Honor, Face, and Violence. Mine Krause

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Honor, Face, and Violence - Mine Krause Cross Cultural Communication

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Iis Sugiyanti praises ←13 | 14→A Thousand Splendid Suns for being “honest enough to give a more informed and rounded appreciation of the life of Afghan women” (48). But there is another angle of attack: strangely equating Pashtun people as a whole with Pashtun men, ones especially having “the responsibility of shielding honor of their women” (421), Khan and Afsar on this basis contend that Hosseini “disorientates readers by distorting real picture of Pashtun people” in that his “representation of Pashtun characters is not based on the traits for which they are known,” so that he “pleases Westerners by devaluing cultural values of Pashtuns/Muslims” and justifies U.S. intrusion into Afghanistan (426). Evidently literature can become a weapon not only of political conflict but of warfare. When another team of critics faults Hosseini’s work for being narrated from a female perspective (Khan and Qureshi 397), we can see how consistently masculinist criticism, with its allies, seeks to safeguard its cultural priorities in nosing out ideological concerns in its study object – but only there. It may need to consider Edmund Husserl’s warning that scientific questioning requires an “inhibiting” or “putting out of play” all “positions taken toward the already-given Objective world” (epoché or parenthesizing, in Cartesian 20). Moreover, whereas Mader condemns Hosseini’s novel for depicting Pashtun men as either brutish or effeminate (88), Khan and Qureshi find them portrayed as “matchlessly helpful to the needy” (392). Does the novel show a different face to different critics?

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      Our topic leads straight into the dispute about “skewing” the culture of one’s country. Such a practice would amount to a failure to give access to significant realities, to authentic or typical conditions. The accusation can bring about an impasse in representation as well as personal trouble. It is a form of “crisis in the correspondence between the representing discourse and the represented world” (with a suspicion that the writer is rendering little more than his/her own “aim and agenda,” as voiced by Khan and Qureshi), technically speaking a “shift from alloreferential to self-referential semiosis” (Nöth 10, 14). Further above, we have warned against treating a fictional work of art as an ethnographical document essentializing a culture. Yet the accusations against authors (in the previous section) show that non-ethnographical aesthetical representation is sometimes taken as if it was merely an opposite extreme, and is accordingly accepted only within narrow limits. Beyond what Winfried Nöth accounts for, there is a risk of losing the referent in such altercation when the depicted conditions’ reality is disputed and/or attention shifts away from them and toward the manner of representation. The Maghreb Page Editors, indeed, confidently proclaim that Daoud constructs “a non-existent space as the object of analysis.”

      We have heard, in the context of our first response, that literature represents “typical deficits, blind spots” within “dominant systems of civilizatory power” (Zapf). Yet critical assessments of the kind we refer to suggest it is mainly the writers themselves who reveal “blind spots,” whether or not they appear to be co-opted in a commodification culture. Adjudicating the dispute adequately would involve extensive, neopositivistic field research in each target country. A number of social research projects have been carried out (see for instance Churchill 118 and 244 for Afghanistan), so that we can and will compare their results with the fictional works and sometimes with legal culture to provide a more comprehensive picture of this complex topic. We can and will also compare the fictionally depicted conditions between works, for an assessment whether any of them are isolated cases. We do remain aware that social science studies as such can be equally liable to the charge of “blind spots”; for major research methods of intercultural and intergroup communication, for instance, it is well said that “each paradigm has its own meaning and rhythm much as is the case with different genres of music” (Ting-Toomey and Dorjee 49). Yet this does not mean that each is, accordingly, more concerned with its internal harmony than with its study objects. Formulating necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, as in a coherence theory of justification, is a challenging requirement both for social and literary inquiries.

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