Region (FIR), a Libyan-claimed air defense zone that extended out well into the central Mediterranean. The northern boundary of the zone was the 34th parallel. Within the FIR all aircraft were required to identify themselves to Libyan air traffic controllers.
At daybreak the guided missile destroyer William V. Pratt (DDG 44) and the destroyer Caron (DD 970) steamed south of 32° 30’ and operated in the Gulf of Sidra for the next thirty-four hours.75 For the duration of the exercise Qaddafi was in Aden conducting an official visit to South Yemen. According to U.S. intelligence Qaddafi had left Tripoli before the start of the exercise and had arrived in the capital of South Yemen earlier than planned. While in Aden he signed a treaty of cooperation with Ethiopia and South Yemen, effectively uniting three of the most radical states in the Middle East and Africa. A CIA analysis of the pact found that the tripartite alliance significantly increased the threat to U.S. interests in northeast Africa. According to the analysts a quick look at a map of the region showed U.S. allies Egypt and Sudan caught between Libya on the west and Ethiopia and South Yemen on the east. According to the terms of the treaty Qaddafi pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance to his partners, and the three countries agreed to maintain a reserve military force of five thousand Libyan, five thousand Yemeni, and fifty thousand Ethiopian troops.
In Qaddafi’s absence his lieutenants reacted swiftly to the American flight operations taking place in the Tripoli FIR and the northern section of the Gulf of Sidra.76 On the first day of the exercise an assortment of aircraft from the Libyan Arab Air Force—consisting of French-built Mirage F-1s and Mirage F-5Ds, and Soviet-made MiG-23 Flogger Es and MiG-25 Foxbat As—took off from bases along the Libyan coast and flew as close as possible to the American battle force. The F-14 and F-4J crews performed thirty-five intercepts of seventy Libyan aircraft operating in pairs. Several of the intercepts evolved into “hassles,” which is fighter pilot jargon for simulated dogfights. Most LAAF pilots turned back before entering the exercise zone, but on three occasions Libyan MiGs entered the restricted area and each time forced the fleet to suspend its missile-firing exercise. Navy fighters closely escorted each intruder until well clear of the exercise area.77
Most of the aviators in the battle force were too young to have flown combat missions in Vietnam, but the first day of OOMEX provided U.S. fighter crews with an excellent opportunity to practice combat maneuvering against a potential adversary flying Soviet- or French-built aircraft. The Americans noted that in general the Mirage pilots were more proficient at evasive maneuvering than the MiG pilots and were more difficult to intercept and hold in formation. Some Navy airmen speculated that the difference might have been due to the quality of the training provided by the French compared to that supplied by the Soviets.78
ABC News correspondent John K. Cooley was in Tripoli during the Sixth Fleet exercise. On the evening of 18 August he observed Libyan television announcers whip up the residents of Tripoli into a terrified frenzy with reports that the CIA was planning to overthrow or kill Qaddafi, that the American battle fleet was sailing toward Libya, that Egypt and Sudan were preparing to attack Libya with American support, and that the Libyan armed forces had been placed on high alert.79 All of this, of course, was unknown to the aviators in the battle force who were preparing for another full day of flight operations over the Gulf of Sidra. The second day of OOMEX promised to be just as exciting as the first.
The Gulf of Sidra Incident
At 0545 local time on 19 August, the Nimitz and the Forrestal ordered their crews to flight quarters. By 0600 the ordnance men had armed the planes, and the aircrews had completed their mission briefings and were manning their aircraft. There was a gentle breeze that morning, and the forecast called for a deep blue sky that would provide clear visibility for several miles. The Nimitz and the Forrestal launched six F-14 Tomcats and four F-4J Phantoms, respectively. The ten fighters were to fill five CAP stations by first light. Tomcats from VF-41 were to occupy the three southern stations, while four Phantoms of VF-74 were to fill the remaining two. Both carriers launched antisubmarine aircraft to guard against the Libyan fleet of Soviet-built diesel submarines and attack aircraft for armed surveillance of Libyan surface vessels. This latter assignment was known as surface combat air patrol (SUCAP) and carried the code name “birddog.” An unarmed E-2C Hawkeye from Carrier Airborne Early-Warning Squadron (VAW) 124 based on the Nimitz took station in the northern portion of the exercise area, out of the reach of Libyan fighters. Its mission was to provide long-range surveillance and fighter control for the battle force. Finally, the carriers launched KA-6D tankers to extend the on-station time of the CAP aircraft.
