having to report to the CCS, but through the British COS. His life now changed from that “of a simple British soldier to that of the international half-world wherein there is no simplicity. It had been one thing to serve as a British commander under foreign orders. It was quite another to owe primary allegiance, as [he] now had to, to an allied committee.”13
An early example of this allegiance was demonstrated when he received a memo from the British War Cabinet that sketched out an idea about applying “the whole united strength of Britain and the United States to the Mediterranean” and that asked Morgan to respond with the advantages of a northwestern European strategy compared with the Mediterranean. He understood that this represented just a late-night conjecture of the prime minister, but he was nonetheless obliged to answer. As COSSAC was an Allied staff, neither American nor British, he also felt obliged to share the memo with Barker, who in turn felt obliged to share the memo with ETOUSA. The net result, after everyone calmed down, was that it became clear that if “there should be anything that the British authorities deemed unnecessary for the American authorities to hear about, then they must not send it to COSSAC.”14
To be fair, there was at least one occasion when Americans in Washington, talking over a secure line to compatriots in London, exhorted their colleagues: “Don’t tell the British for God’s sake.” Which provoked laughter from the London end of the line as “every word had been keenly listened to by two British generals and one British admiral.”15 For Morgan, building trust among COSSAC’s staff as well as a strong sense of unit identity were among the highest priorities. In today’s parlance, it was clear from the very beginning that they “had each other’s backs.”
By the time of the first weekly staff meeting on 17 April, Morgan had gathered enough officers to fill in the top levels of the organization. It helped that he reduced the Combined Commanders’ planning structure from twenty-nine sections down to four, plus an administrative section.16
COSSAC was initially formed with an operations planning branch, with army, navy, and air force sections; an intelligence branch; and a logistics (administration, in British Army usage) branch. Major General West was the operations branch head. There were American and British components to each section, each headed by a principal staff officer or deputy chief of staff. For the British Army, that was McLean. The three components of the planning branch (army, navy, air force) were also split into three sections: one for broad concepts, one for cover plans, and one for detailed tactical planning, each with about four officers. There was a parallel American structure. The exception was the intelligence section, which was headed by a British Army officer and provided reports and analyses to all the operations sections. In addition, a central secretariat was established that served all the branches as well as Morgan.17
This arrangement quickly proved unwieldy, and modifications occurred along the way. By November Barker, in consultation with Morgan, completed the reorganization into an operational staff with the structure completely integrated, the principal staff officer of each section being either British, American, or Canadian on merit, without regard to national identities. As Barker wrote at the time, “In contemplation of the transformation of this staff from a planning to an operational headquarters, any division along national lines should be abolished.”18
Later, sections for civil affairs, press relations, and coordination with governments-in-exile (which was established after the Quebec conference) were created, among others. (On 6 June 1944 the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force [SHAEF], building on COSSAC’s foundations, had expanded to include the following sections: G1, G2, G3, G4, G5 [civil affairs], psychological warfare division, public relations division, signals division, engineers division, adjutant general, medical division, air defense division, political officers as well as naval and air staffs and a European Allied contact section.19)
In general, U.S. officers serving in all the sections and RAF officers seemed to rotate through more often than did British Army officers, with the Royal Navy having periods of stability. The shortest tour of duty was that of then rear admiral Sir Philip Vian, RN, who was present for the first COSSAC meeting and back in an operational command the next week, replacing a commander who died in an air accident. One of the most effective combat officers in the Royal Navy, Vian later became the Eastern Task Force Commander for OVERLORD.
He was replaced by John Hughes-Hallett, who retained command of a small amphibious assault force named Force J, located aboard HMS Vectis—the converted Royal Yacht Squadron facility on the Isle of Wight—while also being Admiral Little’s representative at COSSAC. Morgan noted that Hughes-Hallett, among his other credits, was well known for his motorcycling achievements on the London to Portsmouth road. Barker considered him to be excellent, combat experienced, and “intensely practical.”20 McLean, the practical Scot, thought Hughes-Hallett to be “obstinate and determined. An exceedingly capable man who succeeded in getting everybody’s back up.”21 Another writer with knowledge of combined operations described Hughes-Hallett as someone “whose respect for entrenched rank when it was wrong was not conspicuous.”22 The discussions between McLean and Hughes-Hallett must have been interesting. Hughes-Hallett stayed at COSSAC for the critical initial planning period, being replaced by Rear Adm. George Creasy, RN, in the fall of 1943.
Hughes-Hallett gave an evaluation of the naval planners he encountered in Norfolk House in April 1943: “There was no officer with the authority, or indeed the knowledge and experience, to make even a provisional decision on where the landings should be made or how they should be followed up…. They had become rather cynical and had ceased to believe in the reality of their work.”23 This cynicism could be found among many of the COSSAC planners as they started working with their new commander.
It was this serious morale problem that Morgan addressed head on in his first address to COSSAC staff in mid-April. He gathered everyone, including the cooks, on the ground floor of Norfolk House to let them know what was going on.
Until recently, of course, the initiative remained in the enemy’s hands. I think that we can now say that recently the initiative passed to us, although it must be confessed that hitherto there have not been many signs of our knowing exactly what to do with it now that we have it….
About a year ago it became possible to regard the invasion of Europe as a practical proposition, and attempts were made to define the problem in terms that really meant something. These were not entirely successful, and then, while they were still under discussion, came a sudden change of policy that brought about the campaign in North Africa that is now drawing to a successful conclusion in its first phase.
… I need not go into too much detail with regard to the many vicissitudes that have overtaken this planning. A large number of very able people have done an immense amount of work and have at least produced what is going to be very useful to us, an immense amount of invaluable data bearing on the job in hand. They have produced no plan worthy of the name, but that, I should like you to understand clearly, was no fault of theirs; it was simply because they lacked direction from above.
… I want to make clear that, although the primary object of COSSAC is to make plans, I am certain that it is wrong to refer to it in any way as a “planning staff.” The term “planning staff” has come to have a most sinister meaning—it implies the production of nothing but paper. That (which) we must contrive to do somehow is to produce not only paper; but ACTION!24
Morgan then reemphasized that they were not a planning staff but the beginnings of an operational staff serving as the vanguard for a powerful army being gathered in the United States, which would join with British, Canadian, and American forces already in Britain. Their mission was not to plan another raid or just to cross the Channel. His job was “to plan nothing less than the re-conquest of Europe.”25
He accepted that the planners were frustrated, but time was short,
