted in the election of several vehemently anti-British representatives. Later styled “War Hawks,” these politicians quickly gained control of several prominent administrative committees. They also pushed through a series of measures that could be interpreted as being deliberately aimed at creating an atmosphere of crisis that would bring about a declaration of war against Great Britain. Using the claim of “Free Trade and Sailors Rights” as their basis for complaint, they manipulated public opinion by making inflammatory speeches and publishing vitriolic editorials in the nation’s press. At the same time, if anyone questioned or opposed their position, they were immediately stigmatized with accusations of being subversive or even traitorous in their actions. As a result, the War Hawks successfully marginalized the conflict issues with France and characterized Britain, led by Spencer Perceval (holding the dual roles of prime minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer), as a villainous bully that needed to be taught a lesson.
Such was the depth of anti-British rhetoric within the American legislative assembly that
Peter B. Porter, a leading War Hawk from Buffalo, New York, and chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, was able to openly state on December 6, 1811:
The Committee … were satisfied … that all hopes of accommodating our differences with Great Britain by negotiation must be abandoned … the Orders in Council … ought to be resisted by war…. That we can contend with Great Britain openly and even handed on the element where she injures us, it would be folly to pretend. Were it even within our power to build a navy which should be able to cope with her, no man who has any regard for the happiness of the people of this country would venture to advise such a measure … but, Mr. P. said, there was another point where we could attack her, and where she would feel our power more sensibly. We could deprive her of her extensive provinces lying along our borders to the north. These provinces were not only immensely valuable in themselves, but almost indispensable to the existence of Great Britain, cut off as she now is in a great measure from the north of Europe…. In short, it was the determination of the committee to recommend open and decided war — a war as vigorous and effective as the resources of the country and the relative situation of ourselves and our enemy would enable us to prosecute.[2]
However, despite every effort to create a unified national cry for war against Great Britain, the War Hawks found that when matters finally came to a formal vote for the declaration of war in 1812, the United States was still anything but united in its position. Divided by party politics, there were also strong regional opinions for and against a war. For example, the northeastern seaboard states (Massachusetts [including Maine], Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Delaware), rejected war in the Congressional vote of June 4, 1812, and submitted formal petitions of objection to the president. On the other hand, the inland states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio voted in favour, backed by New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Similarly, the Senate was divided in its vote of June 17, 1812. Faced with this national division, President James Madison initially hesitated to sign the bill. However, when news arrived that a lone gunman had assassinated Prime Minister Spencer Perceval in the House of Commons on May 11, and that the British government was consequently in a state of turmoil, President Madison moved quickly and signed the declaration of war on June 18, 1812.
U.S. President James Madison (artist unknown) signed the declaration of war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812.
Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.
If the American nation was not politically united in its desire for war, neither was it militarily ready to press its point by force of arms. Despite the fact that Congress had taken the president’s earlier request for the raising of 10,000 regulars and 50,000 militia (November 1811) and expanded it to read 25,000 regulars, 50,000 militia, and additional funding of $10 million, it could not simply make these troops appear on the battlefield. Grandiose claims of an instant victory once war was begun were made by people like Congressman Henry
