cruisers had not been alert, then made the mistake of closing too near the badly outgunned destroyers instead of smashing them with long-range fire.
Hoping that the Enterprise had done her job, Admiral Kalbfus for the first time ordered his fleet into range of Black air power; he had decided to close for the decisive surface action. The White fleet moved west; Admiral Andrews’ fleet steamed eastward to meet it.
White fleet had better battleships and two carriers, one still undamaged; Andrews had the PBYs for distant reconnaissance, which meant that he might find his foe first and gain the initiative with strikes by the undiscovered Ranger. It had the look of an even fight.
On the afternoon of the 25th, a PBY sighted the White fleet northeast of Puerto Rico. At 1527, a patrol bomber damaged the San Francisco in a high-altitude attack. At 1605, three seaplanes tried to bomb the Lexington from 12,000 feet, but all were shot down by the combat air patrol and AA fire. A minute later, three more planes attacked the carrier while the fighters were busy with the first group of attackers, but the shrewd ploy was wasted because the bombing was inaccurate and no damage was done to “Lady Lex.”
On the morning of the 26th, the high-flying PBYs kept the White force under steady scrutiny, mostly watching, sometimes attacking separately and ineffectively. The combat air patrol shot down seven of the snoopers during their long vigil. In the afternoon, the last bombs were loaded onto 22 PBYs at San Juan for the seaplanes’ final strike; it was only possible because the tender Williamson had sped to Trinidad and returned with 21,000 gallons of aviation gasoline swishing in her belly.
Meanwhile, White submarines formed an advance patrol line for Admiral Kalbfus’ force. The submarine Seal found the Ranger, but her skipper unwisely delayed sending off a contact report for an hour and a quarter while he stalked the carrier. At 1030, the Seal fired three torpedoes in a submerged attack from 2,500 yards, inflicting minor damage. Destroyer Patterson located the submarine and sank her with depth charges. Then at 1235, while the Salmon was cruising on the surface, her lookouts sighted against the horizon the dark, oblong bulk of Ranger; the submarine submerged for an approach, but her underwater speed was too slow, and the Ranger pulled away. Salmon fired four torpedoes at long range, but all missed.
But then, before the White carrier planes could hunt down the Ranger, before the Black seaplanes could try a final strike at the Lexington and Yorktown, the Problem abruptly and anticlimactically ended. It had run on long, and only one day remained in which to stage the battleship action which traditionally concluded Fleet Problems. It was time to fight the Battle of Jutland.
The battle commenced at 0600 on the 27th, the two forces stationed 120 miles apart on an axis running southeast-northwest, off the north shore of the Greater Antilles; no attacks were permitted for four hours to prevent the planes from inflicting damage while the battle fleets closed. The two sides used similar formations: heavy cruisers and destroyers in the van, then the battleships, with light cruisers and destroyers bringing up the rear. Planes from each fleet tracked the other, but because the fliers had much to learn of the nuances of over-water navigation and ship identification, the copious reports were sometimes confused or contradictory. White submarines scouted to the southwest, trying to stay on the surface to add range to the search; sometimes approaching Black planes forced them to dive, but they usually found that they could sight the aircraft long before they themselves were sighted and so could submerge to safety in ample time.
When the submarines found the Black ships, they essayed submerged attacks. However, the high-speed warships were difficult targets, and the submarines were able to do very little damage. The Snapper made an utterly impractical attack, using sound bearings alone. The battle line was hardly aware that it had been attacked. The destroyers screening the heavy ships were ineffective in discovering the submarines due to the high-speed operations and deficient sonar training.
At 1100, the opposing battle fleets made visual contact at a range of twenty miles. At 1121, at a range of 30,000 yards, the White battleships commenced firing, aided by spotting aircraft; five minutes later, the Black battleships began to return the fire. In the meantime, many lesser duels flared. Overhead, 70 Black patrol bombers and 12 torpedo planes, escorted by 36 Marine fighters, swept in on the White ships; nine White fighters attacked the rear squadron of seaplanes, but their interception was too late and too weak. The patrol bombers struck from high altitude with 152 1,000-pound bombs; the slow, stubby torpedo planes slashed in in a low-level attack off the bow of the White van, but they were badly shot up by antiaircraft fire from three White heavy cruisers. Meanwhile, three other White heavy cruisers and a formation of destroyers attacked the light cruisers and destroyers at the rear of the Black column, causing considerable damage. Then six Black heavy cruisers seized the moment and attacked the three remaining heavy cruisers at the head of the White formation, sinking them all.
With the opening provided by the victory of the heavy cruisers, a Black destroyer squadron launched a torpedo attack against the White battle fleet from off the starboard beam. Admiral Kalbfus ordered his White battleships to make a right-about maneuver to avoid the torpedo attack; his lead battleship, the Tennessee, was hit by fire from the Black battleships and suddenly slowed to 8 knots. The five trailing White battleships then also reduced speed, so that it took them too long to complete the reversal of course and redeploy; for several minutes in the long turn, the three lead battleships masked the fire of the rear three. During this crucial interval, the White battleships suffered costly damage.
The exercise ended at 1236. The Black fleet could claim a victory. Its cruisers had kept heavy pressure on the White light forces, preventing them from attacking the Black battleships, while its own destroyers attacked the White battleships. Black losses were one battleship, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and six destroyers. White losses were one battleship, three heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and eleven destroyers. The White battleships were more heavily damaged than the Black.1
At the conclusion of the Fleet Problem, the Atlantic Squadron’s old battleships of Battle Division 5 and destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 10 were called upon to participate in Fleet Landing Exercise 5, to test the amphibious capability of Admiral Johnson’s command.
The warships fired gunfire support practices off eastern Vieques. The naval fire blasted deep craters on the island, and the din and rumble of the earth seemed demoralizing, but a very disappointing amount of substantive damage was done to the mock-up target defenses. Reconnaissance flights were flown over the island, and a Marine Reconnaissance and Intelligence team went ashore to reconnoiter, a luxury not usually available in combat operations because of the limited time ships might spend in waters patrolled by enemy planes and fear of compromising tactical surprise.
The landing exercises took place on 10 and 11 March. The assault troops, 1st Battalion, Fifth Marines, were as usual carried in the cramped old battleships Wyoming, Texas, and New York due to lack of transports. The Marines’ supplies and heavy equipment were carried in the venerable cargo ship Capella; to a force long bereft of auxiliaries, the vessel, recently refitted after nineteen years out of commission, seemed the “most useful vessel in the expedition.” The main assault landings were carried out despite rising seas and shoals off the beaches. Defending planes simulated strafing attacks on the naked boats, inflicting “appalling” losses. The Marines then quickly established a beachhead, as the troops of the defending battalion, thinly stretched over an impossible 25-mile frontage, pulled back in order to concentrate their dispersed forces.2
Thus ended Fleet Problem XX and Flex 5. The mock warfare campaign illuminated significant trends in naval strategy and tactics, although some lessons remained shadowy.
Generally, the Problem exemplified the psychological advantages of the offensive in warfare. White ships and planes for the most part fought daringly, cleverly, and vigorously; Black ships and planes, leashed in a necessary but seemingly
