Gruenler, “A Response,” 575–76.
247. Gruenler, “A Response,” 576.
248. Van Til, Defense of Faith, 257, 302; Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 442.
249. Gruenler, “A Response,” 587.
250. Gruenler, “A Response,” 588.
251. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, 169–73.
252. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xiii–xiv.
253. Gruenler, Inexhaustible God.
254. Gruenler, Meaning and Understanding, xvi.
Chapter 2: Surveying the Field, Part I
Introduction
In order to understand the appropriate intersections between Van Til’s thought and contemporary hermeneutics, it is necessary to get an initial lay of the land. What are the issues and gaps in the hermeneutical literature which Van Til can most appropriately speak to? Admittedly, this is a daunting task. The prospect of trying to engage in a large-scale analysis of even one aspect of the contemporary landscape, due to the complexity and diversity involved, according to Craig Bartholomew, is “like trying to do analysis with a club, where one requires a scalpel.”255 Presuming to provide a detailed analysis of contemporary hermeneutics (1960 to present)256 would be largely reductionistic.257 Hence, our aim and scope will be tailored according to particular criteria. First, any mention of key figures and movements will be presented according to scholarly consensus regarding their thought and distinctive contributions. Subtle differences and variations among interpreters of such figures will only be noted if relevant to the discussion.258 Second, the primary focus will be on contemporary hermeneutics according to the degree of its influence on biblical hermeneutics. Third, the survey will be conducted with an eye toward Van Til’s emphases in order to make appropriate connections. In this chapter, we will highlight particular trajectories concerning the shifting nature of how hermeneutics has come to be defined.
Defining “Hermeneutics”
One general trend present in the literature is a shift in how hermeneutics has come to be defined. It must be said from the start that the terminology used and distinctions made by various scholars present a unique challenge. For example, more ancient writers tended to treat exegesis and hermeneutics as overlapping concepts.259 Some treat interpretation and hermeneutics interchangeably,260 while others distinguish between exegesis, interpretation, and hermeneutics.261 Thiselton prefers to lump exegesis and interpretation together as interchangeable and sees hermeneutics as a deeper-level discipline.262 Rather than getting lost in these various distinctions, the following discussion will concentrate on concept-level considerations in order to avoid confusion.
Earlier definitions generally reveal a narrower conception in terms of their scope and aim. For example, Berkhof, though more nuanced than others exhibiting this earlier notion, states that “hermeneutics is the science that teaches us the principles, laws, and methods on interpretation.”263 Similarly, Ramm defines it as a science and an art—the former because it is guided by systematic rules and the latter because those rules are applied with a certain skill (not mechanically).264 The same focus on hermeneutics as a set of rules for interpretation is still endorsed among many contemporary evangelicals, although for perhaps different reasons. For instance, Thomas, self-consciously relying upon two older works,265 argues for hermeneutics as a set of principles which are to be used in exegesis. He does so in opposition to what he sees as confusion in evangelical hermeneutics, due to the adoption of newer and different principles which unnecessarily expand its scope.266 Porter and Stovell suggest that one could divide the literature on biblical interpretation into two main categories—those which give step-by-step instruction and tools for interpretation and those which introduce a variety of methods, usually involving a diachronic look at the history of interpretive method.267 In sum, the general consensus is that earlier evangelical treatments of hermeneutics at least emphasized methodology and rules by which a proper interpretation of a text could be obtained.268
These earlier definitions do not necessarily ignore larger questions related to the interpretive endeavor, but they often do not explicitly state their presuppositions. These presuppositions function to determine what questions and what issues are considered relevant to the interpretive task. Many of these assumptions revolve around two key questions: Where is meaning found? What is the goal of biblical interpretation?269 These questions indeed involve a host of other important questions as well. For instance, what authority determines where meaning is found and the goal of interpretation? Earlier works on biblical interpretation tended to assume certain categories and distinctions to one degree or another. Such issues as the subject-object distinction between the reader and the text,270 meaning found in the original author’s intent, the goal of allowing the author to speak through the text, and readers inductively allowing the meaning of a text to emerge were often assumed rather than discussed.
In some cases, these older treatments proceeded on certain modernist assumptions and goals.271 This of course does not mean that in older works a modernistic agenda was pursued. Rather, certain criteria were assumed and seen to be consistent with a Christian approach. The question is whether consistency is present and to what degree. Perhaps most indicative of this type of thinking are those with an especially strong polemical thrust to their work, who sought to guard against certain pitfalls in interpretation. Two examples will suffice. In The History of Interpretation, Farrar argues that the history of biblical interpretation, from its rabbinic roots onward, is largely a sad affair, often darkening the true meaning of Scripture rather than elucidating it.272 He reserves his highest praise for aspects of the grammatical-historical and, especially, the historical-critical method of the Enlightenment.273 It is here that interpretation reaches its zenith and comes into its own, where scientific and historical precision trump diluted eisegesis. Farrar’s emphasis is clearly horizontal—the level of human history and scientific methodology. Overall, he prefers Enlightenment methods, yet endorses Christ’s interpretation of the OT.274 However, are these two approaches compatible?
More recently, Thomas has argued for so-called “traditional” hermeneutics (i.e., focused on propositional truth) in opposition to what he sees as postmodern subjectivism.275 In particular, he faults various contemporary scholars for redefining hermeneutics to include such elements as theological presuppositions and modern meaning. To the contrary, we must set aside any pre-understanding of doctrine until the exegetical task is finished. He goes on to cite works on hermeneutics prior to the 1970s where he sees the traditional quest for objectivity in interpretation—a quest similar to his own. Like Ramm, he is against allowing subjective considerations to become part of the interpretation process.276 With Terry, he is opposed to any pre-conceived hypothesis, whether it is correct or not. This would include one’s own dogmatic conceptions, whether or not they are seen as an essential part of divine revelation.277 He claims that Terry’s only assumption was that he was dealing with an inspired book.278 Concerning objectivity, it seems as though Thomas equates objective certainty with knowability.279 Believers have a “divinely-enabled objectivity” via the Holy Spirit.280 According to Thomas, saying that neutral objectivity is nonexistent (i.e., acknowledging understanding to be subjective and partial) is to affirm that God is non-objective.281 Westphal argues that this type of hermeneutical objectivism (which he sees running through the work of Betti, Habermas, and Hirsch) seeks an absolute in reaction
