careful preparation over a long period…. The decision as to whether or not we prepare the Army specifically for this purpose cannot be deferred…. The rock bottom of it all is, however, this: knowing the very great difficulties in provision of resources, for what are we to plan and prepare?
If we are to plan and prepare for the invasion of Western Europe against opposition it must be on the understanding that the resources considered necessary are fully realized and that it is the intention to provide them. Given that knowledge, we can go ahead on a reasonably firm basis.
If, on the other hand, it is clear that such resources can in no circumstances be provided, then it would seem wise to accept at once that invasion against opposition cannot be contemplated….
In conclusion, a decision on the points raised … is a matter of urgency as a basis for planning and preparation. As already pointed out, to defer the decision is to decide not to be ready.35
Paget sent the plan to the COS, who did not respond directly, although they noted that some of the assumptions regarding the scale of German resistance were vague. With the dramatic changes in circumstances that were occurring across the broad European Theater in 1943 (which are addressed in chapter 7), it could hardly have been otherwise. Paget believed that the COS were “unfavourable to the plan because of the huge bill for resources.”36 SKYSCRAPER did, however, make up a significant part of the stack of papers that Ismay gave Morgan to read before presenting to the COS. Morgan, having read SKYSCRAPER and the other material, made a recommendation in mid-March that clearly convinced the august body of senior officers that he was the person for the job. What exactly did he say?
While he made no attempt to delve into strategy or tactics, Morgan argued that it was necessary for the staff to be a completely joint and combined British-American effort in every detail from the very beginning. It needed to be slotted into the existing chain of command but be independent enough to seamlessly become an operational headquarters when the time came. More importantly, Morgan stressed that the prior habit of separating planning from execution could not continue. It would be necessary “for all concerned to throw their hearts over the jump and make up their minds there and then that the campaign had already begun, that there should be no question of producing just another plan to be a basis for future argument.”37
In the absence of a supreme commander, all that the commander would need must be provided for: forces, a supply system, command and control systems, and, most importantly, “a plan of action both basically sound and yet sufficiently elastic to admit of variation as might be necessitated by developing circumstances.”38 This was a somewhat elaborate way of saying that the plan needed to be good enough to be approved but capable of modification by the commanders as needed without disruption to the basic concept. Morgan also recommended that the senior planners hold the rank of major general and not brigadier as they would have to interact on a daily basis with the War Office and other ministries. To get those ministries to respond, it would be necessary to have sufficient rank to gain and keep their attention.
Morgan had trained troops for amphibious assaults and had planned amphibious operations. As commander of 1st Corps, he was known to Mountbatten and Combined Operations. He had also successfully, if briefly, worked with American forces, and that was not a universal accomplishment. At the time it was widely believed that the supreme commander would be British, with an American deputy, and so it made sense for the chief of staff to be British as well. All of this led to the British COS agreeing on 1 April that Morgan was the man for the job, however the job was going to be defined.39
Notwithstanding Morgan’s impression of the COS’ reaction to his recommendations and Mountbatten’s congratulations, his appointment to head this new planning staff did not come at once. It took about a month to work out details of Morgan’s appointment and for the CCS to issue the directive to him that outlined his responsibilities. Formally issued on 26 April, it was made available to Morgan in draft form in advance, and the British COS authorized him to act on the assumption that approval of his appointment would occur. The key elements of the directive read:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to appoint, in due course, a Supreme Commander over all United Nations forces for the invasion of the Continent of Europe from the United Kingdom.
Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander or his deputy, you will be responsible for carrying out the above planning duties…. You will report directly to the British Chiefs of Staff….
You will accordingly prepare plans for:
(a) An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning down the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and U.S. Eighth Air Force.
(b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.
(c) A full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.40
Morgan asked for clarification regarding the last point, feeling that “as early as possible” was not particularly precise from a planning standpoint. His question went up to the CCS, and their answer—1 May 1944—came back in mid-May, after being discussed at the next interallied conference in Washington, D.C. (TRIDENT).
At the Washington conference, the basic Casablanca priorities were restated. Under “Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept,” there was listed, in conjunction with the use of the heavy bomber weapon in what was named the Combined Bomber Offensive, the resolution “that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with a target date of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.”41 This was far short of being an ironclad commitment to a cross-Channel assault. It was still just one available option of many, but it did allow Morgan to move forward.
The Combined Chiefs noted in their response to Morgan that his report was to be considered at the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in mid-August. Working backward from that date, the CCS would need to have the outline plan for both the cross-Channel assault and the “return to the Continent in case of German disintegration” by 1 August to allow time for them to consider the recommendations. Following from that, the due date to the British COS would be 15 July—Morgan reported to the Combined Chiefs who had authorized the staff, but through the British COS, his immediate superiors, who therefore had a right of first veto on any proposal.
While waiting for the official directive formally appointing him, Morgan knew he had the choice of either waiting for the paperwork to arrive or to “indulge in intense activity guided by common sense and one’s personal predilections.”42 He chose the latter course. He found an unoccupied room in Norfolk House, which was a modern, purpose-built office building, and talked the management into assigning it to him. It happened to be the room where he first met Eisenhower. He also prevailed upon the various organizations located in Norfolk House to provide him with clerical help when needed. At this point his staff consisted of “Bobbie, my aide-de-camp; my motor driver, Corporal Bainbridge, whom together with his car I had frankly stolen from 1st Corps headquarters; and two batmen [personal orderlies].”43 Morgan would readily confess to a weakness for the unconventional, and this new assignment was certainly beginning in a most unconventional way.
Morgan was summoned to a lunch at Chequers on 4 April so that Churchill could take the measure of the man. The prime minister showed his guests the film Desert Victory and insisted that this demonstrated the way to defeat the Germans. Morgan demurred, noting that while war in the African desert and war in northwest Europe
