Marks onboard the torpedo boat Leopard, but there was no visual contact. By 11:00, the end of the mine barrage was reached and course was set for Utsira at eighteen knots with Königsberg and Bremse in line-astern behind Köln. At one stage, Königsberg ventured too close to Köln and, evading to port, lost sight of the flagship in the dense fog. Contact was maintained by USW radio and Group III continued northwards. Twice, aircraft engines were heard overhead, but the German ships were safe inside the fog and not sighted. No further signals were received from Group West and there was little knowledge of what lay ahead.52
Just after 05:00 on 8 April, the third K-class cruiser, Karlsruhe, under the command of Kapitän zur See Friedrich Rieve, left Wesermünde heading for Kristiansand, accompanied by the torpedo boats Luchs, Seeadler, Greif and the depot ship Tsingtau. Onboard were I/IR 310 plus staff, support personnel and naval gunners to take over the coastal forts – in all some 1,070 men. Konteradmiral Schenk, the designated commanding admiral for the Norwegian South Coast, and his staffs were also onboard. Passing Lightship D later in the morning, Group IV split up: Karlsruhe, Luchs and Seeadler taking a westerly route, zigzagging at twenty-one knots, while Tsingtau and Greif hugged the Danish coast at sixteen knots, the best the depot ship could do. C-in-C Torpedo Boats Kapitän zur See Hans Bütow was onboard Luchs and Korvettenkapitän Wolf Henne, commander of 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, was onboard Greif. They were prepared to take independent action if the flag faltered. Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Petersen’s 2nd S-boat Flotilla, also assigned to Group IV, was a mix of boats of different designs, which gave him operational challenges. He and his crews were among the most experienced ‘torpedomänner’ of the German Navy though, and would run independently towards the Skagerrak.53
The last of the western groups to leave for Norway was Group VI. The 600-ton minesweepers M1, M2, M9 and M13 carried the 150 men of Rittmeister Eickhorn’s Radfahrschwadron, tasked with securing Egersund. Eickhorn and his unit had arrived at the port of Cuxhaven by train from their barracks near Stettin in the late morning of Sunday 7 April, were shunted directly into the closed-off harbour area, and loading onto the minesweepers commenced. No transport vessels were assigned to Group VI so all the equipment needed for the unit to survive until reinforcements could be brought in from Stavanger, had to be carried onboard the minesweepers. The tiny flotilla under the command of Korvettenkapitän Kurt Thoma of M9 left Cuxhaven at 20:30 and anchored off the island of Neuwerk, waiting for the appropriate time to head north. With forty to fifty additional soldiers onboard and bicycles, motorcycles, machine guns, crates and other equipment in every available space on and below deck, conditions were cramped indeed. While waiting, the sailors and soldiers were briefed on the task ahead. It was a huge surprise that Egersund and Norway turned out to be their target. The information that they would come as friends was encouraging, but few dared to hope the Royal Navy would stay at home. At 05:45 on the 8th, anchors were weighed again and course resumed on a flat sea with a light south-easterly wind. Later, Group VI met up with the minesweepers and minelayers of Groups X and XI, heading for Denmark, and the small ships travelled north together.54
Kapitän zur See Friedrich Rieve of Karlsruhe leading Group IV. Behind him is the intelligence officer Düwal and von Schroeder, Rieve’s adjutant. (Kapitän Rieve’s photo collection via K Mæsel)
Blücher, the second of the Hipper-class cruisers, had been commissioned in September 1939. The subsequent harsh winter with heavy ice in the Baltic delayed her working-up, as did additional post-launch alterations and only on 30 March was she released from the yard in Kiel. Altogether, Blücher had only spent some twenty days at sea. Neither the torpedo batteries nor the 20.3-cm guns had ever been fired. The young crew had been assembled while she was still in the yard and they knew each other well, but few had experience from other ships – far less from war. The officers were also inexperienced and only a handful had been in battle. Emergency training, damage control and action-station drill were deficient or at best incomplete. Manuals were being implemented, except for those of the engine room, which were still being drafted. Nevertheless, Raeder wanted to free Lützow for her Atlantic sortie, and decided Blücher should join Group V for Oslo. The SKL saw no particular risk in assigning the new cruiser to this presumably simple task and did not protest. Thus the 47-year-old Kapitän zur See Heinrich Woldag was ordered to prepare for exercises in the Baltic with the light cruiser Emden as soon as he was ready. Emden was the oldest and least battleworthy of the light cruisers, but was seen as fit for the Oslofjord.55
During the transfer to Oslo, Konteradmiral Kummetz would be in charge of Gruppe Oldenburg, reporting to Generaladmiral Carls of Group East in Kiel.56 Kummetz embarked on Blücher with his staff in the afternoon of 5 April, heading into the Baltic in the company of Emden. Only Kummetz, Woldag and their senior staff officers knew what was going on. Docking in Swinemünde in the late morning of the 6th, preparations were immediately initiated with the staff of the 163rd ID for the embarkation of troops. A number of administrative, civilian and propaganda personnel came onboard during the day, as well as an advance party of von Falkenhorst’s staff. The embarkation of the soldiers commenced as darkness fell. Most of the equipment was stored on deck while the men made themselves comfortable in the confined, unfamiliar environment below. Few of them received any information at all about what to do in case of alarm. Due to the haste of the preparations, Blücher’s magazines still contained practice ammunition of all calibres. Because of lack of time and to avoid any questions, it was decided not to land this, but merely to stow the live ammunition on top. Thus, there was no room for the ammunition brought onboard by the soldiers, which was left up top; partly on deck, partly in the torpedo workshop and aircraft hangar.57 Ten to twelve Marks floats, with room for fifteen to forty men, arrived the day before sailing after much pressure from Woldag. Kapok lifejackets also arrived late and were for convenience strapped to the guardrails along the superstructure decks.
Blücher left Swinemünde accompanied by Emden and the torpedo boats Albatros and Kondor at 05:30 on 7 April. First they steered east, but as soon as they were out of sight from land, they turned west, heading for Kiel. During the day, Blücher’s main guns were fired for the first and, as it turned out, last time with live ammunition; one round for each gun. Other types of exercises were held all over the ship, particularly focusing on battle drill and damage control. The Landsers, under protest, were kept below deck practising disembarkation drills.58
Shortly before 21:00, the group dropped anchor in Strander Bucht off Kiel, alongside the heavy cruiser Lützow, which earlier in the day had come through the canal from Wilhelmshaven. During the stay off Kiel, the soldiers were only allowed on deck in small groups wearing navy garments borrowed from the sailors. Most of the men believed they were involved in some kind of exercise and found the masquerade quite funny. Waiting for departure time, Konteradmiral Kummetz invited captains, navigation officers and army commanders onboard Blücher to discuss the last details with Generalmajor Erwin Engelbrecht, commander of the 163rd ID. Engelbrecht would be in charge once the troops landed in Oslo and would be acting C-in-C until General von Falkenhorst arrived. For most of the officers this was the first they had learned of their mission.
Group V at sea in the Kattegat. The photo was taken from Emden, with Lützow ahead and Blücher in the lead. (Bundesarchiv Koblenz)
At 03:00 on 8 April, the group weighed anchor in darkness and headed north through the Belts. Blücher was in the van; Lützow, Emden, Kondor and Albatros followed. At 05:30, the torpedo boat Möwe also fell in, having spent the night at anchor further offshore.
