all four destroyers of Group II should go to Trondheim rather than two of them diverting to Åndalsnes as originally planned. It was a small change, but one that would become significant a week later when British soldiers landed just there.37
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau weighed anchor from Wilhelmshaven at 00:45 on 7 April.38 After clearing the river mouth, course was set for Lightship F. The battleships would act as cover for Groups I and II and carried no troops. Following the conference in the Reichskanzlei on 1 April, where all the group commanders had met, there had been discussion over how best to deploy the battleships. Arguments were put forward that it might be better to send the destroyers alone to Narvik and keep the battleships south of the Bergen–Shetland Narrows in order not to draw the attention of the British fleet to Weserübung too early. Others suggested letting the heavy units move out with Group III for Bergen and remain in the North Sea so that the Home Fleet, when alerted, would concentrate on them and leave the invasion groups alone. The SKL eventually decided Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be best employed in support of the groups for Narvik and Trondheim. Loaded with troops and stores, the destroyers would need protection against even light opposition. Should British cruisers meet with the battleships, so much the better as this would mean a certain German victory. Holding the battleships back in the North Sea would increase the chances of encountering superior British forces: to be avoided at all costs. The risk of alerting the Allies to Operation Weserübung two days before its implementation by allowing the battleships to take to sea was worth taking. Should they be sighted, it was even possible that the Admiralty would conclude it was another Atlantic breakout and concentrate their forces between Iceland and Shetland, an advantage for Group III following behind. For the 51-year-old Acting Fleet Commander Vizeadmiral Günther Lütjens onboard the flagship Gneisenau this would be a unique chance to show his abilities at sea.
Gneisenau and her sister ship Scharnhorst were the first capital ships of the new German Navy. They should have been armed with 35-cm guns, but the turrets could not be completed in time and three upgraded triple 28-cm turrets were mounted as a temporary solution. (Author’s collection)
Reaching Lightship F at 03:00, the battleships were joined by Kommodore Bonte and his ten destroyers and, not long after, the compact shadows of Hipper and two destroyers could be distinguished. A few signals were sent and acknowledged from darkened lamps and the newcomers fell in. The most powerful fleet the German Navy had mustered in over twenty years headed northwards at twenty-two knots.39
‘No disturbing news,’ wrote General Jodl in his diary.40
Gathering Storm
Dawn on Sunday 7 April found the fleet in calm sea between the Danish peninsular of Jutland and the German Westwall minefield. ‘Daylight Formation’ was ordered at 05:50 and the destroyers spread out in front of and around the larger ships steaming abreast some two thousand metres apart. Speed was increased to twenty-three knots. Eckholdt and Riedel rejoined the fleet during the morning, reporting everything in order.41 The soldiers were allowed on deck in the sunshine and marvelled at the ships and the sea. They were warned that in case of alarm they would have to hurry below, lest anybody (not even neutral ships or fishing vessels) should see there were soldiers onboard. The sea was exceptionally calm and few paid much attention to the ominous advice given over the tannoys on how to avoid seasickness. Everybody listened very carefully, though, when it was announced that their target was Narvik in northern Norway, to be reached at dawn on 9 April. Few had any idea where this was, and a scramble for maps ensued. Anticipating this, some of the destroyer captains had large-scale plastic-covered maps ready for the sailors to show the Jägers, and discussions continued throughout the day. Few had given much thought to the necessity of invading Norway and there was genuine relief when it was explained that they were coming as friends to ‘assist the Norwegians to deter Allied plans to establish bases in the north’.42
Vizeadmiral Lütjens was worried about the calm weather and good visibility, which increased the risk of being sighted. British reconnaissance over Wilhelmshaven the previous afternoon had found the battleships and several cruisers in harbour and their departure during the night had been unnoticed. At 11:31, Group West informed Lütjens that some two hours earlier a British air-reconnaissance report had been intercepted, reporting ‘one cruiser and six destroyers with eight aircraft on course 350° at 55°30’N’. Luftwaffe fighters ahead of the fleet had chased off two Hudsons during the morning, but apparently not before some of the ships had been observed. Subsequent signals from Group West reported (correctly) that most of the heavy ships of the Home Fleet were in port or far to the south, and there appeared no imminent threat to the operation. Still, Lütjens ordered an increase of speed to twenty-five knots at 12:13 and an hour later to twenty-seven in order to get into the overcast weather ahead.
At 14:20, off northern Jutland, the alarm was sounded and the Jägers rushed below decks. Twelve Blenheims of 107 Sqn approached from cloud bands in the east at about two thousand metres. Hipper was easternmost in the line-abreast and received most of the attention. Dense flak kept the Blenheims at a respectful height and the forty-five 125-kg bombs dropped hit the water well away from the ships, making little impression on the Germans.43 Action stations were stood down after less than half an hour, even if most ships kept the crews at their guns. A signal from one of the aircraft, intercepted by Gneisenau’s B-Dienst, read ‘Three battleships steering north accompanied by destroyers,’ and Lütjens took it for granted that the British now knew that a large German force was at sea. It was later confirmed from Group West that the Admiralty believed at least one Scharnhorst-class battleship was at sea. Increased signal traffic to and within the Home Fleet was registered, as was the departure of at least one cruiser squadron, but Group West – and Lütjens – remained unaware that British capital ships took to sea during 7 April. At 22:05, the SKL informed them that they believed, ‘The enemy has now recognised a northward-directed operation and will initiate countermeasures.’ Kapitän zur See Heye of Hipper commented in his diary that, based on the incoming signals, he expected British ‘counter-operations’ during the night from destroyers and submarines, but trusted the deteriorating weather would be to their advantage.44
During the afternoon of 7 April a strong low-pressure system moved in from the Atlantic as predicted by the German meteorologists and the fine weather gave way to low clouds and showers.45 Visibility was reduced to less than a mile and the sea started to grow under a mounting gale from south-south-west. Towards midnight the wind reached Force 8 to 9 and a heavy swell from aft developed. The destroyers were ordered to leave their anti-submarine stations and form two lines en-échelon to port behind the battleships, preparing for heavy weather. This formation would give the larger ships room to manoeuvre and open fire should an attack come during the night. Lütjens wanted to be well north of Trondheim by dawn and speed was set at twenty-six knots. All doors and hatches were battened shut, while traffic on deck was restricted. The German destroyers, never known for their sea-keeping abilities, began to feel the effects of the stern waves quite badly. The following sea gave the Type-34 Zerstörers weather helm, turning them port broadside onto the sea.46 The helmsmen worked hard, trying to maintain course and position and often had to be assisted by engine manoeuvring. The Type-36 Zerstörers faired somewhat better, but onboard these too conditions became quite appalling. Pitching and rolling with a tireless malice, the bows dug deep into the seas, throwing tons of water over the low forecastle and open bridge, where everyone was soaked to the skin. As the storm increased, there was a real danger that the bow might actually cut under, and radical course and speed alterations became necessary, straining bridge and engine personnel to the limits. In the engine and boiler rooms, water was coming through the ventilator intakes, adding to steam leaking from flanges and connections. Damage and technical defects developed and as lighting-circuits often tripped out, repairs had to be carried out in semi-darkness or aided by unsteady torches. In particular, the electrically driven rudder engines were vulnerable
