combined with the requirements to win the war, encouraged pragmatic thinking and improvisation on the part of the field commanders and troops.
While some of the military leadership in the American forces did serve in the American Civil War and the Indian Wars, the military operations during the Spanish-American War were more or less alien to anything they had experienced before. In addition, the lesson learned from the American Civil War was that the conduct of war was changing and that war was becoming increasingly industrialized and dominated by technology. Jared Diamond explains in his book Guns, Germs, and Steel, “Technology’s history exemplifies what is termed an autocatalytic process: that is, one that speeds up at a rate that increases with time, because the process catalyzes itself … that new technologies and materials make it possible to generate still other new technologies by recombination.”82 The technological development and employment from Diamond’s study was best understood by examining how the older military commanders used their American Civil War experience with the rifle and cannon against the Spanish. In addition, technological improvements in steamships, telegraphs, railroads, smokeless gunpowder, and increasingly powerful artillery made it clear that the complexity and operation of these tools of war required specific training, discipline, and specialization in order for the American military to succeed.
In the case of amphibious warfare, not much had changed in its applications throughout military history. In fact, it continued to stagnate and was really still an ad hoc operation that depended on luck and leadership for its success. Even during the Spanish-American War, amphibious warfare was conducted much as it had been forty years earlier during the American Civil War. Despite the United States’ significant industrial advantages over Spain, military practical experience and knowledge in such operations had atrophied, especially when the missions of both the Army and Navy went their separate ways. The lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy became apparent during the planning and execution of landing American ground forces on Cuba. According to Alfred T. Mahan, the movement of American ground forces from Tampa to Cuba was essential to the war’s success, but required the U.S. Navy to peel away ships from the blockade as well as assemble the numerous small vessels needed to check the possible harmful activity of the Spanish gunboats along the northern coast and, afterward, at Santiago.83
The debarkation of Fifth Army Corps, under General William R. Shafter, in the vicinity of Daiquiri and Siboney near the Cuban capital of Santiago, was a lesson in patience. The Quartermaster’s Department in 1898 was still not ready for war and required more time. It had to find the landing craft necessary to land the men, guns, and supplies on the enemy beaches. In addition, both the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy did not have any specialized boats for amphibious warfare, which were an essential ingredient in ship-to-shore movements to projecting military power ashore. To compensate for the lack of amphibious boats, the American military had to improvise by making use of the lifeboats and borrowed Navy steam launches. Meanwhile, for the disembarkation, the Quartermaster’s Department had to employ steam lighters from American harbors to supplement the expeditionary force.84
Unfortunately, this meant that the landing locations selected in Cuba did not have the port facilities to accommodate the efficient debarkation of the troops, nor did it have the ability to offload and organize weapons, equipment, and supplies for the expeditionary force. In addition, the loading plan for the troop transports was a haphazard effort in which men, equipment, supplies, and horses were thrown together in the rush to get American ground forces to Cuba. Unfortunately, not much thought was put into how the landing force would debark onto Cuba, therefore setting conditions for a confused, disorganized amphibious landing.
The friction and slowness of Fifth Corps’ debarkation put the entire American expeditionary force in a vulnerable position. The inability for American forces to land quickly along Cuba’s southern coast was the result of several factors—the choppy conditions on the ocean, the difficulty of men dropping into boats, and the distraction of the huge guns from American warships providing uncoordinated naval gunfire support. To make matters worse, the unloading of follow-on men, supplies, and artillery simply could not happen because the docks and harbor facilities of Daiquiri were ruined by the storm. Therefore, the American expeditionary force once again adapted to the situation by men and horses jumping into the water and swimming ashore while lifeboats and steam tugs were used to ferry supplies and artillery. Unfortunately, most of the supplies and artillery still remained in the American fleet because there was no way for most of the ships to empty their holds without cranes and winches.85
The troop transports in these operations were contracted from commercial companies, and to make matters worse, the vessels were not designed for billeting troops and conducting amphibious landings. In General Order Number 13 in 1885 released by Rear Admiral James E. Jouett of the U.S. Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station in 1885, he laid out in exact detail how amphibious assaults were to be organized and executed when the landing force began operations from sea to shore:
Land on a beach for ordinary drill or parade, [while] boats will pull in to the beach in line abreast, with intervals of one boats’ length between the boats, and all the men and howitzers will be landed at once. If all must land at one point, “column” will be formed, and the crews will be landed in succession. After landing, the formation will take place at once. The battalion will be quickly established in the desired direction, and the other battalions will be formed on the same line. The intervals between battalions will be six yards. The marine battalion forms on the right, the infantry battalion of seamen on the left of the marines, and the artillery battalion on the extreme left. The order of arrangement of the companies and field pieces from the different battalions will be the same as given for boats; and each company and howitzer crew will upon landing be nearly opposite its place in line.86
While the ships did have life vessels to facilitate the movement of men and supplies ashore, there were simply not enough of them. Men and officers were so impatient with the debarkation process that many jumped into the water to swim ashore, and later they found even the lifeboats could not handle moving horses ashore, which led to the crew having the horses jump into the water so they could swim ashore. Unfortunately, some of the horses became confused when they were pushed into the water and instead swam out into the open ocean where they soon drowned. Due to these complications, not enough horses were left to maintain an effective cavalry unit, and many cavalrymen became infantry for the fighting ahead. In addition, without horses, the careful use of the expeditionary force’s manpower became a concern for the unloading and stockpiling of supplies and equipment for the campaign ahead. According to Richard Harding Davis, disembarkment was a marvelous thing in which thousands of men finally made it ashore, but were prevented from engaging the enemy because three weeks had to be spent unloading their packs, arms, ammunition, and supplies. Instead of the landing force securing the beach and making its way quickly into the interior as originally planned, the Americans became bogged down because of supply and logistical issues while the Spanish had time to prepare for the upcoming American assault.87
Not surprisingly, the plan to seize Santiago in a coup de main was lost when the Spanish colonial forces realized the presence of American ground forces. The Spanish forces under the command of General Antero Rubin took up defensive positions at Las Guasimas and ambushed the American forces as they pushed west toward Santiago.88 Edmund Morris observes that the campaign to capture Santiago was not accomplished without considerable further bloodshed since the city proper was stiffly fortified, with five thousand troops and a seemingly inexhaustible stock of ammunition. In addition, wounds, malarial fever, and dysentery incapacitated or killed more and more men. It took less than forty-eight hours before the expeditionary force was desperate for personnel and supplies.89 During this time, the American ground forces were also hampered by Spanish colonial forces that were very familiar with the jungles of Cuba. Fighting a rearguard action, General Antero Rubin’s forces slowed down the American advance with snipers as well as hit-and-run attacks using the local vegetation and terrain to their advantage. The Spanish colonial forces’ use of smokeless gunpowder made it difficult for the Americans to locate and close with the enemy. This gave the Spanish an edge in the bitter
