through the study of the abandonment provoked by natural disaster. For instance, villages such as Africo (a mountainous settlement in Aspromonte, destroyed in 1951) were relocated to the Ionian coast, thus completely losing their former agropastoral economy. The case of Africo is just one among many that highlight the “dramatic reality that the torrents provoked” (Cingari 1982:346). At the national level, what was exposed in the aftermath of the major floods of 1951 and 1953 was that Calabria had always been used for political justification of various taxations imposed on all Italians. After the disastrous earthquakes of 1905 and 1908 the government22 passed special laws (particularly the 12 January 1909 law), according to which Italians were taxed for the reconstruction of Calabria. Yet, over the subsequent years, the enormous amount of money collected never reached its intended destination; it was rather used for other causes such as the Libyan war and World War II, compromising the social and economic rebirth of Calabria. Leftist parliamentary voices expressed their discontent regarding the legislation and the financial allocation, attacking the inefficiency and corruption of the Christian Democrat government.
Actually little or almost nothing has changed in Calabria since 1953; the special laws for Calabria have been used as an instrument of political power of the Christian Democrats, as a means to extend the electoral clientelism of the governmental party, as motivation for bureaucratic prosperity and corruption…. The sources from the special laws for Calabria were given to the son of the president of the consortium raggruppati di bonifica, an ex-second secretary in the public sector and Christian Democrat. (Atti Parlamentari—29105—Camera dei Deputati IV LEGISLATURA - DISCUSSIONI - SEDUTA DEL 12 DICEMBRE 1966)
What was important, however was the self-determination of the Calabrians, who
were waging their own battle to recuperate the enormous amount of damage provoked by the landslides. Those united committees, comprised of priests, peasants, intellectuals and workers, not only were not encouraged and financed by the government but also they were rather obstructed by it. (Atti Parlamentari—29103—Camera dei Deputati IV LEGISLATURA - DISCUSSIONI - SEDUTA DEL 12 DICEMBRE 1966)23
The floods constitute one of the major problems in South Italy that, at least in a pre-election period, tantalize every government regardless of political disposition. In line with the Christian Democrat government that decided on the relocation of flood stricken populations, the center-left government in 1966 argued that
We must develop the protection of the soil via the evacuation of specific populations. It is not our fault that the Calabresi, in order to survive the Saracen invasions, have inhabited the forests over the centuries. Now, it is clear, that they can no longer live in the mountains; it is not through the mountains that the grandi vie which bring civiltà and prosperity pass. (Atti Parlamentari—29117—Camera dei Deputati IV LEGISLATURA - DISCUSSIONI - SEDUTA DEL 12 DICEMBRE 1966)
Comunità Montana—instituted with the law of 3 December 1971 n. 1102—appeared as the most important legal structure of the time toward the development of the mountainous zones as well as the “internal zones” indicated by article 4 of the Italian constitution. The new law was intended to stimulate economic development and protect the environment of the mountainous zones. A new “mountainous economy” was to be based on the professional and cultural preparation of the populations. Among the main objectives, Comunità Montana was set up to provide mountainous populations with the proper services, aspiring to “compensate them for their disadvantage of living in the mountains” (Foti and Suraci 1983:19–20).
Despite the high publicity of Comunità Montana as a promising autonomous structure that could possibly alleviate the economic and social problems of the mountainous and rural Italian periphery (Foti and Suraci 1983), the Calabrian countryside continued to be abandoned. In the national census of 1971—just prior to the publication of the Comunità Montana bill—the resident population of the mountainous Aspromonte region was 121,702, while that population in the city of Reggio Calabria was 165,822. When the next census was produced in 1981 the resident populations were 110,397 and 173,486 respectively. Not only had the population of the mountains fallen while that of the city had risen, but the difference between the resident populations had grown by approximately 50 percent in only ten years. When coupled with the relatively high internal Calabrian migration rate, it is clear that the results of the Comunità Montana bill in keeping the population in the highlands and ameliorating their lives are questionable. It is interesting to note that in the 2001 national census the resident population of Aspromonte was 97,209, with 180,353 in Reggio Calabria.24 While these statistics do not necessarily suggest that the larger corpus of the Aspromonte population moved to Reggio Calabria, it is clear the Comunità Montana bill did not provide the impetus for people to remain in their place of origin over the past thirty years.
Relocating Populations: Farewell Beloved Village
After the landslides of 1951 severely damaged the Calabrian Ionian coast, the Christian Democrat government decided to relocate the stricken populations as a matter of urgency. People from the Grecanico village of Galliciano were relocated to the fortress of Gaeta in Lazio (Petropoulou 1997; Pipyrou 2016), while villagers from Amendolea and Roghudi were relocated to a military camp in L’Aquila, Abruzzo. Some people, very young at the time of relocation, recollect their time in L’Aquila as “very pleasant.” Mario, sixty-four, a teacher of mathematics at a high school in Reggio Calabria, vividly, and somewhat nostalgically, remembers the years he lived in Abruzzo as “some of the best years as we were attending a very nice local school and our parents were working in local jobs. A lot of families decided to stay in Abruzzo but my family eventually returned to Reggio after some years.” For people like Mario, relocation is part of a “romanzo of the ruins” (Teti 2008), yet for others it was a deeply emotional experience of forced expatriation. Echoing discourses of genocide and forced relocation as documented in various other European contexts, actors recite deeply experiential stories that irrevocably changed their sociopolitical trajectories (Hirschon 1989; Ballinger 2003; Bryant 2010; Danforth and van Boeschoten 2012).
The Gallicianesi were relocated to the fortress town of Gaeta in Lazio where they stayed until 1954, apart from fifteen families who remained in Galliciano. According to Leo, seventy-six, “the first months in Gaeta passed very quickly since we did not have anything to worry about and they were giving us a small amount of money for our needs. But we wanted to return.” Antonia also remembers that “some women got married there with local men but the rest of us returned.” She goes on to say that “we left the village (Galliciano) because it was declared non-habitable and we were evacuated. Our sindaco (mayor) evacuated us” (in Nucera 1984/5:144). During their time in Gaeta, testimonies account for physical confrontation between locals, police, and Gallicianesi as protests erupted due to the squalid living conditions. At one point the administrative authorities only provided the detainees with stale bread, which was duly turned into makeshift weapons and hurled back at police.
The relocations are still a highly emotive, distressing, and sometimes exasperating topic of conversation. Memories remain raw and conflict is easily reignited. Reflecting on the events of the relocations, informants criticized their own compatriots—local Christian Democrat politicians—who complied with central government demands and ultimately persuaded their co-villagers of the need to relocate, thus avoiding further friction. Hints that point to the corruption of the people in question and their immediate profiteering from the promised reconstruction of their villages are evident. One research participant criticized a fellow villager: “now he discusses the landslides as if it is something outside of his family and he seems to forget that it was his father (a DC councilor) who collaborated with the mayor in order to persuade us all of the vital need for the relocation.” Similarly, there is also heavy criticism related to the favoritism of the same local councilors who distributed assets to the stricken populations on their return to the villages. Houses and livestock were allocated to relatives of councilors and people of the same political disposition.
Domenico was eighteen when his family, together
