Upper Canada Preserved — War of 1812 6-Book Bundle. Richard Feltoe

      Sir George Prevost, S.W. Reynolds, artist, date unknown. Appointed governor-in-chief and commander-in-chief of the British forces in British North America in 1811, Sir George proved to be an able civil and political administrator. Unfortunately, his on-field military command capabilities were not as strong. Following flawed decisions made during the Plattsburg campaign of 1814, he was recalled to England at the end of the war to face a court martial inquiry. He died a month before the inquiry began.

       Library and Archives Canada, C-19123.

      A constraint that Brock fortunately chose to interpret with a large degree of flexibility when it came to his course of action over the next few months.

      Nor did Brock receive any significant assistance from the local provincial legislature, which was salted with several actively pro-American sympathizers. This situation had arisen during the period following the colonial rebellion of the American eastern seaboard states in 1776. At that time the population of the thirteen colonies had become divided into what were termed “Rebels” (who sided with those fighting for independence in what became known as the American Revolution), and “Loyalists” (who had fought for the king). With the victory of the rebels and the creation of the United States of America, the postwar punitive measures (including property seizures and revocation of civil liberties, rights of property, employment, and legal standing, not to mention mob violence and lynchings) that were heaped upon the Loyalists forced huge numbers of individuals and families to become homeless refugees. For the British government, the plight of the Loyalists required some form of recompense. In response, large tracts of land were granted to Loyalists in the undeveloped regions of its Canadian colonies, including Upper Canada, in particular along the Niagara frontier. As a result, during the last decade of the eighteenth century, while many waterside areas saw varying degrees of clearing and settlement by these transplanted refugees, the interior of the region still remained relatively untouched. However, during the following years, increasing numbers of Americans also arrived and took up residence, bringing with them their republican sentiments. This new pro-American influx naturally generated resentment within the established communities of the old Loyalist families and their descendants, and effectively split the population into rival political camps. It also created security problems for the limited number of British regular military forces detailed to defend the border against any future American aggression. Numerous letters and reports by successive lieutenant governors of Upper Canada recorded their unease at the increasing influence and dissenting opinions of that sector of the population who maintained that their allegiance was to the United States, not the king, and who considered the annexation of Upper Canada by the United States as merely a matter of time, or opportunity.

      Now, with war in the offing, these near-traitors, in the opinion of Brock and his military subordinates, were taking every opportunity to block any legislation or expenditure designed to improve the defences of the colony. In a letter to Sir George Prevost, penned on February 25, 1812, Brock commented:

I had every reason to expect the almost unanimous support of the two branches of the Legislature to every measure the Government thought necessary to recommend; but after a short trial I found myself egregiously mistaken in my calculations…. The great influence which the vast number of settlers from the United States possess over the decisions of the Lower House, is truly alarming, and ought by every practical means to be diminished….[9]

Similarly, the Upper Canada militias, which although officially listing some 11,000 men of eligible age for military duty in the event of war, were of such a poor quality and in some cases of dubious loyalty that Prevost stated, “… it might not be prudent to arm more than 4000.”[10] Instead, it was recognized that the future security of Upper Canada might depend upon the tenuous alliance of the Native tribes to the British cause. Unfortunately, here too there was a lack of unity amongst the Native nations on the desirability to aggressively pursue a war. In the upper lakes region the western tribes of the Sioux, Winnebagos, and Menominis were fervent in their desire to revenge themselves for the recent incursions of Americans into their territories. On the other hand, on the Niagara frontier the bands of the Six Nations around the Grand River were far more reluctant to go to war, and even withheld any official promise of future assistance to the British cause if the Americans attacked. Their only offer of support came by approving the use of individual warriors volunteering to act with their British allies.

      CHAPTER 3

      The Opening Round, June to August 1812

      Following the official public declaration of war in Washington on June 19, 1812, events began to occur at an increasing pace as notices were dispatched to the frontiers by a series of messengers. Unfortunately for the Americans, although editorials on the imminence of war had filled the pages of the nation’s newspapers for months, once it began the more efficient British communications network notified their distant garrisons before their American counterparts had heard the news. This led to the opportunity for enterprising British and Canadian troops to engage in some pre-emptive strikes. For example, on June 29, at the eastern end of Upper Canada, a detachment of militia stationed at Prescott saw eight U.S. vessels passing upriver on the St. Lawrence, headed for Lake Ontario. Using a number of bateaux and longboats, the detachment chased the American vessels, intercepting them near Elizabethtown (later renamed Brockville). The schooners Sophia and Island Packet were boarded, captured, and subsequently burnt, while the remaining six American boats fled back to their base at Ogdensburg, becoming prisoners in their own port. In a similar fashion, on June 27, two longboats filled with around forty militiamen and regulars from Fort Erie were able to intercept the schooner Connecticut as it set sail on Lake Erie from Buffalo for Detroit. While at the other end of that lake, men from the Provincial Marine, accompanied by six soldiers from Fort Amherstburg (also known as Fort Malden), used a longboat to pursue, catch, and board the American schooner Cuyahoga Packet. Taking the vessel into the harbour at Amherstburg, they found that not only had they captured a detachment of thirty American troops, but also a cargo of food, medical supplies, entrenching tools, and baggage. This material had only been put on board the vessel the previous day and was part of a consignment accompanying Brigadier General William Hull’s army in its march from Dayton, Ohio, to garrison Detroit. While the supplies were a welcome addition to the depleted reserves of the British force, the captors also discovered that they had gained a huge intelligence coup in the form of a chest containing Hull’s entire personal and official correspondence. This included instructions for General Hull from the American secretary of war, the muster rolls of manpower for his command, and a complete set of lists detailing the quantities of ammunition, arms, and other supplies accompanying the army in its march to Detroit.