his behavior regarding terrorism, but none would directly assail his regime. Furthermore, many of the elements were to be carried out only after careful consultation with America’s allies in Europe and the Middle East. On the other hand, although the political appointees compromised on specific details of the strategy, they nevertheless achieved their objective of altering U.S. policy toward Qaddafi. Henceforth the Reagan administration regarded Qaddafi as an enemy of the United States.61
Planning the Gulf of Sidra Operation
At the Pentagon the planning for the FON exercise in the Gulf of Sidra made steady progress. Ostensibly the purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the right of the United States to navigate the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra and to train Sixth Fleet ships and aircrews in the employment of modern guided missiles. The real intent, however, was to make a powerful impression on Qaddafi with a tremendous demonstration of U.S. military power.
In light of Libya’s track record of attacking U.S. aircraft in international airspace, Pentagon officials were gravely concerned about the risks associated with a major naval exercise inside the gulf. Coincidentally, the exercise was the first test of a new set of naval rules of engagement (ROE), formally titled the Worldwide Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Sea Borne Forces. The new ROE were the product of a thorough review of the existing ROE as ordered by Admiral Hayward in 1979.62 Navy regulations already gave on-scene commanders the authority “to counter either the use of force or an immediate threat of the use of force” with military action.63 The new ROE were appropriately nicknamed the “Reagan ROE” in military circles.64 They described in uncomplicated language the circumstances under which a commander could take appropriate action without approval from higher authority to defend his ships, aircraft, and personnel against an opposing force committing a hostile act, demonstrating an imminent use of force, or exhibiting a continuing threat to use force.65
While the Pentagon was finalizing the exercise plan a multiagency national security working group was studying Qaddafi’s likely reaction to a large-scale naval exercise in Libyan-claimed waters. The participants concluded that the chance of Libyan reaction was low for a number of reasons. First, Qaddafi understood that ordering a major attack on the battle force would be tantamount to sending his air force and navy on a suicide mission. Second, the Soviets would not come to Qaddafi’s assistance in defending a territorial claim that they did not recognize.66 Earlier in the year, during a conversation with Haig, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, made it clear that “Libya was an American problem.”67 Administration officials quickly determined that the Soviets did not think Qaddafi was worth the risk of fomenting a major confrontation with the United States. Finally, it was presumed that Libya would not harm Americans living in the country because of their crucial role in Libya’s oil industry. In July the NSC reviewed the exercise plan and recommended its approval. The plan was forwarded to Reagan, who on 1 August gave the Pentagon the official go-ahead.68
The exercise plan contained several operational contingencies for dealing with escalating levels of Libyan aggression. Aside from action taken in self-defense, any military response under this program of graduated measures required Reagan’s approval. Although the new ROE gave a great deal of discretion to the on-scene commander, a number of senior Pentagon officers accustomed to seeking permission first and shooting later still sought assurance from the White House that the new ROE were genuine.
At a cabinet meeting in early August Reagan received a thorough briefing on the details of the FON exercise, which carried the innocuous name Open Ocean Missile Exercise (OOMEX). Each year the Navy conducted several OOMEXs to maintain the efficiency of missile-firing ships and fighter squadrons. This particular missile exercise was to be performed in conjunction with the high-profile naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, and it incorporated the new ROE. According to the ROE the carrier-based fighters were to intercept all approaching aircraft and escort them until they were clear of the exercise area, opening fire only if fired upon first (a significant change from the ROE that had been in effect during the Carter administration). Under former rules American pilots were required to request permission from the task force commander before firing back. Furthermore, according to the old ROE a pilot had to hold fire if the enemy pilot disengaged and returned to his base.69 At the meeting Reagan made it absolutely clear that his naval forces had the authority to take appropriate action to protect themselves. “Any time we send an American anywhere in the world where he or she can be shot at, they have the right to shoot back,” he said. Enemy fighters would no longer get free shots at American aircraft. When asked by a cabinet officer how far a U.S. pilot could go in pursuit of Libyan planes that had fired on him, Reagan responded: “All the way into the hangar.”70 The individuals present at the briefing were satisfied that the new ROE were genuine and that Reagan would support any member of his armed forces who exercised self-defense against an adversary committing or threatening to commit a hostile act.
As a further precaution the JCS ordered Rear Adm. James E. Service—a veteran attack pilot who served concurrently as commander of Carrier Group Two, as commander of Battle Force Sixth Fleet (also known as Task Force 60), and as the officer in tactical command (OTC) of the upcoming exercise—to Washington for discussions on the operational details of the exercise and the circumstances under which his task force, particularly his aircrews, could engage a hostile military force. On 12 and 14 August the U.S. government issued a notice to airmen and mariners that announced that live missile firings would be conducted in a 3,200-square-mile hexagonal area of the Mediterranean on 18 and 19 August. The exercise area included a section of the disputed waters south of 32° 30’.71
Not surprisingly, the Libyan government protested the planned exercise, calling it a violation of Libya’s territorial waters and airspace. In addition, one Libyan official accused the United States of coordinating the movement of the Sixth Fleet with Egyptian military forces that were conducting maneuvers near the Egyptian-Libyan frontier.72 Newsweek, in the issue that arrived at newsstands on 17 August, substantiated this accusation when it reported that “Washington officials are . . . eager to see how Qaddafi will react to what they insist is a coincidence: Egyptian troops will conduct maneuvers along the Libyan border at the same time.” Two days before OOMEX started Egypt canceled its plans for a military exercise near the Libyan border, fearing that if its maneuvers took place at the same time as the Sixth Fleet exercise Qaddafi might conclude that he was under a two-pronged attack and respond irrationally.73
The Open Ocean Missile Exercise
For the two-day surface and air exercise Rear Admiral Service commanded a large battle force consisting of the carriers Nimitz (CVN 68) and Forrestal (CV 59); Carrier Air Wings (CVW) 8 and 17 based on the Nimitz and the Forrestal, respectively; and thirteen escort and support ships.74 The planned highlight of OOMEX was the destruction of target drones by Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles fired from fighter aircraft and Standard surface-to-air missiles launched by the nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers Texas (CGN 39) and Mississippi (CGN 40). In addition to carrying out the missile exercise and the FON operation Admiral Service was fully prepared to intercept and escort all Libyan aircraft and naval vessels that approached the exercise area and, if necessary, to perform armed defense of the battle force.
With his carriers in position north of 32° 30’ Service commenced OOMEX in the early hours of 18 August. Several F-14 Tomcats from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz and F-4J Phantom IIs from the Forrestal catapulted into the morning sky and established a barrier of seven combat air patrol (CAP) stations between Libya and the battle force. The two Tomcat squadrons based on the Nimitz were the “Black Aces” of Fighter Squadron (VF) 41 and the “Jolly Rogers” of VF-84. The “Bedevilers” of VF-74 and the “Fighting Silver Eagles” of Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron (VMFA) 115 flew Phantoms off the Forrestal Pairs of F-14s filled four stations; pairs of F-4Js filled the other three. One Tomcat CAP station was located below 32° 30’. All of the U.S.
