had one particularly heavy sea crash into the no.1 boiler room through the fan intakes, temporarily extinguishing the burners and darkening parts of the ship. Onboard Hipper the chief engineer reported the rudder engine overheating because of the continuous adjustments, and requested less use of the rudder.
Increasing winds during 7 April made the sea rise towards the afternoon. (Author’s collection)
The larger ships were also affected by the heavy seas from astern. Speed was temporarily reduced to fifteen knots around 21:00 but this created problems for the fuel pumps of Scharnhorst and had to be increased again. Speed was thereafter kept between twenty-two and twenty-six knots during the night. As darkness approached, stern lights were rigged to help keep contact and avoid collisions. The destroyers were instructed over USW radio to do their best and to try to regain contact at first light if they could not keep up. It was imperative that the fleet was as far north as possible by dawn and it was better for some of the destroyers to find their way alone than for the landings to be delayed. On the positive side, the chance of being sighted by British aircraft was negligible.
The Jägers felt as if they had been thrown into hell. Trapped in a crowded, alien environment below deck, with an unbearable atmosphere, they sank into apathy, paralysed by seasickness and fear. The noise was infernal as the shrieking of the storm added to the racket of the fans and engines and the never-ending seas crashing over the forecastle. Everything loose was thrown about by the violent rolls. ‘Hold di fast!’– ‘Hold tight!’ – was the call. The next sea could be fatal if sleep or exhaustion relaxed attention. Arms and legs were broken, heads smashed and the medical personnel worked overtime.
General Dietl was one of the very few not affected by the storm, it was said. He stayed on the bridge of Heidkamp, next to Bonte and Erdmenger, virtually the whole journey, except for a few short naps. A feat that added nicely to the already long list of legends and anecdotes associated with his name. ‘We would never have risked this speed under such conditions in peacetime,’ commented Bonte. ‘Well,’ answered Dietl, ‘just get me there in time, that’s all I care about.’
Around midnight, the German fleet passed the latitude of Bergen. The wind increased further and some of the destroyers started to lose touch with the flagship. Rolls of over forty-five degrees were experienced during the night and most army equipment lashed on deck, as well as the ships’ own boats and depth charges, went overboard. Some of the latter exploded in the wake of the ships, creating yet another unwanted danger and tension onboard the larger ships – where it was at first believed the explosions were incoming shells. Moving about on deck was hazardous and, in spite of ropes strung on all decks, at least ten men went overboard from the destroyers between the evening of the 7th and the morning of the 9th. ‘Keine Rettungsversuche’ – ‘no rescue attempts’ – was the laconic order given. It would have been virtually impossible to rescue anybody from the corkscrewing ships anyway, even if they, against all odds, survived more than a few minutes in the icy water.47
Back in Wilhelmshaven, Konteradmiral Hubert Schmundt, acting flag officer scouting forces in charge of Group III, considered Bergen the most dangerous objective of the whole invasion.48 Groups I and II would be very exposed indeed, but unless the Royal Navy was already at sea, they would have a fair chance of escaping interception even though they most likely would be sighted. Group III would leave Germany some twenty-four hours behind Groups I and II and Schmundt expected to be confronted by fully alerted British forces. Bergen was only eight to nine hours’ steaming from Scapa Flow and securing the Bergen–Shetland Narrows would, in Schmundt’s opinion, become a British priority once it was clear that German ships were at large. It did not ease his worries either that all the large, modern units of the navy had been allocated to Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo. In particular, the disposition of several heavy ships in the Oslo group annoyed Schmundt, as he believed this to be for prestige reasons. Group III, on the other hand, in addition to the light cruisers Köln and Königsberg, had been left with Bremse, a gunnery training ship, the torpedo boats Leopard and Wolf and the depot ship Carl Peters with six S-boats (motor torpedo boats).
Konteradmiral Hubert Schmundt, acting flag officer scouting forces in charge of Group III. (Bundesarchiv Koblenz)
Bremse and Carl Peters both had cruising speeds of less than twenty knots, meaning the crossing would take about twenty-four hours, including a full day in the North Sea, increasing chances of interception and submarine attacks. Schmundt appealed to the SKL, requesting a swap of the two for Karlsruhe from the Kristiansand group in order to have a homogeneous force with a higher transit speed. His request was denied and he had to make do with what he had; Krancke at one stage remarked to Buschenhagen that Schmundt seemed to have lost his nerve. Schmundt contacted Generalmajor Hermann Tittel, C-in-C of 69th ID, to ensure that Bremse and Carl Peters carried as few as possible of the men absolutely needed on the invasion day. In case of problems, the slower ships could turn east and seek shelter in Norwegian waters or in the Skagerrak, while the cruisers and torpedo boats attempted a high-speed breakthrough towards Bergen after darkness, supported by the S-boats.
On 7 April, Köln, Königsberg and Bremse were at Wilhelmshaven, Carl Peters and the torpedo boats in Cuxhaven and the S-boat Flotilla at Helgoland.49 It was forbidden to leave the ships from early morning, and telephone lines were barred. In the afternoon, the senior officers were informed of the operation and soon after the first troops started to arrive in small groups. The main embarkation started when a troop train was shunted into the enclosed area of the Hipperhafen docks as darkness fell. All men were onboard by 23:00, Köln having embarked 640 officers and men, mostly from I and II/IR 159 in addition to Generalmajor Tittel and his staff. Königsberg embarked a further 735 men, including Oberst Graf von Stolberg, commanding officer of IR 159, Vizeadmiral von Schrader, the designated commanding admiral for the Norwegian West Coast and their staffs. Onboard Bremse were 207 men, mostly from 8th Company IR 159, but also some police and guard units. Korvettenkapitän Hans Marks, commander of 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, was in charge in Cuxhaven, where the remainder of the two battalions embarked on Carl Peters, Leopard and Wolf. In all, some 1,900 soldiers were onboard the ships of Group III. Support personnel, field guns, heavy matériel, horses, vehicles, A/A guns and further provisions were onboard the transports Rio de Janeiro, Marie Leonhardt and Curityba, already at sea.
Light cruiser Köln. The 6,650-ton K-class cruisers were capable of well over thirty knots and armed with nine 15-cm guns, six 88-mms and twelve torpedo tubes. (Author’s collection)
Confined below decks, the soldiers were given a meal, followed by brief instructions of what to do and what not to do while onboard and advised to go to sleep. The cruisers and Bremse cast off at 23:10 and after passing through the locks headed down the Jade towards the open sea. Shortly after, Admiral Schmundt received information from Group West that the British had sighted Groups I and II, but it appeared that only light enemy forces had taken to sea so far. Carl Peters and the torpedo boats, having left Cuxhaven an hour earlier, had orders to join the flag in the forenoon of 8 April, west of Ringkøbing.50 Meanwhile, the cruisers zigzagged northwards at twenty-three knots. By daylight, a handful of escort aircraft arrived overhead. There were (false) torpedo alerts on a few occasions, but after some quick turns the ships were back on main course again.51 To Schmundt’s great relief, the weather closed in during the morning with low clouds and rain, reducing visibility. Around 10:45, fog set in and visibility was reduced. The air cover had to give up and turned for home, but that meant little as no British aircraft or submarines could find