The Black Aces of VF-41 flew the most capable fighter plane in the world. The Tomcat’s AN / AWG-9 radar could detect targets nearly two hundred miles away, and the aircraft’s weapons control system could track twenty-four targets and simultaneously engage six with AIM-54C Phoenix missiles. During OOMEX the F-14s were armed with short-range AIM-9L Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles, medium-range AIM-7F Sparrow semi-active radar-guided missiles, and long-range Phoenix active radar-guided missiles. The Tomcats were also equipped with an M-61A1 Vulcan 20mm Gatling gun for close-in dog-fighting. The Bedevilers of VF-74 were armed with Sidewinders and Sparrows. The Navy version of the F-4 Phantom was not equipped with a gun system.80
A pair of Tomcats with radio call signs “Fast Eagle 102” and “Fast Eagle 107” was scheduled to fill the southernmost CAP station. Comdr. Henry M. “Hank” Kleeman, the commanding officer of VF-41, flew the lead F-14 fighter, Fast Eagle 102, and his wingman Lt. Lawrence M. “Music” Muczynski piloted Fast Eagle 107. Lt. David J. Venlet and Lt. (jg) James P. “Amos” Anderson served as the radar intercept officers (RIOs) in Fast Eagles 102 and 107, respectively. Muczynski later admitted that he would not have been disappointed had the sortie been completely uneventful. On the previous day, 18 August, he had seen plenty of action performing a pair of intercepts, one of which was against a powerful MiG-25. Once airborne Fast Eagles 102 and 107 topped off their fuel tanks then headed south to their CAP station at the southern end of the patrol area. While en route to their station they monitored on their radios a hassle that was taking place to the west between two Libyan MiG-25s and two VF-41 Tomcats. The Libyans eventually broke off and returned to base. Meanwhile, a pair of birddog A-7E Corsair II aircraft kept watch over a Soviet-built Osa-class missile patrol boat that had moved into the exercise area. Minutes later two Bedevilers swung south to intercept a pair of MiG-23 Flogger Es, which were heading north toward the battle force. The Tomcats arrived on station at sunrise and commenced a racetrack patrol pattern, cruising at twenty thousand feet at three hundred knots. The aircraft timed their patterns so that one plane was always pointed toward the Libyan coast while the other flew its northern leg.81
At approximately 0715, while the two Phantoms from VF-74 were escorting the two MiGs, Kleeman began what he thought was his last turn toward the coast before breaking off to refuel from an airborne tanker and returning to the carrier. Suddenly Venlet detected an air contact on his radarscope due south at eighty miles. It was proceeding north from the Libyan air base at Ghurdabiyah on the south shore of the Gulf of Sidra. The E-2C detected the contact at the same time and tracked its northward progress. Venlet immediately noticed the contact climb to twenty thousand feet and increase its speed to 550 knots. It was heading right for Fast Eagle 102. Venlet reported the contact to the E-2C and to the battle force antiair warfare commander (AAWC) stationed on the Nimitz. The AAWC, a senior officer in the battle force, had the authority to initiate defensive measures to protect the force from a hostile air threat. Venlet received no reply, however, because the radio circuit was busy with reports from the F-4Js escorting the MiG-23s.82
Muczynski and Anderson in Fast Eagle 107 also held the presumed-to-be-Libyan contact on their radarscope. Muczynski abandoned the racetrack pattern and swung his Tomcat into a combat formation known as a “loose deuce.” This maneuver placed him four thousand feet above Kleeman and two miles off and slightly ahead of his skipper’s right wing. The loose deuce, an aggressive and flexible formation, allows each fighter to protect the other and enables either plane—depending on who spots
