Gagging of God, 194, 201, 202, 204, 223, 229.
81. Carson, Gagging of God, 223–24.
82. Elsewhere, he argues that God is not merely an impersonal “ground of being” (Carson, Collected Writing, 19, 21).
83. Carson, Gagging of God, 226–28.
84. Carson, Gagging of God, 229.
85. Carson, Collected Writings, 22.
86. Frame, Van Til, 51–88.
87. Curiously, he says in passing that both are inspired by the common sense realism of Thomas Reid, who, he argues, was more nuanced in his thought than representatives of either of these approaches (Sparks, God’s Words, 44). However, Sparks provides no evidence in support of such a claim (especially with regard to Van Til). In fact, Reid’s influence appears in varying degree, consistently or inconsistently, in two apologetic approaches which Van Til argued explicitly against, namely Old Princeton and that of Joseph Butler (Frame, Van Til, 134n7, 273; Hunt, “Bavinck,” 330–31; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 162).
88. Sparks, God’s Word, 44–47.
89. Sparks, God’s Word, 45.
90. Sparks, God’s Word, 45.
91. Sparks, God’s Word, 46.
92. Basically, Van Til’s notion of “analogy” emphasized the ontological and epistemological differences between God and man, based on the Creator-creature distinction.
93. Sparks, God’s Word, 45n55 (citing Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16).
94. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 16 (emphasis his).
95. Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 17 (emphasis his).
96. Van Til, Systematic Theology, 371–75.
97. Van Til, Case for Calvinism, 145.
98. This is Sparks’ definition.
99. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 190–99; Common Grace, 5; Systematic Theology, 117–89; Bahnsen, “Crucial Concept,” 1–31; Van Til’s Apologetic, 442–60. For example, using a helpful and creative illustration, Van Til refers to the unbeliever’s faculties functioning like a “buzz saw”—which may work efficiently but in the wrong direction, making faulty use of his created equipment (Van Til, Defense of Faith, 97, 105).
100. Sparks, God’s Word, 49.
101. E.g., Van Til, Theory of Knowledge, 47–49; Christian Epistemology, 20–23; Defense of Faith, 36–37; Christian Apologetics, 33–34, 42–43, 79, 154–55.
102. Sparks, God’s Word, 49–50. For instance, Sparks exaggerates what Adam and Eve did not know and seems to confuse finitude with sin. The latter confusion is expressed in saying that, “only an infinite being—God himself—is able to perceive reality without distortion . . . our epistemological success is limited by finitude” (God’s Word, 50). This raises questions concerning what is epistemological “success” for finite man and whether man’s thinking is inherently distorted due to his finitude.
103. Sparks, God’s Word, 50–51. This seems to contradict his earlier dismissal of Van Til’s concept of analogy (God’s Word, 45n55).
104. Davis, “Inerrancy,” 44.
105. Gaffin, “Epistemological Reflections,” 103–24; Berkouwer, “Authority of Scripture,” 197–204.
106. Davis, “Inerrancy,” 45–46.
107. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 309–36.
108. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 322.
109. Vanhoozer, Frist Theology, 322.
110. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 326.
111. The only other mention of Van Til appears in another essay entitled “The Trials of Truth” on Christian epistemology in the face of postmodernism. Vanhoozer cites an article by John Cooper, who reminds us of the contributions of twentieth-century Dutch-Calvinists, including Van Til. In particular, he mentions their attack on the alleged neutrality and autonomy of man’s reason (Vanhoozer, First Theology, 343n16). Vanhoozer uses this to support his notion of “expository epistemology” (i.e., the need to uncover one’s ultimate presuppositions).
112. Another idea congruent with Van Til’s thought is Vanhoozer’s treatment of the questions of God, Scripture, and hermeneutics as one problem. Each is part of the “hermeneutical circle” in which our understanding of God informs hermeneutics and our hermeneutics informs our understanding of God (First Theology, 9–10; Van Til, Christian Epistemology, 1–13).
113. Pratt, Every Thought Captive.
114. This is not to say that Van Til’s ideas are not in the general backdrop throughout his work on hermeneutics (Pratt, He Gave Us, 1, 66–67). For example, he expresses appreciation for Van Til’s assessment of the influence of Kant in the history of western philosophy, citing The New Hermeneutic in the very context of discussing his definition of “hermeneutics” (Pratt, He Gave Us, 1, 409n1).
115. Pratt, He Gave Us, 43–52.
