models”; it “seizes upon a constituent disparity in the thing from which it strips the rank of model,” as “the instance which includes a difference within itself” (xx, 67, 69). It implicates “word” in language with “action = x in history” (Deleuze 299), hence for us the impact of extratextual coordinates.
34 To illustrate: when Cao Xueqin has a major woman character in Story of the Stone at the moment of death reflect “honor and disgrace follow each other in an unending cycle,” or when Khaled Hosseini (as we will see) shows us how it comes about that “Nana’s own father disowned her,” in each case the signifying network and its narrative conditions call for tracking discursive agendas, be they parallel or competing, which they disclose – beyond what Berger calls “mischief” within the immediate sign structure.
35 In Singularity Derek Attridge argues that literature cannot serve as an instrument for any predetermined end, be it political or moral, “without at the same time challenging the basis of instrumentality itself” (13). As an event, in terms of its reading a literary work presents an “unprecedented, hitherto unimaginable disposition of cultural materials” (63). Hence reading as a creative process is or ought to be open to “surprise and wonder” of diverse kinds (83), an expectation which may owe something to Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Life is a series of surprises” (413) or “In the thought of genius there is always a surprise; and the moral sentiment is well called ‘the newness,’ for it is never other” (483). In Work, significantly for us, Attridge is attentive to “responsible reading across cultures” (216): the value of “opening up to new possibilities” of a culture, enabling multiple readings (218). Literature is “characterized by a challenge to the habits and norms by which the reader relates to the world,” dislocating the reader, and “responsible” textual instrumentality will not seek to glide over a work’s challenge (121). Hence of value is “that which is unencounterable, given the present state of the encountering mind or culture” (55).
Mariano Longo, too, from the viewpoint of social science emphasizes fictional narrative’s ability to provide “new perspectives from which to observe and understand reality” (51, similarly 33). This is worth keeping in mind whenever we are tempted to read mainly for confirmation of our own stereotypes regarding honor and face cultures.
In its proximity to Levinassian otherness, this post-theoretical highlighting of responsible reading enables us to share the experience which, for instance, Khaled Hosseini has articulated about literature: it will “allow you to climb over the wall of yourself”; Kimberly Collins affirms that his work can “jar our previous impressions” (Collins). There are significant cases: the fairly dominant but nonetheless endearing patriarchal figure of Baba in The Kite Runner does not simply support a stereotype. As Moira Macdonald describes it, Elif Shafak’s Bastard “extends beyond its pages into startling real-life news.” The father figures in Yasmina Khadra’s Ce que le jour doit à la nuit and also in Orhan Pamuk’s The House of Silence are not merely dominantly masculine, as befitting a patriarchal structure, but are also described in their weak moments. In Tahar Ben Jelloun’s L’Enfant de Sable we likewise find features which a reader may not have expected; we gain a strong impression of the pressure on a husband because his wife does not give birth to a son. Chen Xunwu reads Cao’s Story of the Stone in terms of contingency, the opportunities created by “openness, novelty, uncertainty, unpredictability, and irregularity” (25, then Chapter 4): this, too, comes close to the challenge we find in reading. It takes the unprecedented disposition to fuel the interpretive shuttle we have discussed above: “no representation without alteration, […] alterity, alienation; the very concept of representation involves entry into a signifying medium that splits the representation, alienates it, from the presence it represents” (Berger 502).
To some degree “new possibilities” emerge, too, whenever the fictional realities we are studying do not quite run parallel to social science’s image of realities in honor and face cultures. In such cases, we see no reason to assume, without further evidence, that the fiction does not address genuine social phenomena. We should add that in our limited context we cannot always interpret the narrative works as extensively as might be desirable for a full focus on each.
Introduction to honor cultures: Gender-specific, collectivistic honor
The concept of honor is a traditional one, deeply rooted in the ancient culture of desert tribes. We can understand honor generally as “the concept that structures the value of individuals and groups within a wider social context” (Oprisko 31). By linking practices throughout society, and mutually configuring cognitive, libidinal-aesthetic, and ethico-political regions, it is “the axiological total social fact” (Oprisko 48, 146) – as the definite article “the” indicates, not just one among several.36 It also “shaped the formation of both Western and Islamic family law” (Hussain 227). Such an understanding associates value study and the sociology of circular, reciprocal obligation. Especially relevant in our context is the external rather than internal honor system (as in Stewart 32). On this basis, as a social and relational process, honor hinges upon an individual’s “internalization of the identification with the value that the group has so inscribed” (Oprisko 113). Such internalization can occur to individually differing degrees.
Through the centuries, reflections about the significance of honor have accompanied humanity all over the world. However, for our purposes we are less concerned with honor values in connection with military conflicts or male-male insults. Today certain honor-related behavioral codes are of more concern to honor cultures, which include the Middle East, Mediterranean countries, South America, and some North African regions, than they are to so-called dignity cultures such as Europe and North America (according to Leung and Cohen).37 ←31 | 32→In this context we wish to emphasize that the term “culture” is not necessarily co-extensive with any particular nation or country, since within them there are likely to be regions, communities, and individuals not bound by such codes.38 When it comes to the respective manifestations of this virtue, two main dichotomies should be mentioned: while in dignity cultures, honor is perceived as a gender-neutral and individualistic value, in honor cultures it is regarded as gender-specific and largely collectivistic.39
Firstly, in dignity cultures the expression “honor” can include notions of morality, dignity, good reputation, honesty, integrity, or sincerity which, at least ideally, do not necessarily depend on a person’s gender or on an evaluation of one’s self by the outside world (see Leung and Cohen, Üskül et al., Severance et al.): “[…] every person, simply by virtue of his or her humanity, is one whose dignity calls for our respect. Nothing we do or suffer can deprive us of the dignity that belongs to each person” (Meilaender 7). This is a modern formulation of Immanuel Kant’s eloquently presented principles in his 1797 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (6:434–35). In terms of such a concept of dignity, “the notion of comparing or weighing values has no place at all” (Meilaender 86). It would, however, be wrong to assume that in the geographical areas called dignity cultures individuals cannot suffer from a negative moral reputation or will not be rejected by others (Ermers 34–35). Individuals can “attempt” to project their will, but without psychological liberty “do not need to do so successfully” (Oprisko 126). In honor cultures, at any rate, the honor value more often goes hand in hand with explicit, gender-specific behavioral guidelines that must be followed.40
←32 | 33→
As many instances which we are about to discuss will show, an attempt to erase difference actually magnifies it – which becomes evident in the ensuing fear of an overwhelming Otherness, requiring obsessive concern for boundary maintenance. The concept of honor is closely associated with social appearances and external judgement
