El Dorado Canyon. Joseph Stanik
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After lunch Reagan addressed the Constellation’s crew assembled in the hangar deck. He again praised them and sent a stern message to the enemies of freedom: “You all make me very proud to be able to say I’m the commander in chief of all of you. The demonstration of firepower and efficiency by the air wing was . . . impressive to the enemies of freedom in the world. And we had an example of that just night before last on the carrier Nimitz. . . . You are ensuring peace just by doing what you’re doing, because any potential enemy has to see the price of aggression is . . . more than he might want to pay, and that’s the greatest service that can be performed.”111 The crew burst out in cheers several times during his brief remarks.
Perhaps the most significant development following the air battle was the absence of second-guessing of the actions of the fighter crews by administration officials. If there were any doubts that the aircrews had acted properly, Reagan put those doubts to rest. He fully supported their split-second decision and reiterated his complete confidence in the talent and judgment of his armed forces. His “hands-off” approach to military operations attained its first success.
In his autobiography, An American Life, Reagan reflected on the message that the United States delivered to Qaddafi courtesy of the Sixth Fleet: “We weren’t going to let him claim squatters’ rights over a huge area of the Mediterranean in defiance of international law. I also wanted to send a message to others in the world that there was a new management team in the White House, and that the United States wasn’t going to hesitate any longer to act when its legitimate interests were at stake.”112
While Reagan Slept
Immediately after the shootdown a flash message was sent from the Nimitz to the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe located in London, then forwarded to the headquarters of the European Command in Stuttgart, West Germany, and finally sent to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. It took less than six minutes for the message to travel from the Nimitz up the chain of command to the Pentagon command center. Lt. Gen. Philip J. Gast, USAF, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was on duty in the command center, immediately notified Weinberger and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones, USAF. Weinberger called National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen, who a few minutes later notified Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III. Both Allen and Meese were with Reagan at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles. Weinberger’s call to Allen came in around 2300 Pacific Daylight Time. By that time Reagan had gone to bed. Meese decided to wait for a complete report on the incident from Weinberger before waking Reagan. Five hours later Meese and Allen had enough information. Shortly before 0430 the two aides woke Reagan and informed him of the incident. Reagan asked about the condition of the American aviators, he stated that he regretted the Libyan action, and he expressed his approval of the fleet’s response. Satisfied that the situation was in good hands he went back to sleep.113
In the wake of the sixty-second air battle with Libya some journalists tried to stir up controversy when they learned that Reagan’s staff had waited nearly five and a half hours before waking him and informing him of the dogfight. Reagan reacted to the “scandal” with his characteristic good humor: “There was no decision to be made or they would have . . . awakened me. . . . If our planes were shot down, yes, they’d wake me up right away; if the other fellow’s [planes] were shot down, why wake me up?”114 Besides, he quipped, “4:30 in the morning, California time, is as early as I want to be awakened.”115
Libyan and International Reaction
The Libyans reacted to the incident with disinformation and venomous rhetoric. The Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency reported that the LAAF had combated eight F-14s and shot down one. A few thousand demonstrators took to the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi to shout anti-American slogans, but they seemed to be chanting from rote and lacked conviction.116 At a rally in Aden Qaddafi charged that the United States threatened peace by “persisting in its provocations and terror.”117 A few days later in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, Qaddafi accused the United States of “wanton provocation, an act of international terrorism, brigandage and brinksmanship.”118 He called on the Arab world to “declare a state of mobilization to face imperialist-Zionist and reactionary challenges,” and he boasted that his country was “ready to defend the Gulf of Sidra even if it means a third world war.”119 “We are ready to die for the Gulf of Sidra,” Qaddafi told a crowd celebrating the twelfth anniversary of the Libyan revolution. “We will make the Gulf of Sidra into a new Red Sea with our blood.”120
The PLO and a number of radical Arab states such as Syria, South Yemen, and Algeria denounced the United States and expressed support for Libya. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, whom Qaddafi condemned for being too moderate in the struggle against Israel, called the incident “the beginning of a new phase in the conspiracy against Libya and the Arab nation.”121 In an illusory showing of Arab unity, several moderate Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Tunisia and the controlled media in their countries charged the United States with aggression against a fellow Arab nation.122 The secretary general of the League of Arab States, Chadli Klibi of Tunisia, called the air battle “a violation of the peace and security” of the entire Arab world and stated that the incident “can only increase tension in the Middle East.”123 Privately many moderate Arab leaders praised the American action. After Reagan briefed Sadat on the upcoming exercise during the latter’s visit to Washington in early August, the Egyptian leader exclaimed, “Magnificent!”124 Sadat was undoubtedly delighted by the results of the air battle over the Gulf of Sidra.
Moscow offered perfunctory condemnation of the incident,125 declaring that the Sixth Fleet’s “piratical action had caused a storm of indignation around the world.”126 The planners in Washington had been right in their prediction: the Soviets did not come to the assistance of Qaddafi. The incident demonstrated the paradox of Moscow’s relationship with Libya. The Soviets were willing to demonstrate a degree of support for an Arab leader who shared many of their interests, especially in the Middle East, and who purchased huge quantities of their weapons, but they could not champion many of Qaddafi’s extreme policies and declarations. The Soviets took no further action on behalf of Qaddafi because they did not support his claim to the Gulf of Sidra.
Among America’s allies only Israel lent unabashed support to the United States. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the U.S. action “an act of self-defense—just like our raids on the Iraqi nuclear plant and on the PLO headquarters in Beirut.”127 In Western Europe the reaction to the incident was mixed. Governments and the press generally supported the United States for acting in self-defense in international waters but expressed some concern that the United States may have provoked the incident. One unlikely source welcomed the American show of force. In an editorial the left-leaning French newspaper Le Monde stated: “Restoring the power of the United States . . . is above all a question of showing that the country will not hesitate to act whenever it is challenged. The hesitations and the scruples of a Jimmy Carter thus are relegated to the antique shop.” The Spanish newspaper Dario 16, however, best expressed the conflicting feelings held by many Europeans: “While Carter’s excessive weakness was a threat to Western stability, the whole world now feels insecure after Reagan’s show of force.”128
The prospect of Libyan retribution against American citizens and interests in Libya was relieved one day after the incident when senior officials from the Libyan ministries