with the approved strategy for 1943 and 1944” and not just be done for their own sake (a reference, perhaps, to Dieppe) and that “a plan for moving an Army into Europe in the event of serious deterioration in German morale should be prepared in outline.”24
In the memorandum the planners also proposed consideration of an alternative to the existing ROUNDUP plan. Noting that the capture of the Pas-de-Calais might be a “very hazardous operation,” the planners proposed the capture of Le Havre, Rouen, and Cherbourg at the earliest opportunity. If German forces in the Pas-de-Calais could be contained by a series of major raids, then a “land and sea attack on the Cotentin [Cherbourg] Peninsula (could be) increased in strength.” They went on to state that while prior planning had been based on the idea of simultaneous assaults over a wide front, consideration should be given to launching a series of assaults, “timed and directed to take advantage of the then existing circumstances, and supported in each case by a maximum possible concentration of air and naval effort…. We might hope to deceive the enemy as to whether he was still faced with major raids, or feints or with our main effort.”25
The concepts in these memos were put forward as a basis for operations in 1944. The Combined Planners then asked the COS if they agreed in principle with the concepts and if they wished the planners to begin a detailed study of the proposed alternatives.
In broad terms, these ideas were not far off from Churchill’s vision of what a cross-Channel attack might look like. In his note to the British COS regarding Operation IMPERATOR, Churchill noted that “if this were one of a dozen simultaneous operations of a similar kind, very different arguments would hold” versus those against the operation in question.26 His vision in June 1942 was of “at least six heavy disembarkations at various points along the north and west coast of Europe, from Denmark and Holland down the Pas de Calais [‘where a major air battle will be fought’] to Brest and Bordeaux. He also advocated ‘at least a half a dozen feints’ to mystify the enemy. These armoured landings would be followed by a second wave of heavier attacks at four or five strategic points, with the hope that three might be successful.”27 He envisioned a third wave once a port had been captured and opened.
There was, of course, no calculation of resources needed or resources available, nor any particular target date for the operation, nor any force commanders to lead beyond the roles to be played by the Combined Commanders.
The Combined Planners suffered from being a British, as opposed to an Allied, group. While it was true that there was ongoing, informal collaboration between Barker’s group at ETOUSA and the planners, they reported to the Combined Commanders, who then reported to the British COS. The blunt-speaking Hughes-Hallett (who was called Hughes-Hitler behind his back28) said of the planners, “I could not take the work very seriously. The combined staffs of the Combined Commanders were so large that when they had plenary meetings it resembled a meeting of Parliament itself—with no equivalent of Mr. Speaker to enforce rules of order.”29
The questions the planners had were not being answered. The projects were beginning to feel like exercises that were never to be executed. In addition to the fighting in North Africa, initial plans for attacks on either Sardinia or Sicily were being considered, which left few resources for the planners to use for any cross-Channel operation. It seemed that the Allies were going to stay in the Mediterranean for a long time.
At the end of October 1942 the COS accepted a memorandum from the Joint Planners, which was a statement of the British military’s strategic outlook. Among the analyses was the following:
Despite the fact that a large-scale invasion of Europe would do more than anything to help Russia we are forced to the conclusion that we have no option but to undermine Germany’s military power by the destruction of the German industrial and economic war machine before we attempt invasion. For this process, apart from the impact of Russian land forces, the heavy bomber will be the main weapon, backed up by the most vigorous blockade and operations calculated to stretch the enemy forces to the greatest possible extent….
Even when the foundations of Germany’s military power have been thoroughly shaken, it is probable that she will be able to maintain a crust of resistance in Western Europe. We must have the power to break through this crust when the time comes. We must therefore continue to build up Anglo-American forces in the European Theatre in order that we may be able to re-enter the Continent at the psychological moment.30
As for amphibious operations against France, the paper suggested more “Dieppe”-type raids (obviously with better outcomes) as well as large raids of longer duration against high-value targets and smaller commando raids.
Operation SKYSCRAPER
According to Barker, now a brigadier general, he and the other U.S. and British planners grew increasingly frustrated throughout the fall of 1942. In December a British major general, John “Sinbad” Sinclair, an officer in the Royal Horse Artillery who had started out in the Royal Navy, joined the planners. Sinclair and Barker finally got down to what Barker felt was constructive planning.31
On New Year’s Day 1943 Barker and Sinclair agreed that they had accumulated large amounts of data, information, intelligence, and tentative plans, and they felt it was necessary to “produce something that would bring it all to a head and come up with a definite conclusion and a definite recommendation.”32 What they produced on their own initiative became known as Operation SKYSCRAPER.
SKYSCRAPER, an outline plan submitted to the Combined Commanders on 18 March 1943, was an impressive document and unambiguous about its purpose. The first sentence reads, “The object of this paper is to obtain decisions on certain major points which must govern not only the planning for a return to the Continent against opposition, but more particularly the organization, equipment and training of the Army in the United Kingdom during 1943.”33 Barker and Sinclair note that the plan had not been approved by the Combined Commanders nor had all the details been worked out. That is, they acknowledged that it was their idea to create the document and send it up the chain of command, and it was not the result of a directive to generate another study.
They go on to make the point that “it is generally agreed that the original ‘ROUNDUP’ plan is not a feasible one and some other basis is therefore necessary.” Unlike earlier plans, Barker and Sinclair proposed a landing concentrated on the beaches in front of Caen in Normandy as well as landings on the Cherbourg Peninsula. Starting with the premise of a landing against determined resistance, not a weakened or demoralized enemy, they estimated the initial assault force at ten divisions afloat and up to four or five airborne divisions, plus commandos, engineers, and other special troops. They also estimated the numbers of all the specialized landing craft that would be needed.
While their scenario involved three distinct phases from initial landings to the capture of Antwerp, the key message to the Commanders and the COS comes toward the end of the summary. First there is an acknowledgement of the size of the force contemplated or the “bill” for the operation. They acknowledged that the bill “is a large one, and obviously not to be accepted lightly.” They go on to state, “A warning must, moreover, be sounded with regard to the degree of opposition which could be overcome if the ‘bill’ is met, and the resources provided. The ‘bill’ is for THE MINIMUM RESOURCES LIKELY TO PROMISE SUCCESS AGAINST APPRECIABLE RESISTANCE…. The margin between success and failure would be very narrow.”34 Because they were not presenting a plan to deal with weakened German forces on the brink of collapse, the margin would always be narrow for troops fighting their way ashore from the Narrow Sea.
The most remarkable part of the plan comes at the end of the summary, when Barker and Sinclair demand that the COS make a clear and unequivocal choice:
An invasion of the Continent in the face of German opposition is such a specialized problem
