moved beyond him to accept implicit beliefs mediated through custom, which could not satisfy the seminal demands of abstract reason of the Cartesian approach.
PYRRHONISM
In the unfolding literary drama of Hume’s early work, his response to Pyrrhonism further reflected the adeptness of his approach. Concerning Hume’s skepticism, Nicholas Capaldi writes that “no issue has engendered more misunderstanding in Hume scholarship than this one.”21 I shall not delve into the full range of skeptical interpretations here. I simply explain that Hume equated Pyrrhonism with an egregious form of skepticism, then he relied on nature, beliefs, and habits as fundamental for experience. Hume generally possessed an affinity for skeptical solutions in epistemology and sensitivity to the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment. He offered, however, two inseparable arguments against the Pyrrhonian attitude.22 The first held that one cannot actually act from a thoroughly Pyrrhonian consciousness in common experience; thus, Pyrrhonism was impossible. The second argument stipulated that the Pyrrhonian method of hesitation produced no convictions; therefore, Pyrrhonism was impractical.
The Treatise gives mostly probable conclusions, makes provisional judgments based on observation, and traces the origins of our most significant beliefs. On its argument the complete suspension of judgment is simply not viable for a philosophical thinker. It is, in fact, impossible. Thus, Hume’s early work conciliates between belief and skepticism. His “mitigated skepticism” reminds him to be humble in his judgments and “diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical convictions” (1.4.7.14). Defending himself in his Letter from a Gentleman against being labeled a Pyrrhonian, Hume writes,
As to Scepticism with which the author is charged, I must observe, that the doctrine of the Pyrrhonians or Scepticks have been regarded in all ages as Principles of mere Curiosity, or a Kind of Jeux d’ esprit, without any Influence on a Man’s steady Principles or Conduct in Life. In Reality, a Philosopher who affects to doubt of the Maxims of common Reason and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest, and that he intends not to advance an Opinion which he would recommend as Standards of Judgment and Action. (2)
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