philosophy, therefore, makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that everything remains precisely as before.
—T, 1.4.5.35
Hume framed his arguments about God within a climate of philosophical discourse on religion that generally reinforced the theism of popular Christianity. His philosophical mission was, in part, to expose the God of popular religion to be an unstable concept masquerading as religious truth. To Hume, the vulgar theism of this brand of false religion was both impractical and dangerous; it relied on a method of reasoning that betrayed the principles of understanding and distorted the natural powers of the mind. On his account the idea of a morally worthy deity was misleading, belief in worship-worthy divinity created factionalism, and the concept of a God with moral attributes was unintelligible. Hume’s devastating critique of popular theism relied on a moral stance (that God was not the source of our moral judgment), a political commitment to stability of the social order, historical awareness (from which he deduced that religion was most often destabilizing), and his approach to understanding the limits of the human mind. The latter interests frame the argument of this chapter.
An important focal point of Hume’s philosophical writings was his description of the process by which we come to hold beliefs and ideas. These foundations were important for his later “religious” writings. In the Natural History of Religion (NHR) what Hume called “vulgar theism” (as in common, general, or customary theistic beliefs) was a distortion that arose from the natural tendency of our imagination to form the idea that “the order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind” (T, app., 18n). In his first philosophical work he explained that the creative powers of the imagination—guided by associative principles—fashioned ideas of necessary connection, causal power, and regularity that were indispensable for experience. Some of these ideas struck the mind with vivacity, found support in conventions of social life (i.e., popular religion), and became beliefs. Hume’s argument, like any observational science, presupposed order and regularity (though he was critical of causal regularity). In fact, modern science—understood as knowledge of prediction—can proceed only if events and objects exist and produce specific effects according to their nature. Perhaps a Humean perspective would add a further stipulation: for science to be possible our minds must function in a way that makes it seem that events and objects exist and produce specific effects according to their very own mysterious natures.
Approaching Hume’s work through the lens of our speculative Humean true religion provides warrant for us to consider the presuppositions of Hume’s philosophy, at least provisionally, as a kind of “basic theism.” Reflecting on his work from this angle allows insight into his underdeveloped notion ‘genuine theism’ and provides grounds to determine if it might be justifiably positioned within religion’s proper office.
The Author of Nature
The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind; that is, a mind whose will is constantly attended with the obedience of every creature and being.
—T., app., 18n
Basic Theism: The Source of Vulgar Theism and Genuine Theism
Hume’s philosophy, like any science, rested on the general assumption of a rudimentary form of causal regularity. It affirmed both our belief in hidden powers in nature (a source for what we take to be the principles of human nature) and our instinctive perception that the universe is ordered and regular. I name this “basic theism” because, on Hume’s argument, to assume a constantly dynamic order is to invite the mind to the idea of an Orderer. Another way to say this—and this is accepted in Hume scholarship—is that the presupposition of order and regularity irresistibly orients the mind to the idea of an Author of Nature. For Hume, the source of this basic belief was neither a causal regress nor the ascription of intention in the universe based on observable effects; it was—more simply—common life’s suggestion and a propensity of the imagination to regard the universe as purposive.1 Unlike the later Kantian approach, the Humean style was not preoccupied with establishing conditions for the possibility of its own observational science. For Hume, true philosophy unself-consciously accepted premises that could not be proven. The Humean approach was invested more in questions that spoke to everyday curiosities instead of philosophical quandaries. Thus, what we can say about this assumption—a dispositive propensity—is that it was sustained by habits of the mind and reflective customs of common life. While the disposition to order and regularity made the belief in “invisible, intelligent power” irresistible, this basic theism presupposed by Hume’s philosophy had little to do with conventional religion. Hume was adamant that belief in an all-knowing, omnipotent deity with a moral plan for the universe was unintelligible, historically divisive, and morally contentious. My reading basic theism in Hume’s philosophy calls the reader’s attention to what is presupposed by Hume’s philosophy—more than the sum of what was given in experience—and thereby set up his notion of genuine theism for our speculative Humean true religion.
I am mindful that it may be confusing to name a presupposition of Hume’s philosophy, even provisionally, a basic theism and that some may disagree with this choice, though I have exercised caution by defining it as a disposition rooted in the simple assumptions of order and regularity. It is of use-value in this study because Hume used the terms “vulgar theism” and “genuine theism” as opposites. He explicitly and repeatedly remarked that the vulgar theism of popular religion was a distortion of mind. We can fairly presume that the genuine theism of true religion was an enlargement of mind. It follows that for each case we ask, what is being distorted or enlarged? I submit that it is the natural disposition to belief in an Author of Nature. This temperament, the willingness to tacitly cosign belief in an Author of Nature, is what I conditionally call “basic theism.” On Hume’s science of human nature, it is grounded in the assumption of a natural order, essential for any observational science and fundamental for the form of scientific rationality that undergirds Enlightenment thought. Does Hume’s philosophical project presuppose this basic theism or does the argument of the Treatise foreclose the intelligibility of basic theism? How can basic theism fund the genuine theism of our Humean true religion? I shall begin to pursue these questions through a brief assessment of Hume’s iconoclastic intervention in philosophy. After setting aside the deep skeptical reading of Hume by arguing that—on Donald Livingston’s phenomenology of common life—Hume was a mitigated skeptic who left room for true philosophy and true religion (with its genuine theism), I posit some sources for belief in basic theism in his philosophy. A Deleuzian reading of Hume’s theory of mind and an interpretation of his thoughts on natural belief as understood by Norman Kemp Smith furnish two methods of understanding how basic theism might be understood as both a presupposition for and a consequence of Hume’s philosophy of the imagination and common life.
Though my moderate claim for the irresistibility of the belief in an Author of Nature is largely uncontroversial, some might challenge my assertion that theism exists in the Treatise on grounds that the work took little or no interest in religion.2 My approach, however, acknowledges the significant religious interest underneath Hume’s intense philosophical focus. Hume’s philosophy was concerned with how we come to hold beliefs, particularly belief in deity; thus it was crucial for theism. In the well-cited section of the Treatise, “Of the Immateriality of the Soul,” Hume took a direct stand against both Spinozist and Cartesian positions on theism by claiming “anything may be the cause or the effect of anything” (1.4.5.32). Further, he stated—concerning the existence of God—that “existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it” (1.3.7, 2) and that our “idea of deity,” if it were to be intelligible on the standards of abstruse reason, should rely on an impression like our other ideas (1.3.14.10). These few examples (there are others) stand against the prevailing view that Hume’s religious writings are the only ones to be consulted for his views on deity. Paul Russell’s important work on Hume’s irreligion, whose conclusion—that Hume was against popular religion—I support, stands
