between Creator and creature.282 Throughout Thomas’ discussion, there is an emphasis on detached objectivity and precision, especially as it relates to the historical side of hermeneutics, for there to be true understanding in interpretation.283 Moreover, one might add that even amidst such a supposedly detached approach, assumptions about the morality of knowledge are unavoidable. In such an enlightenment-like pursuit, doubt is considered a virtue and credulity a vice.284 Hence, neutrality is undermined. Granted, both Terry and Thomas are on the more extreme end of the spectrum. They more self-consciously exhibit certain modernist notions and values present in some older work in the field.
Another highly influential work in evangelical hermeneutics is E. D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation.285 Hirsch was a secular literary-critic286 who argued for the existence of objective meaning in literary works. Perhaps most significant and influential is his distinction between meaning and significance and its effect on the nature of meaning and relevance for the contemporary reader.287 For our present purposes, it is important to point out two influential aspects of Hirsch’s work. First, his stated goal is to achieve validity in interpretation, which he defined as probable consensus regarding the intent of the author. This is opposed to the notion of certainty.288 Second, his work has a strong polemical thrust, seeing anything less than an unchanging meaning found in the author’s intent alone as necessarily relativistic. He particularly takes Gadamer to task for confusing the original meaning (intended by the author) and modern meaning of a text.289 Hirsch’s main focus is rooting validity in the intent of the human author and finding objective meaning with definite boundaries, yet through a process of probability and consensus, not certainty. Lundin sees a certain irony in how evangelicals have embraced Hirsch’s work, with its modernist premises. “In trying to counter the rationalism and subjectivism that threaten their faith and its sacred texts, Christian scholars turn for aid to the very source of the ideas and practices they so strenuously oppose.”290 This at least raises questions concerning the compatibility of Hirsch’s views with a consistent, Christian hermeneutic.
How has the emphasis in defining hermeneutics shifted in more recent years? The general trend has been a movement toward a more all-encompassing definition rather than focusing merely on rules and practical methodology. To Gadamer, hermeneutics is not a method for understanding but an exploration of the conditions under which understanding takes place.291 Understanding always involves interpretation.292 Earlier evangelical treatments have a perceived lack of sophistication in light of this more recent shift. Noll observes that:
Evangelicalism . . . has not regularly promoted sophisticated hermeneutics. While many elaborate systems are at hand for extracting meaning from the biblical text, few are available for understanding the interpretive constraints brought to the text, or more specifically the cultural presuppositions which often hide under the guise of commonsensical interpretive techniques.293
Accordingly, many have adopted an expanded definition reflective of current philosophical questions. Soulen suggests that the older definition (prior to what he calls the “modern” period) became unworkable in light of the erosion of certain theological premises.294 He goes on to say that:
In its modern form, hermeneutics seeks not merely to describe rules for appropriate interpretation but more basically to provide a general theory of human understanding that can support continued claims for the contemporary meaningfulness and possible truth of biblical (and other ancient) texts.295
Some evangelical scholars have also followed suit, though not all would go as far as Soulen. Thiselton sees the root of this expanded definition to be “the recognition that historical conditioning is two-sided.” The text and the interpreter both stand in an historical context and tradition and are so conditioned by that standing.296 Following Gadamer, he concludes that the nature of the hermeneutical problem is shaped by this dual conditioning so that “for understanding to take place, two sets of variables must be brought into relation with each other.”297 Ultimately, this requires a fusion of two horizons, wherein “the interpreter’s own horizon is re-shaped and enlarged.”298 For this to take place there must be an awareness of larger philosophical issues involved. J. B. Torrance, in his preface to Thiselton’s seminal work, The Two Horizons, suggests that “we cannot raise the question of interpretation without raising questions about the nature of knowledge, the use of language, and the scientific and ontological presuppositions operative in the mind of the exegete.”299
It may be noted at this point in our discussion that certain labels put on the various stages of development in the history of interpretation must be given an honest assessment in order to avoid caricature. This can be seen in relation to the shift in defining hermeneutics. In some treatments, using the pre-modern (or pre-critical),300 modern, and postmodern schema, the pre-modern phase is almost invariably dismissed for lacking the sophistication of later phases. This criticism differs from that of Noll’s cited above in that Noll is exposing the refusal to acknowledge complexity, while here there is a refusal to acknowledge at least an implicit awareness of complexity in pre-modern hermeneutics. Upon closer examination, this dismissal is unfounded. Richard Muller has objected to the term pre-critical as a label for pre-Enlightenment hermeneutics due to the fact that medieval and Reformation commentators were readily aware of and actually addressed issues of philology and context. The real issue is a difference over critical presuppositions, not critical method.301 Zimmerman has helpfully provided a corrective to such a tendency.302 Perhaps most helpful is his point that pre-modern theologians not only had worldview awareness (in terms of epistemology, ontology, and ethics), but also saw hermeneutics as involving the interpreter.303 In fact, Zimmerman contends that the arrival of a more universal scope in hermeneutics is actually “a return to interpretation as worldview thinking that pre-Enlightenment theology already possessed to a great measure.”304 Space will not permit a detailed analysis of his argument in support of these points. However, it is a helpful reminder that in the midst of a shifting definition of hermeneutics, recent emphases are not necessarily new ideas.
In sum, hermeneutics has generally shifted from an emphasis on techniques and principles of interpretation to seeking to provide a general theory of understanding. The implications of the latter necessarily go beyond merely interpreting texts, but touch upon all areas of human awareness.305 This widened scope has simultaneously brought about both rationalistic and irrationalistic tendencies among scholars who seek to address the Pandora’s box of complexity. This shift raises an important question: how can one offer a general theory of understanding while still exercising an appropriate humility which takes into account human limitations?
Reasons for the Shift?
Dissatisfaction with Objectivity and Neutrality
So, what accounts for this shift in defining hermeneutics? Surely, the answer to this question is complex and involves a multitude of factors. We will briefly mention some identifiable, interrelated trends that at least contributed to it. It is possible to conceive of these particular factors as perspectives on the overall trend. These will include ones which have both indirect and direct bearing on biblical interpretation.
First, growing dissatisfaction with the overall pursuit of a detached objectivity and neutrality in interpretation has led to a consideration of a wider range of factors, including presuppositions. Unacknowledged presuppositions are actually more dangerous than those expressly stated. For example, in what Bartholomew calls the “classic liberal move”—one sets up a fictitious objectivity obscuring philosophical presuppositions under the veil of neutrality which in turn disallows any presuppositions (at least from opponents).306 Consequently, such presuppositions lie outside the sphere of critique and are assumed to be necessarily true. The focus on rules of interpretation was not in and of itself incorrect, but incomplete. A growing philosophical awareness in hermeneutics may be traced back, at least more systematically, to the work of Schleiermacher (notwithstanding Zimmerman’s observations stated above), who argued that even rules of exegesis presupposed an answer to the question of how any understanding was possible to begin with.307 Moreover, an explanation of a text using “tools” already involves a selection of those tools, which is in itself an
