policies of Agostino Depretis who exploited a trend that already existed in order to “express or rationalise the absence of party coherence and organised action” (Smith 1997:103; Schneider and Schneider 2001:436). Depretis justified and rationalized the “replacement of distinctive parties and programmes by fluid personalistic parliamentary groupings negotiating their support for a government in terms of purely local and sectional interests” (Woolf 1979:479). Until the mid-1950s, the politics of Reggio Calabria were dominated by center-right coalitions, while over the next decades, despite still being in power, the local DC experienced intraparty conflicts (Walston 1988:189). This was the result of many factors. The ’Ndrangheta, first, was increasingly implicated in Reggini public life, infiltrating public contractors and political circles. Second, and perhaps predominantly, instead of developing the infrastructure of Reggio Calabria the government was exploiting the tertiary sector in return for electoral support (Cingari 1982:380).
In the Gardens of Eden
The quartieri of San Giorgio extra, Sbarre, Gebbione, and Ravagnese, similar to many peripheral quartieri32 during the 1950s, were inhabited by coloni (peasant workers), military and police force pensioners and middle- and upper-class families of Reggio Calabria, who were also small land owners. The areas that surrounded the centro storico were characterized by their giardini (gardens) and sparse residences. In his study of the Plain of Gioia Tauro (in the province of Reggio Calabria), Pino Arlacchi describes the gardens as “the elementary unit of the agrarian system based on medium-sized property and medium-sized enterprise, that is, a piece of territory thickly covered by fruit trees and specializing in the production of one crop only, whose sale on the market furnished a median yield among the highest in Italian agriculture” (1983:77; also Petrusewicz 1989). This mode of agriculture had a further effect on the development of the local market and the “periodic movements of the economy from cereal to pasture and back” (Arlacchi 1983:78) minimizing the annual unproductive periods (Giacomini 1981:13).
The agrarian reforms of the 1950s (see Biagini 1952) provided the opportunity for some of the lower classes such as the coloni to step onto the economic and social ladder. Apart from the land to which they were entitled according to their particular tenure contracts,33 they also “inherited” the status of the nobles for whom they were working. This shift in social status needs to be understood in a context of consolidating political power through land ownership (Rossi-Doria 1958:52). Despite the fact that Manlio Rossi-Doria refers to agrarian reforms that took place between 1880 and World War I—a period also characterized by the beginning of transoceanic migration (51)—land purchase in the peripheral quarters of Reggio Calabria during the 1950s followed the same logic of reconfigured power relations.
Doctor Colleti is one such example. He is a medical doctor and his family—originating from the Grecanico village of Staiti—used to be coloni for Baron Taconi’s mansion in Reggio Calabria. They lived in a house within the garden walls, which eventually passed into their possession after the reforms. Colleti’s professional occupation and residence are significant factors contributing to his socioeconomic mobility, also reflected in the respect the members of his family enjoy in wider society. His mother, the baron’s former housekeeper, is now greeted with respect and considered one of the “first ladies” of local society. The family employ a Polish housekeeper as well as a gardener. Living in a house that constitutes part of the manor, and being a medical doctor, Colleti is considered by Reggini society as having a very high social profile.
During the 1950s the giardini of the peripheral quartieri of Reggio Calabria were cheap and thus affordable to the majority of the Grecanici. Kin clusters bought adjacent plots of land with the view to reside in close proximity. Gradually, with the men working as economic migrants abroad (mainly in Switzerland), they started building their homes. In the absence of their husbands and sons, women remained in the Grecanici villages tending their land and animals and raising their children. As soon as the houses in Reggio were habitable, women transferred to the city, ideally in time for the children to attend local schools. With the money collected from every year of labor, families added an additional floor to the house. The main aim was to build a number of floors that accorded to the number of children.
In the same period, Grecanici started entering the public administrative sector of Reggio Calabria. At this time Nicolo was assesore34 of the comune of Reggio Calabria, married to a Grecanici woman. Kinship ties between Nicolo’s wife and other Grecanici families were instrumental for both parties. Nicolo “systemized” (inserted into the system) Grecanici males as public cleaners in the city, with their families offering electoral support in return. Coincidentally, at the beginning of the 1960s, an old ’ndranghetista Giuseppe, from the area Grecanica became close friends with the local Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI). Giuseppe came from a large family with an extensive kin network. He was in the service and a close friend of the president of the committee of the Istituto Autonomo per la Case Popolari (Autonomous Institute for Government Housing) in Reggio Calabria. When the institute started building government housing, Giuseppe exerted his influence on the president of the institute and persuaded him to favor the Grecanici as well as other Reggini who were linked to him. Owing to these relations, many families found themselves with a local authority house. Other families who already owned a house in the city sold their allocated “council house” and released the capital. At the beginning of the 1980s, the president’s (a Craxian Socialist35) power was such that he could control the Istituto Autonomo per la Case Popolari without consulting the board. As James Walston notes, “He goes around with a rubber stamp, signs minutes and takes decisions without having had a meeting” (1985:97).
The province-based public housing authority Istituto Autonomo Case Popolari is one of the examples of many public agencies that were deemed to serve political clientelism. Walston argues that “public works and housing became another cornerstone of DC policy” (1985:96–97, 1988:55). Indeed, the committee of the institute, precisely due to its provincial character, was in the position to allocate houses, direct funding toward “favorite” comuni, and even distribute jobs. The ’ndranghetista of Grecanico origin, similar to the DC politician, created a kinship-based “clientele.” Grecanici clearly used their various systems of relatedness to find political representation and secure their new livelihoods in the city.
From internal rural-urban migrations to natural disasters and forced relocations, Grecanici social history of the past century is entwined with movement, aid, aggression, and competing orders of governance. The ethnographic chapters that follow show how Grecanici fearlessly seek political representation through diverse channels of governance, including civil society, kinship networks, and implication with the ’Ndrangheta.
Chapter 3
The Vicissitudes of Civil Society
The Non-Visit
In July 2006, one of the Greek associations in Reggio Calabria, comprised mainly of Greek nationals of the diaspora, invited a high-ranking member of parliament from the governing Greek New Democracy party to visit South Italy. The association acted as a mediator between the mayor of Reggio Calabria, Giuseppe Scopelliti, and the Greek government, and the invitation was intended to foster relations of good will between Reggio Calabria and Athens. According to the president of the Greek association, the meeting was conceived of as a New Democracy initiative toward pastoral care for Greek communities abroad. The association went to great lengths to organize the visit of the Greek politician. For weeks they spent endless hours with the mayor’s secretary and various assessori who could persuade the mayor to agree to a meeting. On my part, I had long discussions with people from the Greek politician’s office, trying to identify what they wanted to achieve from the visit and providing details about the Greek association. After much negotiation with the mayor, who attempted to thwart the plan at every turn, the association was in the position to send an official invitation to Athens with a detailed itinerary of activities
