protection of a powerful European Fascist nation, White (Germany). Anxious to secure a base in the Americas from which to menace the Panama Canal and extend its influence in Latin America, the White government decided to assist the revolt with military advisers, aircraft, and modern arms. The White fleet sortied, escorting a supply convoy to the New World. In response, Black transferred part of its split main fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic to reinforce the Atlantic Squadron and intercept White’s force.
The Black fleet was commanded by Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, 59 years old, somewhat pompous, intelligent and flexible, but perhaps too long a staff officer. His force consisted of 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 32 destroyers, and 15 auxiliaries, mostly aviation tenders. The backbone of his air power was the carrier Ranger with 54 light bombers and 18 fighters; for long-range scouting and strikes he had 102 shore-based patrol bombers; 62 land-based Marine scout bombers and fighters rounded out his air force.
The Black fleet steamed at sea off Puerto Rico, as Admiral Andrews did not have a large anchorage to accommodate his force and was reluctant to disperse ships in several harbors or in a close blockade of Green lest the separate elements be defeated in detail by the concentrated enemy force.a Andrews reasoned that the White fleet, not the convoy, was his proper objective, for even if the White supplies allowed the rebels to gain control of Green, the permanence of their rule must depend on the ability of White sea power to keep open the lines of communication to Germany. Andrews’ decision, while technically sound, was politically flawed, for it meant that the rebels would be given time to solidify their position in Green, blurring the distinction between internal revolution and external aggression, thus making it more difficult for the United States to justify intervention.
However, Admiral Andrews had scant choice. Lacking air bases in the southern Caribbean, he had to use ships, not planes, to scout for the enemy convoy. Hence, the radius and effectiveness of his search must be limited. He sent a scouting line of 7 cruisers, backed by the Ranger, out to seek the White convoy and hopefully direct the Ranger’s planes to it; but the Ranger could not be risked in too close support of the cruisers because of the uncertain whereabouts of the White fleet’s three aircraft carriers.
Lack of sea and air bases in the Caribbean limited Admiral Andrews to a defensive strategy. He kept his fleet off Puerto Rico, protected by his shore-based aviation. His plan was to engage the White fleet in a decisive, daylight surface battle when the enemy passed within range of his land-based air power.
The White fleet was commanded by Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, an experienced, conventional battleship officer. He had a force of 6 battleships, more modern than those of his adversary, 6 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 31 destroyers, 13 submarines, and the auxiliary Utah, which simulated the White convoy. His air power consisted of the carriers Enterprise, Lexington, and Yorktown, with 72 light bombers, 54 torpedo planes, 36 torpedo-bombers, and 54 fighters.
Admiral Kalbfus’ intention was to escort the convoy to Green while keeping his main battle fleet well beyond a 600-mile circle out from the Black air bases on Puerto Rico and Haiti. The convoy and its escort were protected by one carrier in close support and by a second carrier astern; farther back were the battleships and main fleet; the third carrier screened the flank of the fleet. Kalbfus’ formation was designed to allow the battle line to protect the convoy from surface attack but keep the battleships safe from surprise air attack. Admiral Kalbfus’ plan was to protect the convoy’s passage to Green, then use his carrier aviation to erode Black air power before seeking to close for the decisive surface battle.
Thus, each admiral made air power the cornerstone of his strategy. Admiral Andrews intended to fight at sea only within range of his air support and Admiral Kalbfus intended to destroy his foe’s air power before confronting him at sea.
Fleet Problem XX commenced at 0600, 20 February 1939.
No contacts were made on the 20th.
The 21st was a gray day, and the wind blew sprinkling black squalls across a choppy, slate-colored sea. Despite the bad weather, Admiral Andrews’ scout cruisers managed to launch float planes, and several of the reconnaissance aircraft located the lead White ships and got off contact reports before being shot down by an angry swarm of chunky fighters from the Lexington. The Black cruisers sped eastward to try to regain contact with the enemy.
Meanwhile, throughout the morning, White planes from the Enterprise and Yorktown flew strike missions in search of the Ranger, the Black fleet’s only carrier, disdaining the cruiser targets scouting below. As Vice Admiral King, unhappy at the tight leash thus far held on his carriers by Admiral Kalbfus, gladly ordered his fliers: “Black carrier will be the primary objective for all attacks.” But King’s men could not find the Ranger, which was lurking to the west and north.
Soon three of the Black scout cruisers, the Northampton, Salt Lake City, and Pensacola, sighted the White convoy at long range. They were promptly taken under fire by three matching White heavy cruisers of the escort, the San Francisco, Quincy, and Tuscaloosa, and a running battle developed, with the Black ships firing at long range while dodging in and out of rain squalls. Then seventy-two Yorktown planes, returning in dark humor from the futile search for the Ranger, found the Northampton and Pensacola and bombed the twisting, firing cruisers, sinking both. The Salt Lake City, damaged in the gun battles, ran out of the dripping shelter of a squall in an attempt to circle the White cruisers and get in some distant shots at the convoy; but the San Francisco headed her off, and Salt Lake City was sunk by gunfire. The remainder of the scout cruisers also fared badly. Enterprise and Lexington planes sank the Philadelphia and Savannah and heavily damaged the Brooklyn and Nashville.
Admiral Andrews, learning of the massacre of his scouts, decided to send the Ranger after the White convoy, then reconsidered. He could not send one carrier against three. The Ranger was directed to come north, and the White convoy reached Green unharmed. The cost of overturning the Monroe Doctrine was three White heavy cruisers damaged and 39 carrier aircraft lost.
The ordeal of the picket cruisers showed that the airplane had deprived the modern cruiser of its traditional functions in naval warfare, scouting and quick thrusts against the enemy’s line of communications; more than the battleship, whose guns could still prove useful for shore bombardment and antiaircraft defense, the cruiser was obsolescent.
Despite his early successes, Admiral Kalbfus understood that in order to secure Green he must defeat the Black fleet and establish an advanced base in the Puerto Rico-Virgin Islands region from which to support future operations in the Western Hemisphere. But he knew that he could not achieve either objective until his forces destroyed Black shore-based aviation. Thus, on the 22nd, White submarines poked about the bays and inlets of the Puerto Rican coast, looking for the Black aircraft tenders. A landing party from the submarine Salmon discovered that with the Black fleet out at sea the tenders and patrol planes were vulnerable. The White force destroyermen then conceived of a series of hit-and-run raids designed to reduce Black air strength.
Four ships of Destroyer Division 3 running close offshore of the Leeward Islands were nearly overlooked by Black patrol bombers searching for larger ships in deeper waters; when they were sighted, lowering clouds and slow pilot reactions prevented successful attacks. At 0256 on the morning of the 23rd, Drayton and Flusser sneaked into Culebra harbor past the somnolent picket destroyer Hopkins. Inside, the two destroyers sank the small tenders Sandpiper and Lapwing with torpedoes and gunfire and shot up four of the moored PBYs. The Hopkins tried to intervene, but the four-stacker was no match for the modern ships and she went down in an unlucky thirteen minutes.
The two destroyers went on to San Juan, Flusser to attack, Drayton to cover her. Two Black guardships were patrolling
