of true religion. Following the path of basic theism to false religion exposes “sick men’s dreams” (15.6), yet conjecturing on how basic theism might lead to true religion makes Hume’s ideal for religion less opaque. The rare, true religion could, under very exceptional conditions, help to “reform Men’s Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moral Duties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate.”11 Note Hume’s use of the infinitive form of verbs: “to reform,” “to purify,” “to inforce,” and “to secure.” Cumulatively and in significant part, we might say that these are the functions of a Humean true religion.
It is important not to overstep: the fact that Hume “warmly endorses what he calls ‘true religion’” and “sometimes speaks approvingly of ‘true religion’” does not dismantle his powerful conviction that most of the time our unmediated fears and hopes shape the natural propensity for basic theism into belief in a particular providence or a personal god, the vulgar theistic attitude of false religion.12 He writes, “Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded that they are other than sick men’s dreams: or perhaps will regard them more as the playsome whimsies of monkeys in human shape” (NHR, 15.6). He seems to at least allow, however, for a less vulgar alternative, a basic or general “universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature” (15.5).
POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO MY ARGUMENT FOR BASIC THEISM
My emphasis on basic theism in Hume’s early philosophy is likely to generate four responses. I name them the standard, fideist, moderate, and skeptical readings. The standard interpretation vehemently rejects the designation ‘theism’ when it is applied to Hume’s work. This position begins by reducing the idea of religion to a system of beliefs about God, an error generally made by those who hold conventional conceptions of both theism and religion. Theism, on this view, is conceived as veneration of a worship-worthy, omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent deity and taken as the substance of religion. From this perspective Hume is considered irreligious due to his frontal assault on popular religion and his trenchant criticisms of traditional metaphysics.13 It follows that if religion is purely reducible to theism, then Hume’s irreligion must be the equivalent of antitheism. This way of reading Hume completely ignores the basic theism in his philosophy and leaves us with a nontheistic and irreligious David Hume.14
The standard interpretation is useful: it reaffirms Hume’s seminal criticisms of religion and reminds us of the close connections between religion and theism. To completely reduce religion to theism, however, delimits our capacity to consider nontheistic traditions as religious and restricts the possibility that our beliefs in “universal principles” (T, 1.1.4.1), “elements and powers of nature” (T, 1.4.4.5), and order in the universe (e.g., T, app., 18n) might mark a nonconventional, basic theism. Additionally, from this view Hume’s claim that the “whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author” (NHR, 1.1) is comprehensible only as ironic, deceitful, or cunning. Finally, the standard interpretation diminishes our ability to think creatively about the proper office for religion and truncates the conversation about the role nontraditional theism might play in a speculative, Humean-inspired true religion. In short, the standard position gives us no traction in our quest to use Hume as a generative resource in religious studies.
A second response to the idea that Hume’s work contains a basic theism is the fideist view. This position claims that Hume’s skepticism concerning reason along with his refusal to explicitly discard theism make his work compatible with those who hold the idea that reason is not warranted to justify religious belief.15 Fideists ground this contention on the belief that Hume’s statement, “our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason” (E, 10.2.27), was a critique of rationalist theology and an endorsement of an authentic Christian faith. They allow that for Hume, God is unknowable through reason and the universe is ultimately mysterious. On this view, Hume accepts God and God’s ineffability on faith.
The fideist interpretation is important: it reminds us not to lose sight of the fluidity between skepticism and faith, a binary that is hierarchical, invertible, and codependent (as Derrida taught). The fideist reading also refuses to toss aside Hume’s noncritical claims about theism and religion as simply ironic. Hume was neither invested in a Kierkegaardian leap of faith to Christian belief nor willing to cosign any extant religious doctrine such that he would recommend dogmatic commitment to it. He argued that direct-passion hopes and fears—always on a continuum—were the sources of our popular religious beliefs, and he mounted a scathing moral challenge against these false beliefs. His intentions were more humble than the fideists allowed: to observe the machinery of the mind in common life, understand its principles of association of ideas, and illuminate sources of our beliefs and actions. Hume accepted that our natural sense of universal order and regularity was not warranted by either abstruse reason or faith. It is safe to say that he recognized, as Deleuze wrote, that “the subject goes beyond what the mind gives it.”16 Still, Hume did not endorse faith as a means to the truth as fideism generally holds; rather, he observed religious practice in common life and described it as grounded in a set of imaginative beliefs. Further, he suggested that Christianity took root because of the psychic relief it provided for human fears and hopes, not because of the faith it inspired.
A more moderate view constitutes the third response to the contention that Hume’s work confirms the idea of basic theism. This position holds that Hume’s philosophy admits our belief in a genuine sense of order and regularity in the universe due to the mind’s functioning as a cause-seeking tool. Best represented in the work of J. C. A. Gaskin and Keith Yandell, it rests on statements such as “our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other” (E, 8.5). Gaskin locates what he calls an “attenuated deism” in Hume’s work. This form of deism is the belief that God is a remote, unknowable Orderer of the universe, unconcerned with human existence. It does not, on Gaskin’s argument, recommend itself to any religious vision nor does it inspire morality. It is meaningless for religion. Similarly, Yandell calls Hume’s position a “diaphanous theism”—a theistic worldview that is too thin to merit anything positive for religion.17
The moderate position as taken up by Gaskin and Yandell is important. It thoughtfully attempts to sort out the theistic dimensions of Hume’s claim that our minds are hardwired to think causally. The verdict that Hume’s theism (or deism, for Gaskin) is completely irrelevant for human life is, however, overstated. What is curious about this position is its uncritical reliance on conventional approaches to both theism and religion. Gaskin and Yandell rightfully point out that our belief in order and regularity has little relevance for popular religion. They miss the crucial role, however, that this belief might play for true religion and true philosophy. Their insight, that Hume’s idea of false religion supplied a vulgar theism and led to factionalism, is attenuated by their oversight regarding Hume’s basic theism. The very existence of the category ‘true religion’ in Hume’s thought grants some possible religious meaning to his basic theism, which is clearly useful for his philosophy. Unfortunately, Gaskin and Yandell leave these options unconsidered; thus, their slightly modified version of standard theism gives us no greater purchase on Hume’s true religion.
True religion and vulgar religion are similarly formed. Hume tells us that vulgar religion is grounded on vulgar theism; it follows that true religion is based on genuine (or true) theism. Vulgar theism is formed by our direct-passion fears and hopes of unknown causes (NHR, secs. 1–5). We can presume then that genuine theism is formed by the moderation of our fears and hopes of unknown causes. To put it in a way that privileges a more conventional religious perspective: patient acceptance of the order and regularity of experience—particularly when experience does not seem ordered and regular—is a kind of peacefulness. We can understand this sort
